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 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
From 1994, the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) undertook a 
number of cooperative regional military projects with the support of numerous 
Western countries.  In particular, the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) 
was an example of efficient Western defence cooperation to generate outcomes 
in order to achieve military and political goals.  BALTBAT became the template 
for other Baltic programmes: the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic 
Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College 
(BALTDEFCOL).     
 
This thesis analysed the Baltic programmes, particularly BALTBAT, as a case 
study for identifying the elements of a model for effective military assistance 
projects.  The focus was on the broad political decisions agreed upon by the 
donor and recipient states, such as the selection of development of 
peacekeeping capabilities, as the basis for military assistance, which provided 
the foundation for these initiatives.   
 
The value of the Baltic programmes as a case study and basis for identifying 
the elements of a model was enhanced by the fact that they succeeded at a 
delicate time in a sensitive region.  The Baltic states had virtually no military 
forces upon regaining independence.  Russia objected to Baltic state 
membership in NATO and was sensitive about a build-up of military capabilities 
close to Russian borders.  In spite of these obstacles, the Baltic projects 
achieved outcomes which supported the military and political goals of the donor 
and recipient states.  
 
Analysis of the Baltic projects highlighted the importance of broad political 
decisions between donor and recipient states for military assistance initiatives.  
It also indicated the major factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) resulting 
from those decisions which were important to the outcomes from these 
programmes.  These Mechanisms comprise the elements of a model which 
could be of value to academics and practitioners working in the area of military 
assistance. 
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15 February:  Baltic Defence Ministers signed agreement to form a joint 
peacekeeping battalion. 
 
18 March: Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) Steering Group formally 
established during a meeting in Copenhagen. 
 
25-29 April: United Kingdom (UK) and Nordic "briefing and fact finding team" 
visit to Baltic states to investigate nature of support needed to BALTBAT. 
 
2-3 June: Nordic-Baltic Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning co-
operation on the formation of BALTBAT signed in Visby. 
 
8 August: Baltic participation in UN courses began. 
 
31 August: Russia completed withdrawal of forces from Latvia and Estonia. 
 
 xxii 
11 September: MOU on Cooperation on formation of BALTBAT signed between 
Defence Ministers of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Sweden and the UK.   
 
1996 
 
8-18 July: BALTBAT participated in BALTIC CHALLENGE 96 exercise. 
 
7 October: Staggered deployment of Latvian company to International Force 
(IFOR)/Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia with Swedish forces.   
 
8 October: Lithuanian company deployed with Danish forces to IFOR/SFOR in 
Bosnia.  
 
12 October:  Baltic Defence Ministers issued "Declaration of Intent" to continue 
BALTBAT project after 1997. 
 
1 December: Estonian company deployed to United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) with Norwegian forces. 
 
1997 
 
10 April: Lithuanian company returned from IFOR/SFOR deployment in Bosnia. 
 
18 April: Latvian company returned from IFOR/SFOR deployment in Bosnia. 
 
9 June: Estonian company returned from UNIFIL deployment in Lebanon. 
 
12-17 July: BALTBAT participated in Field Training Exercise BALTIC 
CHALLENGE 97. 
 
1998 
 
12 June: Memorandum of Support for the Baltic Defence College 
(BALTDEFCOL) is signed. 
 
31 July: Military Working Group (MWG) report issued on "what it would take" to 
deploy BALTBAT to UNIFIL. 
 
12 August: Baltic Defence Ministers formally decided not to proceed with a 
possible deployment of BALTBAT to UNIFIL. 
 
28 August: Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) was inaugurated. 
 
20 October: Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian companies began staggered 
deployments to SFOR in Bosnia with Danish Battalion.  Each deployment 
preceded by two months pre-mission training in Denmark. 
 
 xxiii 
 
1999 
 
16 August: First senior staff course at the BALTDEFCOL initiated. 
 
2000 
 
20 March: Estonian Latvian and Lithuanian deployments to SFOR in Bosnia 
ended. 
 
6 June: Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) began operations. 
 
9-20 October: Field Training Exercise BALTIC EAGLE marked completion of 
the BALTBAT transition to an infantry battalion. 
 
2003 
 
26 September: BALTBAT deactivated. 
 
2004 
 
29 March: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became NATO members. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
One issue with which states continue to grapple is how to develop capable 
military forces.  This remains a challenge for military assistance programmes, 
not only for the developing countries trying to establish an effective force, but 
also for developed nations that attempt various types of assistance initiatives to 
help developing countries achieve that goal.  Mott (1999) asserted that:  
 
Over the course of history, governments have devoted vast sums of 
money and incalculable other resources to military assistance as an 
instrument of foreign policy and military strategy.  They have not usually 
had, however, the benefit of anything beyond political insight and the 
pressures of current events as bases for their actions (p. 4).  
 
1.1.1 Increased Importance 
  
If Mott was correct and there is a paucity of concrete theory regarding military 
assistance, such a situation is surprising in light of the increased attention on 
the use of such programmes.  Cottey and Forster (2004) noted that: 
 
Over the last decade, there has been a growing trend, especially 
amongst the Western democracies, towards the use of defence 
ministries and armed forces as means of building cooperative relations 
with other states, and supporting other states in reforming their militaries 
(p. 6).   
 
The authors emphasized that the important change is that such efforts are “now 
being used not only in its longstanding realpolitik role of supporting the armed 
forces and security of allies, but also as a means of pursuing wider foreign and 
security policy goals” (Cottey and Forster, 2004, p. 7). 
 
With a specific focus on the United States (US), Reveron (2010) noted the US 
“has stepped up its security assistance efforts and finds its military forces in 
more countries than ever” adding that “the forces seldom engage in direct 
combat operations, but are training, equipping and mentoring partner countries’ 
militaries” (p. 23).  Reveron (2010) emphasized the policy imperative for such 
action, noting that “national strategies underscore the interdependence of 
security and prioritise building the capabilities of partners as the basis for long-
term security” (p. 48).  As a result, commented Reveron (2010), the US military 
is facing new challenges and “activities are evolving beyond old models of 
military assistance that transferred weapons or occasional military interventions” 
with US military commands incorporating civilians into command structures to 
better address non-warfighting challenges (p. 49).    
 
Supporting Cottey and Forster in general and Reveron in particular, Glantz 
(1998b) concurred on the growing significance of military assistance, stressing 
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“the US military assistance program is an important tool of the nation’s foreign 
policy” and “military assistance is an essential element in the US strategy of 
engagement designed to promote regional peace and stability, which the US 
defines as vital national interests” (p. 1).   
 
1.1.2 Definition and Purpose 
 
It appeared valuable to see what type of contribution could be made to 
academic theory regarding military assistance programmes.  In order to do so, 
the first question to be addressed was what exactly constitutes military 
assistance.  The definition provided by Mott (1999) is straightforward and was 
the definition used for this thesis: “Military assistance involves providing 
equipment, funds, training, or leadership to the military forces of a recipient 
nation” (p. 17).   
 
The second question which arose concerned the purpose of military assistance.  
On that count, Mott (1999) asserted that: 
 
The fundamental objective of military assistance is to strengthen, 
expand, or increase the military capabilities of the recipient country, and 
thereby to achieve whatever other aims are involved.  Well-articulated 
objectives for military assistance involve the specific force development 
to be accomplished by the military assistance – specific levels of 
readiness, combat capabilities, force structures and strengths, weapons 
inventories, or even levels of training and proficiency to be attained in the 
recipient force (p. 17). 
 
1.1.3 Success and Failure 
 
It appeared that despite a large quantity of information gathered over numerous 
military assistance projects, it remains a challenge to efficiently assist nations in 
developing military forces.  With regard to why such results occur, Mott (1999) 
asserted that the fields of political science, economics, military science or 
diplomacy have not: 
 
… produced a coherent theory that provides standards, criteria, models 
or even clear guidance for practitioners or administrators, whether for 
particular issues or the entire concept of providing or accepting military 
assistance.  The absence of any theoretically sound, historically 
demonstrable tenets, any conventional wisdom, or even much rigorous 
analysis forces theoretical critiques to rely on selected examples that 
‘prove’ a point (p. 8). 
 
1.2 Thesis Aims and Research Aims 
 
The aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to the body of knowledge 
regarding military assistance programmes.  In particular, this thesis is an 
attempt to identify elements which could be used as a basis for eventual 
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development through further research of a model for effective military 
assistance initiatives that would be of use to both academics and practitioners 
in the area.  The identification of such elements could assist academics in the 
generation of concrete theory and practitioners in the consideration of practical 
steps that should be taken regarding military assistance projects. 
 
It should also be noted that, in line with the thesis aims, the research aim was to 
analyse one particular set of military assistance initiatives used for one set of 
countries at a particular point in time, and assess the extent to which they have 
the potential to provide general lessons for military assistance programmes.  It 
is noted that for the purposes of this research, there was no distinction between 
“project,” “programme,” and “initiative.”     
 
The projects which were analysed are the various initiatives in the 1990s which 
focused on assisting the three Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) to 
develop modern military forces.  These programmes consisted of the Baltic 
Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), 
the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College 
(BALTDEFCOL).   
 
Particular attention was paid to BALTBAT as it served as the blueprint for the 
other Baltic defence initiatives which were subsequently established.  A number 
of different supporting states participated in the various programmes, with the 
Nordic countries taking a leading role in handling much of the work on these 
projects.   
 
1.2.1 Research Question 
 
The specific research question to be addressed was:  Can the elements to be 
used as the basis for development through further research of a model for 
effective military assistance projects be identified from the experience of the 
Baltic military cooperative programmes, particularly BALTBAT?  An analysis of 
models, modelling and elements for use in generation of a model is provided in 
Section 3.5.9.   
 
1.2.2 Research Objectives 
 
This research put forward the proposition that a number of aspects of the 
establishment and development of the Baltic military projects were worth 
analysing.  There were four distinct objectives for this research.   
 
The first objective was to review the literature regarding the specific issue of 
military assistance programmes.     
 
The second objective was to construct an appropriate research methodology to 
allow for the gathering of primary data regarding the Baltic initiatives which 
could contribute to knowledge in the area of military assistance programmes. 
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The third objective was to analyse that data and identify the elements of a 
model for effective military assistance projects derived from the Baltic 
programmes which could be of value to academics and practitioners working in 
the area.   
 
The fourth objective was to provide recommendations on the potential utility of 
these elements for a model for effective military assistance initiatives, and note 
recommended areas for additional research to fully develop such a model.     
 
1.3 Scope of the Research 
 
An assessment of four separate defence cooperation programmes involving a 
dozen nations would be unwieldy without a decision on the scope of the 
research.  For this thesis, the scope involved analysis of the overarching 
political decisions which provided the foundation for the detailed work on 
initiating, establishing and developing BALTBAT and the other projects.  These 
decisions included issues such as the areas in which BALTBAT would focus its 
attention (peacekeeping capabilities), the pace at which the Baltic countries 
would assume responsibility for the initiatives and the role the Baltic 
programmes would play with regard to larger political (NATO membership) and 
military (development of national defence forces) goals. 
 
It is important to note what was not covered by this study.  The research did not 
address the detailed steps taken to initiate, establish and develop these 
projects.  This topic had been addressed by Brett (2001) and others.  While 
issues such as project management arose as part of the discussion of the Baltic 
initiatives, they did not constitute the focus of attention for this thesis.   
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
The research methodology utilised is described in detail in Chapter Three.  Due 
to the nature of the subject matter, a qualitative approach was selected, as it 
appeared more suitable than a quantitative approach.  One reason for selecting 
this topic was that it is still possible to obtain information from individuals who 
worked on the establishment of the Baltic projects.  Their recollections and 
reflections were particularly valuable in analysing the factors which resulted in 
the strengths and weaknesses of these initiatives.  The use of qualitative 
methods allowed for gathering a wide range and depth of data.  A more detailed 
analysis of these points is provided in Chapter Three. 
   
1.5 Research Design and Ethical Issues 
 
As will also be detailed in Chapter Three, the case study method appeared to 
be most useful for this particular research and semi-structured interviews the 
best method to obtain original data.  All the interviews were conducted in 
English.  Particularly for those in policy-making positions, English was the 
language utilised by those participating in the Baltic initiatives.  Moreover, the 
command language for BALTBAT was English. 
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One ethical issue regarding this research involved anonymity for the 
interviewees.  For this thesis, the interviewees were asked whether their 
comments were for attribution.  If they did not wish to have their comments 
attributed to them, adequate methods of keeping the individual anonymous 
were utilised.  For example, the quote was attributed to "an Estonian official."   
 
In order to provide a common framework, all interviewees were provided a 
questionnaire in advance (Appendix A in Appendices).  It was emphasized to 
the interviewees that the document was intended to highlight possible points for 
discussion, but was not a limitation on subjects for discussion.  The interviews 
were written up and sent back to the interviewees for their edits before they 
were finalised.   
 
The results of the interviews were coded with the use of NVIVO 8 software.  In 
addition, documents from the Baltic projects were reviewed for content relevant 
to any factors which emerged from the interview material.  The data from 
interviews and sections of relevant documents were analysed to determine 
whether a specific factor was present.  A detailed analysis of the points 
regarding research design and method is provided in Chapter Three.   
 
1.6 Background to the Research Subject 
 
The author is a former US Foreign Service officer who served at the US 
Embassy in Copenhagen, Denmark during the period 1996-2000.  The US was 
one of the countries providing support to BALTBAT and the other programmes, 
and the author had an opportunity to view the extensive effort which the 
supporting states, and Denmark in particular, put toward the success of 
BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives.  While this experience might have 
generated questions with regard to the neutrality of the author, every effort was 
made to try to remove bias in the conduct of the research. 
 
1.7 Contribution to Knowledge: Study Value 
 
This research sought to provide contributions to the body of knowledge 
regarding military assistance.  Mott (1999) asserted that: 
 
A set of general uniformities about the donor-recipient relationship that 
holds over time, across politics, in peace and war, and in various 
geopolitical-economic situations may form a theoretical and logical 
foundation for useful analyses of military assistance (p. 19).   
 
With regard to benefits from the research, the first benefit was the contribution 
to the academic work in the area of military assistance.  As will be indicated in 
the Literature Review in Chapter Two, the author was unable to find any 
research into the specific area of political decisions between the donor and 
recipient states regarding BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects (a lacuna).  
The second benefit arose for practitioners in the subject area.  Identification of 
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the elements of a model for effective military assistance initiatives drawn from 
factors for success from the Baltic programmes could assist the efforts of 
developed and developing countries to achieve the goals they set for these 
projects.   
 
Other academic areas, such as project management, were touched on as 
appropriate as the material from the research was analysed.  However, they did 
not receive explicit emphasis and were handled as subsidiary areas of 
academic or practical interest.   
 
1.8 The Baltic Military Assistance Programmes: Historical Background 
 
In June 1992, the Baltic states signed a "Protocol on Agreement on Co-
operation in the Field of Defence."  The document set out the framework for 
Baltic defence cooperation.  In 1993, at a meeting of Baltic military 
commanders, the Commander of the Estonian Defence Force broached the 
idea of a joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion.  
 
The "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Concerning Co-operation on the 
Formation of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion" was signed by the three Baltic 
countries, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) on 
11 September 1994.  The MOU set out the project framework for BALTBAT.  
France, the US, Germany and the Netherlands later signed as supporting 
nations.   
 
With regard to the other Baltic initiatives, BALTRON was inaugurated on 28 
August 1998.  The first senior staff course at the BALTDEFCOL was held on 16 
August 1999.  BALTNET began operations on 6 June 2000.   
 
BALTBAT was de-activated on 26 September 2003.  The other BALTIC 
initiatives are still in operation with BALTRON and BALTNET integrated into the 
NATO operations of the Baltic forces. 
 
1.9 A Particularly Difficult Environment 
 
The Baltic initiatives appeared to be a particularly interesting set of military 
assistance projects which warranted extensive review.  All of the following 
points are assessed in detail in the Literature Review in Chapter Two, and 
indicated the challenges faced by the Baltic and donor governments at the time 
BALTBAT and the other programmes were initiated. 
 
The first challenge was Russian troops.  The Baltic and Western governments 
had to decide how to develop the military capabilities of the Baltic countries in a 
delicate political environment.  Latter (1992) highlighted comments from the 
Russian military which indicated they would not withdraw from the Baltic states 
under any circumstances (p. 2).  Russian forces did not complete their 
withdrawal from Lithuania until August 1993 and from Estonia and Latvia until 
August 1994. 
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The second challenge was the sensitivity regarding treatment of Russian 
minorities in Estonia and Latvia.  Asmus and Nurick (1996) highlighted the 
significance of this issue as a cause of regional tension.  The third challenge 
involved Russian sensitivity regarding membership of the Baltic states in NATO.  
Russia had made it clear, noted Blank (1997), that it would not accept Baltic 
state membership in NATO and even threatened to terminate cooperative 
efforts with the West (p. v).   
 
The final challenge was the fact that the Baltic governments had virtually no 
military forces upon regaining independence.  Former Lithuanian Defence 
Minister Linkevicius (1999) wrote that at independence the military was short of 
everything and there was no national security concept.  Former Latvian National 
Security Advisor Zalkans (1999) noted that in 1993, the Defence Ministry had 
no defence concept or defence plan. 
 
All of these topics, and other relevant issues noted in the Chapter Two 
Literature Review, indicated that the development of BALTBAT and the other 
Baltic initiatives under such challenging circumstances highlighted the value of 
analysing these military assistance programmes. 
   
1.10 Thesis Structure 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The first chapter provides an overview of the plan for the thesis and the 
rationale for the research. 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
The second chapter provides a systematic literature review on the issue of 
military assistance.  There is also a narrative literature review of the points 
noted above in Section 1.9 which provide the political and historical context in 
which the Baltic programmes were developed.    
 
Chapter Three: Research Methodology 
 
The third chapter provides details into the research methodology and specific 
research methods which were utilised.   
 
Chapter Four: Collected Data 
 
The fourth chapter outlines the interviews which were conducted as well as the 
various documents regarding the Baltic programmes which were assembled 
and analysed. 
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Chapter Five: Data Analysis 
 
The fifth chapter presents the critical factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) 
which emerge from analysis of the data from interviews and documents. 
 
Chapter Six: Discussion of the Elements of a Model 
 
The sixth chapter provides the identified elements of a model for effective 
military assistance programmes arising from the critical Mechanisms. 
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The seventh chapter summarizes the conclusions of the research and 
recommends future possible areas of research. 
 
1.11 Summary 
 
The overarching goal of this research was to make a contribution to knowledge 
in the important area of military assistance.  In that regard, it is useful to note 
the comment from Mott (2002) that: 
 
… military assistance was and remains a valuable policy instrument.  
Soldiers, politicians, diplomats and bureaucrats can use it effectively to 
achieve donor aims.  Scholars, analysts, and pundits can explain it and 
predict its effects.  In our efforts to create and manage the future, we can 
only be well served by observing and learning from the efforts of our 
predecessors to use this unique instrument.  We would be best served, 
however, by refining their refinements to accommodate our own world, 
rather than rejecting their work as flawed or irrelevant (p. 312). 
 
The specific aim of this research was to analyse the Baltic military initiatives, 
particularly BALTBAT, as a case study to identify the elements of a model for 
effective military assistance projects.  Brett (2001) noted in his review of 
BALTBAT that he found a consistency of views that BALTBAT was a success 
(p. 60), so it would appear that the Baltic programmes were worthwhile subjects 
for analysis.   
 
The proposition put forth in this thesis is that the elements of a model composed 
of key factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) for effective military 
assistance initiatives can be identified from the experience of the Baltic military 
cooperative programmes, particularly BALTBAT.  They were a valuable topic for 
research, and provided results which are worthwhile for academics and 
practitioners in the area of military assistance. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter One provided an introduction to the thesis and outlined why military 
assistance in general and BALTBAT and the Baltic military assistance 
programmes in particular should be analysed.  Chapter Two provides a 
systematic review of the literature regarding the specific issue of military 
assistance.  There is also a narrative review of the literature to provide 
background regarding the relevant political and military issues concerning the 
establishment of the Baltic initiatives.   
 
It is worthwhile to begin with a delineation of what is covered in this chapter with 
regard to "literature."  The proposed answer is that for purposes of this thesis, 
literature involves the writings of academics and practitioners. 
 
2.2 Narrative Literature Review 
 
As highlighted by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000), the critical literature 
review forms the foundation on which research is built (p. 44).  The initial 
question was what type of review should be conducted.  The two primary 
methods are a narrative literature review and a systematic literature review.  
Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) noted that a narrative literature review is a 
descriptive account “of the contributions made by writers in the field” (p. 208).  
However, narrative literature reviews have been criticised for various 
weaknesses, with Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) asserting that they 
“frequently lack thoroughness” (p. 207) and “have also been condemned for 
lacking critical assessment” (p. 208).   
 
2.3 Systematic Literature Review 
 
A systematic literature review provides a more structured method by which to 
determine what literature to review and also to assess the quality of the 
literature to be assessed.  Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) commented that: 
 
Systematic reviews differ from traditional narrative reviews by adopting a 
replicable, scientific and transparent process, in other words a detailed 
technology, that aims to minimize bias through exhaustive literature 
searches of published and unpublished studies and by providing an audit 
trail of the reviewers decisions, procedures and conclusions (p. 209). 
 
Buchanan and Bryman (2009) asserted that selection of a systematic literature 
review method is not “merely a technique for snapping reality into focus; choice 
of methods frames the data windows through which phenomena are observed, 
influencing interpretative schemas and theoretical development” (p. 1).  Denyer 
and Tranfield (2009) noted that in a systematic literature review: 
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…the researcher is required to set prespecified relevance and quality 
criteria for the selection/inclusion of studies and to make such criteria 
transparent to readers.  Extensive searches are conducted to incorporate 
both published and unpublished studies (p. 671).   
 
The point was made by Denyer and Tranfield (2009) that a systematic literature 
review should be regarded “as a self-contained research project in itself that 
explores a clearly specified question, usually derived from a policy or practice 
problem, using existing studies” (p. 671), and “if the review identifies knowledge 
gaps or incongruent findings, then this signifies a research need and raises 
questions for future research” (p. 672).     
 
There are weaknesses with regard to a systematic literature review.  Tranfield, 
Denyer and Smart (2003) noted that they have usually been applied in areas 
utilising positivist and quantitative methodologies (p. 212), and as a result, 
“researchers from an interpretivisit or phenomenological position may suggest 
that systematic reviews, with their positivist leanings, should not be adopted in 
the social sciences” (p. 214).     
 
Despite these criticisms of a systematic literature review, it appeared that its 
use was advantageous in reviewing the literature regarding military assistance.  
As the focus was on the “need to discuss critically the work that has already 
been undertaken” in the specific area of research and present it “in a logical 
way” (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2000, p. 45), a systematic literature 
review was most appropriate, as it allowed for a structured method of evaluating 
literature in the area of military assistance.   
 
2.4 Conduct of the Systematic Literature Review 
 
Turning to the conduct of a systematic literature review on the issue of military 
assistance, the first stage was planning the review (Tranfield, Denyer and 
Smart, 2003), and the need to “arrive at a definitive review question” (p. 215).  
Denyer and Tranfield (2009) cited as an example that “in management and 
organization studies, a practitioner question may be framed as follows: how can 
project team performance be optimized through leadership behaviours?” (p. 
682).   
 
For this thesis, the review question was as follows: “What is the significance of 
broad political decisions between donor and recipient states on the ability of 
military assistance programmes to achieve military and political goals?” 
 
2.5 CIMO - Context/Interventions/Mechanisms/Outcomes 
 
Denyer and Tranfield (2009, pp. 682-3) cited the Context, Interventions, 
Mechanisms and Outcomes (CIMO) model as a logical method of 
deconstructing the review question into four specific, reviewable questions.  The 
CIMO model appeared to be of utility in conducting the systematic literature 
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review for this thesis and structuring the analysis of the results of that review.  
The specific CIMO components were described by the authors as follows: 
 
Context – Who are the individuals of interest?  Which interpersonal 
relationships are of interest?  Which aspects of the institutional setting are of 
interest?  Which aspects of the wider infrastructural system are of interest? 
(Denyer and Tranfield, 2009, p. 683, Figure 39.1).  In the particular case of 
military assistance, the specific Context question was:  What is the nature of the 
relationship between donor states and recipient states?     
 
Interventions - What is the Intervention of interest?  Denyer and Tranfield (2009) 
cited as Interventions “leadership style, planning and control systems, training, 
performance management, etc.” (p. 683, Figure 39.1).  In the particular case of 
military assistance, the specific Intervention question was:  What is the impact 
of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states on the 
efficacy of the military assistance programme?   
 
Mechanisms – What are the Mechanisms of interest?  What is it about 
Interventions acting in a Context that leads to the outcome?  Why are 
Mechanisms activated or not activated?  (Denyer and Tranfield, 2009, p. 683, 
Figure 39.1).  In the particular case of military assistance, that meant the 
following questions:  What are the particular Mechanisms that can cause broad 
political decisions between the donor and recipient states to have an impact on 
the efficacy of military assistance?  Political commitment?  Behaviours?  
Organizational structures?  Leadership?  Support? 
 
Outcomes– What are the relevant Outcomes?  What Outcomes would be 
important to the individuals involved?  How will the Outcomes be measured?  
What is the primary Outcome and what are the secondary Outcomes? (Denyer 
and Tranfield, 2009, p. 683, Figure 39.1).  In the particular case of military 
assistance, that meant the following question:  Are the military and political 
goals associated with the military assistance programme achieved?    
 
2.5.1 Other Possible Models 
 
There were other models which could have been utilised for this research 
instead of CIMO.  As it involves development of military forces, the widely used 
framework for the evaluation of training and education generated by Kirkpatrick 
(1994) could have been utilised in this research.  That model remains standard 
in business, government, military and industry and uses a framework with four 
levels: reaction, learning, behaviour and results.   
 
However, there were limitations to the Kirkpatrick model.  Bates (2004, p. 342) 
asserted that the model is incomplete and that it does not consider contextual 
influences in the evaluation of training.  The significance of context as cited by 
Bates indicated a key weakness in the Kirkpatrick model.  It also highlighted the 
advantage of using the CIMO model to consider context.  
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Another model which could have been utilised was the organizational elements 
model from Kaufman (2000) which is used in the areas of strategic planning and 
needs assessment.  This model identifies linkages and alignments of inputs, 
processes, products, outputs and outcomes.  Such a model has strong positive 
attributes to recommend itself with regard to this research.  The evaluation of 
two factors and what is generated at three different levels would be suitable for 
a military assistance initiative: results (micro level) outputs (macro level) and 
outcomes (mega level).  However, the model suffered from the same weakness 
as the Kirkpatrick model: the context is not considered.       
 
One additional type of analysis that could have been utilised for this research 
was costs-consequences analysis.  Kaufman et al (1997, pp. 8-9) described it 
as “a suggested coarse-grained estimate of what one puts into a system and 
what one gets out of it.”  The analysis “provides decision makers with the array 
of variables to make an informed decision” and it “defines the minimal data 
required to provide useful indicators of return-on-investment” (Kaufman, 1997, 
p. 9).  However, the authors stressed that “it is intended to be used by leaders 
and decision makers when there is not the necessity nor the time and/or 
resources for complete determination of all of the variables that actually go into 
a full-scale return-on-investment analysis” (Kaufman, 1997, p. 9).  With regard 
to the Baltic programmes, the participating states had the time and resources to 
thoroughly consider what military assistance initiative would be of greatest 
value.       
 
The justification for use of the CIMO model was noted by Hartley and Tranfield 
(2011), who asserted that: 
 
Realist evaluations are comprehensive in that they take account not only 
of I-O (Intervention-Outcome) logic, but address in addition, the impact of 
specific Contexts/Circumstances (C) in which the intervention took place.  
They also identify the Generative Mechanisms (M) that were triggered by 
the intervention to produce the specific range of intended and unintended 
outcomes…  Because a realist evaluation operates on C-I-M-O logic it 
attempts to explain ‘what works for whom in which circumstances and 
why?’  (p. 5). 
 
As an indication of its utility, the CIMO model has been utilised in various types 
of research.  Madu and Kuei (2012) used CIMO in their construction of a model 
with regard to sustainability management, writing that “This model adopts a 
systems approach with a focus on the context-intervention-mechanism-outcome 
(CIMO) logic” (p. 10).  Van Aken and Romme (2012) analysed a design science 
approach to evidence based management and with regard to design 
propositions, “one would like to have it tested through actual applications and 
grounded in a theoretical explanation of why this type of contract is super in this 
particular context.  The logic of the field-tested and grounded solution concept is 
called the CIMO-logic …” (Van Aken and Romme, 2012, p. 147). 
 
 13 
In a paper on e-prescribing, King (2009) used CIMO and noted that “while not a 
structural analogy like inter-organizational systems or social networks, CIMO 
does provide a prescriptive framework for analysing organizations” (p. 15).  
Raisanen et al (2014) gathered and organized data in an examination of the 
requirements for an intergenerational learning game utilising CIMO.  
Holmstrom, Tuunanen and Kauremaa (2014) noted in a conference paper on 
logic for design science research theory accumulation that the proposition rests 
on the notion that “representing the structure and logic of DSR (design science 
research) theory components by using CIMO makes it easier to understand how 
design theory components are related, which in turn, enables DSR theory to be 
more easily evaluated, transferred, and combined” (p. 3701). 
 
In short, there were numerous examples of academic research in which CIMO 
had proven to be of utility, particularly because of the inclusion of Context.  
Such a consideration appeared to justify the use of CIMO as the preferable 
model for this thesis. 
 
2.6 Conduct of the Review 
 
The second stage of the structured literature review involved conducting the 
review.  Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) noted this begins with “the 
identification of keywords and search terms” and then a decision by the 
reviewer “on the search strings that are most appropriate for the study” (p. 215).  
For this literature review, the three search terms identified were “military 
assistance,” “defence assistance” and “developing military forces.”  The data 
bases utilised were ABI, EBSCO, Emerald, Praeger, SAGE, Science Direct, 
Taylor & Francis and Wiley.  The three search terms were run in these eight 
data bases to search for literature on military assistance.  The specific time 
period for searches was for articles from 1990-2013.  The justification for 
selecting 1990 as the start date was to gather articles written from the time of 
the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.  As 
noted by Mott (2001), the focus of attention for military assistance shifted 
dramatically with the end of the competition between the US and the Union of 
Soviet Socialists Republic (USSR). 
 
Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) noted that “searches should not only be 
conducted in published journals and listed in bibliographic data bases, but also 
comprise unpublished studies, conference proceedings, industry trials, the 
Internet and even personal requests to known investigators” (p. 215).  It must 
be conceded that the literature search which was conducted for this thesis did 
not meet all of those requirements and was limited to the results found from 
searches conducted in the eight data bases noted above and literature from 
other sources identified from the searches.   
 
However, Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003) also noted that “the strict criteria 
used in systematic review are linked to the desire to base reviews on the best-
quality evidence” (p. 215).  In that regard, the use of the specific search terms 
and the data bases noted above indicated the structured literature review 
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conducted for this thesis did result in “the best quality evidence,” particularly as 
the referenced literature was also drawn upon to supplement the analysis.  
Denyer and Tranfield (2009) made the case “for the development of a bespoke 
and fit for purpose methodology, which can cope with the variety and richness 
of research designs, purposes, and potential end uses of management and 
organization studies reviews” (p. 672). 
 
The third stage in the process was reporting and dissemination, which provided 
“a broad ranging descriptive account of the field with specific exemplars” as well 
as a “thematic analysis” (Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003, p. 218), with 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000) noting that the result “may be highly 
critical of the earlier research and seek to discredit it” (p. 45).  
 
2.7 Military Assistance - Results of Systematic Literature Review 
 
The results of the search for the specific terms in the specific journals for the 
specific period outlined above resulted in thousands of items.  However, filtering 
the results through use of the specific review question and the CIMO sub-
questions noted above, the articles relevant for this systematic literature review 
became apparent.  Those results also led to references and other literature on 
military assistance relevant to the review question and CIMO sub-questions.   
 
As noted above, Denyer and Tranfield (2009, p. 672) supported development of 
a bespoke methodology suitable for the purpose of the research, and it 
appeared to be prudent to include academic literature on military assistance 
relevant to the review question which served as source material for the literature 
identified in the search.  With regard to a framework for analysing the results of 
the systematic literature review, the CIMO structure appeared to serve as the 
optimal tool, as it was the basis for the sub-questions which were analysed.     
  
2.7.1 Other Literature on Military Assistance 
 
The academic literature indicated numerous issues involving military 
assistance.  One theme was its role in pursuing foreign policy goals.  Pach 
(1991, p. 4) commented that the US considers “military aid essential to the 
attainment of vital objectives.”  Hovey (1965, p. 256) noted that “most programs 
of assistance, economic and military, were closely related to meeting immediate 
military threats.”  Sachar (2003, p. 404) asserted that India’s military experience 
could be used “to build close military ties and healthy, mutually beneficial 
bilateral relations.”  Neuman (1986, p. 126) wrote that the superpowers use 
“military assistance both to enhance their position in the world and to limit each 
other’s expansion.” 
 
However, Pach (1991, p. 4) noted that critics assert that military assistance 
policies “have exacerbated local and regional hostilities … and burdened the 
United States with new obligations to defend foreign countries.”  Moreover, 
Tessman and Sullivan (2012, p. 11) concluded that “increasing levels of US 
military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behaviour” with the 
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US.  Agyeman-Duah (1986, p. 305) asserted that the decision of the Ethiopian 
military to terminate the US military assistance programme “serves as a serious 
indictment against the prevailing premise – that military assistance cultivates 
political attitudes in a recipient country that should prove favourable to the donor 
nation.”  
 
A second key theme addressed the decision-making process within donor 
states with regard to military assistance.  Anderson and McCauley (2009) 
asserted that the US makes decisions on military assistance and foreign aid in a 
pragmatic manner, rather than due to ideology.  Poe and Meernik (1995, p. 399) 
wrote that strategic, political, economic, human rights and economic 
development issues are all considered in decisions on military aid.  However, 
Pach (1991, p. 6) noted that the Truman administration rapidly expanded US 
assistance programmes “often with little thought about their ultimate goals.”  
Moreover, Kilford (2010, p. 8) asserted that Canada was not immune to the 
demands of other countries and “its own industries to become engaged, 
militarily, in developing countries by selling weapons and providing military 
assistance.”  
 
A third key theme was the impact of military assistance on recipient states, 
which can cover a variety of areas.  Wolf (1961, p. 828) outlined the broad 
question of how military assistance can generate military effectiveness and “yet 
generate improved economic and political side-effects.”  One aspect was the 
impact of military assistance on the behaviour of recipient states.  Sylvan (1976, 
p. 609) concluded that “sharp increases in military assistance tend to change 
decidedly the recipient nation’s international conflict and cooperative behaviour” 
and “the direction of that behaviour change is toward increased conflict and 
decreased cooperation.”   
 
Another aspect involved direct economic impacts on recipient states.  Hartman 
and Walters (1985, p. 453) noted that receipt of substantial amounts of military 
aid “was one route to limited upward mobility … for a small number of 
countries.”  Stein, Ishimatsu and Stoll (1985, p. 42) concluded that “military 
assistance by the U.S. can have large, and often unanticipated, fiscal effects on 
the recipient nations.”  Khilji and Zampelli (1994, p. 345) asserted that US aid is 
“highly fungible with a significant portion channelled to the private sector where 
it finances current consumption relatively more than investment.”  Kilford (2010, 
p. 1) noted that in the early 1960s, there was a belief “that military assistance 
would be a catalyst for wider economic and political development in the 
receiving countries.”  However, “military forces in the developing world, it would 
eventually become clear, were not agents of change and modernization at all” 
(Kilford, 2010, p. 8).     
 
One other aspect involved military assistance and human rights.  Pach (1991, p. 
4) noted that critics assert that military assistance policies have “assisted more 
often in the suppression of legitimate opposition than in the repulsion of external 
aggression.”  However, Lefever (1976, p. 85) asserted that the US Military 
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Assistance Training Program had “advanced the efficiency, professional 
performance, and readiness of the recipient military services.”   
 
One final key issue involved the practical question of how military assistance 
projects can be improved.  Hajjar (2014, p. 647-8) noted that “effective advisors 
deploy a multifaceted cultural toolkit filled with peacekeeper-diplomat, warrior, 
subject matter expert, innovator, leader and other tools.”  
 
In short, there were numerous important aspects of military assistance 
addressed by the literature which were worthy of study.  However, it was also 
apparent from the literature that a critical aspect of military assistance projects 
which also should be addressed is the relationship between donor and recipient 
states, a Context which is addressed in Sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2.  Moreover, it 
was also apparent from the literature that a significant component of this 
relationship involves political decisions regarding the initiative, as this 
Intervention constitutes the foundation of the programme.  
 
2.8 CIMO - Context 
 
As indicated above, with regard to Context, the specific question was: What is 
the nature of the relationship between donor states and recipient states?  While 
the specific time period for the systematic literature review began in 1990, it is 
worthwhile noting that much of the early academic research cited by writers in 
the 1990-2013 period addressed foreign aid in general with only some attention 
to the specific issue of military assistance.  Brown and Opie (1953) provided 
one of the first overviews of US foreign aid, touching on military assistance.  
However, the focus of their work was on foreign aid with attention to economic 
issues.  Liska (1960) provided more of a political perspective with attention to 
military assistance, commentary on donor control and the need for military 
assistance and foreign aid policies to be consistent.   
 
On those lines, Wolf (1960) examined the issue of allocating donor resources 
between various recipients and addressed the issue of allocation of resources 
between economic aid and military assistance.  As with Brown and Opie (1953), 
the focus of Wolf’s work was on the economic aspects of aid.  Jordan (1962) 
analysed military assistance from the practical view of an administrator, 
asserting that it is important to generate a basic theory to deal with 
administration, goals and means as well as what can be accomplished through 
military and economic aid. 
 
In an assessment of US and USSR foreign aid, Walters (1970) provided a 
political-economic analysis of the aims of donor states, although much of the 
attention was devoted to economic assistance.  Addressing the Context sub-
question about donor and recipient states noted above, Pranger and Tahtinen 
(1974) asserted that a donor state needs to have some direct way of influencing 
recipient state actions in order for military assistance to be successful, noting 
that politics, economics and strategy in both the donor and recipient states have 
to be considered.    
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2.8.1 Context - Donor/Recipient State Relationship 
 
Detailed research on military assistance is a more recent occurrence.  With 
regard to the Context issue, Mott (1999) proposed that “For military assistance 
to be effective, a donor must fathom the recipient’s polity, economy, and culture 
and cause the recipient to adopt desired policies, military strategies, or other 
behaviors” (p. 17).  Indeed, Mott (1999) asserted that “the donor-recipient 
relationship of military assistance creates its own worldview, its own structural 
and behavioural norms, and its own set of rewards, punishments, values and 
incentives” (p. xii).   
 
2.8.2 Context - Long-Term Relationship 
 
Other writers supported Mott’s emphasis on the centrality of the relationship 
between donor and recipient states.  Cottey and Forster (2004) asserted that 
the relationship between donor and recipient states “should be viewed as a 
long-term - decades-long - process, rather than an approach likely to produce 
quick results” (p. 28).  With regard to the Context sub-question, Cottey and 
Forster (2004) wrote that “common interests should be emphasized” and that 
“functional cooperation and substantive projects may provide a more durable 
foundation and have a greater impact than more symbolic measures” (p. 29).   
 
The point made by Cottey and Forster (2004) regarding the Context issue of a 
long-term relationship between donor and recipient states was highlighted in 
other literature.  Glantz (1998a), in the first of his three articles analysing 
assistance to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, asserted that with 
regard to these recipient states, “this struggle to overcome the legacies of the 
past will be a long-term one,” adding that “rather than years or decades, 
generations will be involved” (p. 4).  Glantz (1998a) stressed that:  
 
… the intellectual legacy of Soviet rule may prove to be the most difficult 
problem in the military to overcome.  In fact, this reality poses the 
greatest barrier to military reform in the three countries and, at the same 
time, the greatest challenge to foreign military assistance that seeks to 
foster military reform (p. 4).   
 
Supporting the view put forth by Glantz (1998a), Sieca-Kozlowski (2006) 
reviewed two books by Forster, Edmunds and Cottey, The Challenge of Military 
Reform (2002) and Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe (2003), 
both of which are cited later in this chapter, and stressed that these books 
enable the reader: 
 
… to better understand the scope of such a task as army 
professionalization in these countries: new roles and mission must be 
identified in a changing geopolitical context, resources must be 
reorganized, and non-military democratic control accepted.  The 
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progress of reform depends on many factors such as resources and the 
solidity of political commitment… (pp. 170-171).   
 
In short, particularly for countries in the former Warsaw Pact, it was important 
for the relationship between donor and recipient states to be of a lengthy 
duration, as successful change of military forces would involve generational 
change.  Referring specifically to Baltic military forces after they had 
experienced a long period of military assistance from the West, Trapans (2002) 
noted that “a generational change is evidence” that “a new and well-trained 
group of younger officers was emerging” (p. 88).   
 
2.8.3 Context - Political and Security Concerns 
 
On the Context question and the specific impact of political and security 
concerns of recipient states on the nature of the relationship with donor states, 
Glantz (1998a) commented on the security policy views of Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic, noting that there is congruence among the leadership of 
the three countries about security needs (p. 5), particularly about the centrality 
of Article V of the NATO Treaty regarding mutual security guarantees (pp. 6-7). 
There was therefore a strong desire on the part of these recipient states to have 
a robust military assistance relationship with Western donor states. 
   
Political and security concerns held by donor states also had an impact on the 
relationship with recipient states.  Glantz (1998b) noted that “national-level 
policy documents provide clear aims, objectives, strategies, and performance 
indicators for the US military (security) assistance program” and that these 
documents “which established, implemented, and have guided the operation of 
various assistance program elements, generally accord with national guidance” 
(p. 2).   
 
However, highlighting points which have an impact on the Context issue of the 
relationship between donor and recipient states, Glantz (1998b) commented 
that four issues “closely associated with the program’s aims, objectives, and 
methodologies are generating some concern and confusion in the countries 
receiving military assistance” listing these issues as: 1) overall US aims, 2) the 
role of commercial motives for military assistance, 3) a perceived shift in US 
policy after the Madrid Summit in 1997, and 4) the congruence of US and NATO 
aims and objectives, particularly after Madrid (p. 2).  Glantz (1998b) asserted 
that “the US military assistance program must address and clarify these four 
issues if it is to remain coherent, credible to both recipient country and NATO 
ally alike, and effective as a foreign policy tool” (p. 8).   
 
On the specific Context question of the relationship between donor and 
recipient states in military assistance projects, Reveron (2010) noted that 
“Different from direct action or counterinsurgency, security assistance 
programmes attempt to strengthen the partner to provide for its own security, 
thus enabling political and economic development” (p. xi).   
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2.8.4 Context - Goals of Donor States 
 
As noted in Section 2.7.1, among the various areas of academic literature on 
military assistance was the issue of the goals of donor states in providing such 
aid in pursuit of overarching security policy goals.  Specifically with regard to the 
Context question in this thesis, the significance of military assistance and the 
donor-recipient relationship was emphasized by Reveron (2010) in his comment 
that “Security assistance is now a key pillar of U.S. military strategy, which 
places American officers and non-commissioned officers in more than 150 
countries to train, mentor and professionalize other militaries” (p. 2), adding that 
“security assistance can help democracies consolidate, fragile states avoid 
failure, and authoritarian states liberalize” (p. 6).   Reveron (2010) noted that 
military assistance involves a wide variety of non-combat activities between 
donor and recipient states, and that:  
 
By doing so, the United States seeks to improve its international image, 
strengthen the state sovereignty system by training and equipping 
security forces, pre-empt localized violence from escalating into regional 
crises, and protect U.S. national security by addressing underlying 
conditions that inspire and sustain violent extremism (p. 6).     
 
With regard to the Context issue of the goals of donor states in assisting 
recipient states, and with a focus on the US as a particular donor nation, then-
US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2010) commented in an on-line article 
that strategic realities demand that the US improve on “building partner 
capacity,” and that “building the governance and security capacity of other 
countries must be a critical element of U.S. national security strategy.”  Gates 
(2010) asserted that within the US military “advising and mentoring indigenous 
security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities” to a point 
where it is “a key mission for the armed forces as a whole.”  Indeed, Gates 
(2010) stressed that “there has not been enough attention paid to building the 
institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital 
(including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the 
long term.” 
 
Referring to principles cited by Cottey and Forster (2004) and also by Glantz 
(1998a) regarding a long-term approach by donor states, Gates (2010) 
commented that “security assistance efforts must be conducted steadily and 
over the long term so as to provide some measure of predictability and planning 
for the U.S. government and, what is more significant, for its partners abroad,” 
and concluded by noting that “helping other countries better provide for their 
own security will be a key and enduring test of U.S. global leadership and a 
critical part of protecting U.S. security as well.” 
 
2.8.5 Context - Review 
 
The specific Context question was: What is the nature of the relationship 
between donor states and recipient states?  A review of the literature 
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specifically on the Context question indicated recognition of the significance of 
this relationship for military assistance projects.     
 
A number of important aspects of the donor-recipient relationship have been 
noted.  Mott (1999) asserted that it is central to successful military assistance 
initiatives.  Cottey and Forster (2004), Glantz (1998a and 1998b) and Sieca-
Kozlowski (2006) put great emphasis on the importance of a long-term 
relationship between the donor and recipient states and the complexity of 
assisting states in developing military forces.  Reveron (2010) and Gates (2010) 
highlighted the significance of the political and security policy focus of donor 
states in shaping military assistance programmes.   
 
In general, on the specific issue of Context, there appeared to be a view that the 
nature of the donor-recipient relationship is important to military assistance 
programmes and various aspects of that relationship have been identified in the 
literature.  The next question which arose was that of specific Interventions and 
the impact on these initiatives. 
 
2.9 CIMO - Interventions 
 
The next area in CIMO is Interventions.  For this research, the specific question 
regarding Interventions was the following: What is the impact of broad political 
decisions between the donor and recipient states on the efficacy of the military 
assistance programme?   
 
2.9.1 Interventions - Mott 
 
One of the most detailed analyses of this question was provided by Mott (1999) 
and is worth examining in detail.  In the first of his three books on the subject, 
Mott (1999) began with the general assertion that:  
 
Success of donor policies would, thus, depend less on donor actions 
than on the donor-recipient relationship - or perhaps a set of necessary 
conditions to allow donor success.  In such a donor-recipient relationship, 
success of recipient policies would be either the converse - when goals 
diverge - or in parallel - when their goals converge - with donor success 
(p. xii). 
 
Mott (1999, p. 21) analysed eight instances of wartime military assistance 
through four independent variables (italics in original text): 
 
Convergence, compatibility or congruence of donor and recipient 
purposes, goals, and objectives in establishing the relationship 
determines whether recipient mediation is additive or subtractive to donor 
resources and efforts. 
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Control by the donor, with corresponding responsivity by the recipient, 
can ensure additive mediation by the recipient or improve the results of 
subtractive mediation to neutral indeterminacy. 
 
Commitment of donor combat forces provides the foundation on which 
military assistance can construct a capable recipient military force. 
 
Coherence or integration of donor military assistance with donor foreign 
policy and strategy strengthens donor control, strengthens convergence, 
and rationalizes a commitment of donor forces. 
 
As a result, Mott (1999, p. 25) asserted that:  
 
The set of apparent conditions for a successful donor-recipient 
relationship involves four basic elements, and perhaps several 
corollaries, that seem critically related to success in achieving donor 
purposes: 
 
Common, converging, or complementary purposes of donor and 
recipient; 
 
Donor control of resources transferred; 
 
Combined donor and recipient military capabilities adequate to 
achieve donor purposes through military operations; 
 
Donor use of military assistance as one element of an integrated 
approach to foreign policy, military strategy, and economic policy. 
 
Continuing with his analysis, the conclusions reached by Mott (1999, p. 267) 
encompassed a set of uniformities regarding the donor-recipient relationship 
which appeared to be directly related to the Intervention question on the 
significance of broad political agreement between the donor and recipient states 
for military assistance initiatives (italics in original text): 
 
Convergence of National Aims and Interests: The donor and the recipient 
share common national aims and interests expressed in terms of national 
purposes, policy goals, and military objectives in peace, and focussed in 
war goals, military objectives, and complementary strategies in times of 
war. 
 
Donor Control of the Relationship: The donor retains, and exercises, 
sufficient control of all resources transferred to promote donor interests 
and adequate influence over the recipient military forces to ensure that 
their operations achieve donor purposes. 
 
Committing Donor Military Forces: The donor is politically willing and 
economically able to commit military forces as necessary in conjunction 
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with providing military assistance to ensure achieving donor aims when 
recipient forces are inadequate, unable or unwilling to do so. 
 
Cohesion of Donor Policies and Strategies: The donor integrates foreign 
policy, military strategy, military assistance, and economic aid into a 
single cohesive, coherent, global approach to achieving donor aims 
through, with, and in the recipient country. 
 
Concluding his analysis, Mott (1999) asserted that: 
 
… the set of uniformities provides the foundation for a coherent theory of 
military assistance.  The structure and features of the relationship 
between the donor and the recipient are, clearly, critical elements of any 
explanation or prediction about military assistance.  The donor-recipient 
relationship determines the likelihood of donor success, its timing, its 
cost, which features of the relationship most influence donor success, 
and the relative strength of any exogenous factors in achieving or 
frustrating donor aims (p. 268). 
 
The initial analysis by Mott (1999) involved instances of wartime military 
assistance.  Subsequently, Mott (2001) examined military assistance in the Cold 
War era, focussing on Soviet military assistance.  Mott (2001) noted that the 
Cold War context “required several profound refinements” (p. 325), but asserted 
that “the results of this empirical analysis of Cold-War Soviet military assistance 
confirm the conclusion of the earlier companion work” (p. 324). 
 
In his first study, Mott (1999) asserted that “US policy was not the determining 
factor in producing results” in military assistance programmes, and that 
outcomes were determined by the donor-recipient relationship (p. xiii).  In his 
third study, Mott (2002) concluded that his empirical analysis “supports the 
earlier conclusions that ‘the structure and features of the relationship between 
the donor and the recipient are, clearly, critical elements of any explanation or 
prediction about military assistance’” (p. 311). 
 
2.9.2 Interventions - Training 
 
In the third of his articles, Glantz (1999) provided an explanation of why the 
Intervention of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states has 
an impact on the Outcomes of military assistance projects, commenting that “for 
military assistance to achieve its ambitious aims, it must be comprehensive and 
effective” and that “it must also satisfy the security needs of recipient countries” 
(p. 3).   
 
The literature indicated that many of the issues (such as training) cited by 
Denyer and Tranfield (2009, p. 683) appeared to be affected by broad political 
decisions between the donor and recipient states, which was the Intervention 
question.  One aspect appeared to be the type of training programme agreed 
between donor and recipient states.  Handy (2003) wrote that the US “should 
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continue to craft customized training packages for individual nations and 
strengthen the follow-up mechanism to ensure that these programs are 
appropriate and that the train-the-trainer concept is working” (p. 63).  
Addressing another aspect of the broad political decisions regarding training, 
Handy (2003) added that the US must also “intensify its efforts to involve major 
regional powers (anchor states) in the program” (p. 63).     
 
With regard to training requirements for Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, Glantz (1998a) asserted that training remains “a major deficiency in 
the militaries of all three countries.  In light of current and likely future fiscal 
resource problems in some, if not all, of these countries, all will require greater 
and more imaginative US training assistance” (p. 27).  Glantz (1998b) 
specifically noted that “training poses one of the most imposing challenges to all 
three countries,” adding that “training should be one of the highest priority types 
of assistance during the two-year transition period before the three countries 
achieve full NATO membership” (p. 8).   
 
With regard to specific types of training as a manifestation of the Intervention of 
broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states, Glantz (1998b) 
asserted that “the most practical and valuable dimension of US training 
assistance to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary derives from their 
participation in the wide variety of exercises” conducted by the US European 
Command and Allied Command, with comments by officials from those three 
countries indicating “they consider the program to be a vital one that warrants 
further expansion” (p. 17).   
 
On the topic of broad political decisions and training, Szayna and Larrabee 
(1995) assessed Eastern European military reform and agreed that “personnel 
training is perhaps the most important area in which the United States can 
make a long-term impact” (p. xi).  In particular, Szayna and Larrabee (1995) put 
forward the proposition that the US should help those states develop a cadre of 
civilian personnel and also reassess US-based training of military officers from 
these countries “since the current efforts have had limited impact” (p. xi).   
 
2.9.3 Interventions - Education 
 
A separate issue involved education (as opposed to training) as another 
important aspect of the Intervention of broad political decisions in the donor-
recipient relationship.  Glantz (1998b) asserted that “the single most important 
facet of military assistance is the educational effort designed to change minds 
and attitudes.  This effort and its consequences will ultimately determine how 
lasting the other military reforms will be” (p. 26).  After a review of numerous 
aspects of US military assistance regarding this issue, Glantz (1998b) 
concluded that “the vital intellectual (educational) dimension of military 
assistance programmes is no longer sufficient to meet the growing needs of the 
three NATO-accession countries” adding that “this is the single most serious 
deficiency in the assistance program” (p. 39).  Glantz (1998b) noted that 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary “possess a handful (8-15) of 
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educated civilian and military defense policy specialists and a woefully 
inadequate number of military theoreticians and analysts” and concluded that 
“the entire intellectual dimension of US military assistance requires fundamental 
reassessment and much greater efforts” (p. 40). 
 
2.9.4 Interventions - Recipient State Assumption of Control 
 
Assessment of BALTBAT indicated the significance of broad political decisions 
between the donor and recipient states on the efficacy of the assistance 
programme.  The Memorandum of Understanding specifically noted that the 
intention of the donor and recipient states was that there would be “mechanisms 
by which the Baltic States can themselves in the future maintain a 
peacekeeping capability” (BALTBAT Memorandum of Understanding, Article 2, 
para 1).  Fischer (2003) made the general point on the overarching political 
agreement regarding these initiatives, and stressed the significance of having 
the Baltic countries develop sufficient capabilities to gradually take over the 
BALTBAT project (p. 13).     
 
2.9.5 Interventions - Funding 
 
Funding of the military assistance initiative was another area which was a result 
of a broad political decision by the donor state and could generate difficulties 
with the recipient state.  Glantz (1998b) noted that there were problems with 
regard to US funding, asserting that “funding of virtually all facets of the 
assistance program is barely adequate for current needs and will be inadequate 
to future needs,” adding that funding levels do not match the scope and 
importance of overall program aims, specifically, the reform of recipient states’ 
defense establishments and the improvement of their defense posture” (p. 54).   
 
2.9.6 Interventions - Review 
 
The specific question regarding Interventions was the following: What is the 
impact of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states on 
the efficacy of the military assistance programme?  Mott (1999) provided the 
most detailed analysis of the significance of those broad political decisions and 
the prospects of failure for the initiative if there is a dispute between the donor 
and recipient states.  Glantz (1998a, 1998b), Handy (2003) and Szayna and 
Larrabee (1995) also appeared to concur that the broad policy decisions 
between donor and recipient states regarding training in particular are important 
for the efficacy of the initiative.  Moreover, such broad political decisions have 
an impact on areas such as education and funding (Glantz, 1998b).  With 
regard to BALTBAT in particular, Fischer (2003) noted the significance of 
political agreement with regard to recipient state assumption of control. 
 
It appeared that there was a reasonable basis to assess broad political 
decisions between donor and recipient states as a specific Intervention with 
regard to military assistance programmes.  The next question was the extent to 
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which the literature indicated specific Mechanisms would trigger the particular 
Outcomes sought in the military assistance programme. 
 
2.10 CIMO - Mechanisms 
 
With regard to Mechanisms, it is worthwhile to reiterate that Mechanisms are 
what trigger Outcomes.  As noted previously, the specific questions for this 
research regarding Mechanisms were:  What are the particular Mechanisms 
that can cause broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states 
to have an impact on the efficacy of military assistance?  Political commitment?  
Behaviours?  Organizational structures?  Leadership?  Support? 
 
2.10.1 Mechanisms - Broad Overview 
 
Glantz (1999) cited a number of items which arise from the Intervention of broad 
political agreement between donor and recipient states and have an impact on 
the Outcomes of military assistance projects, writing that: 
 
First, to succeed, the military assistance program requires real national 
commitment to it, particularly in terms of the focus, attention, and human 
and financial resources commensurate with its ultimate importance.  
Second, while its aims must be consistent with US values and national 
interests, they must also recognize and accord with the values and 
interests of other NATO members, prospective NATO members, and 
partners alike.  Third, the US must divorce the military assistance 
program from traditional security assistance to rid it of the damaging 
perception that it is more about arms sales than real assistance.  Fourth, 
the US must structure the program for maximum efficiency to reduce 
friction, confusion, and redundancy and to improve control, 
communications, and efficiency.  Fifth, and most important, individuals 
who possess a deep and fundamental appreciation of the conditions the 
program is designed to address must provide informed guidance at the 
top and informed administration at all levels below (pp. 3-4).   
 
2.10.2 Mechanisms - Commitment by Donor States 
 
One Mechanism involved the commitment by the donor state to the military 
assistance project, manifested by a long-term commitment due to the extensive 
amount of time needed to generate Outcomes.  Cottey and Forster (2004) 
emphasized the significance of time and that such efforts need to be viewed “as 
a long-term policy instrument that may only reap dividends after many years, 
even decades” (p. 74), adding that:  
 
Generational change will be particularly important, and the full benefits of 
defence diplomacy may not be seen until new generations of officers 
move up through the ranks.  Western governments therefore need to 
have patience when defence diplomacy does not produce dramatic 
results overnight, and provide sustained long-term support for 
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engagement with other countries, even when there are setbacks in the 
reform process (p. 75).  
 
Mott (1999) asserted that “a critical feature of the donor-recipient relationship 
involves the ‘commitment’ of the donor to the relationship” (p. 19) and goes on 
to note that there is a need for “focused management, priority for resource 
allocation, and full donor attention within an integrated holistic policy to achieve 
some basic primary war purpose” (p. 269). 
 
2.10.3 Mechanisms - Control by Donor States 
 
With regard to the Mechanism of control by the donor state, Mott (1999) 
provided the view that:  
 
The degree, type, and level of control exerted by the donor over the 
recipient’s use of military assistance and over those recipient forces 
supported by military assistance, form a critical component of the 
relationship, especially when the interests of the donor and recipient do 
not coincide.  Without close donor control, the recipient military forces 
can be expected to operate in accordance with recipient, rather than 
donor interest, and by mediating donor resources, the recipient can be 
expected to divert those resources to its own purposes (p. 22). 
 
With regard to BALTBAT, the organizational structure involved policy (Steering 
Group) as well as operational (Military Working Group) decisions.  Brett (2001) 
asserted that the two groups did good work in acquiring and distributing 
equipment, arranging training and support, and implementing a successful 
"training the trainers" approach in BALTBAT (p. 7).  Raunio (2002) concurred on 
the success of the “training the trainers” approach. 
 
In an on-line article, Bergman (2000) highlighted the fact that the organizational 
structure for BALTBAT involved clear divisions of responsibility among the 
Nordic donor states in particular: the Danes handled training of reconnaissance 
and signal platoons; Norway trained the headquarters platoon and medical 
platoon; Sweden provided training of maintenance, supply and engineering 
platoons; and Finland trained the catering and transportation platoons.  
Bergman (2000) added that the division of labour extended to the type of 
equipment and material that was provided.  Denmark supplied light mortars, 
sub-machine guns, trucks, generators, depot stores’ shelf systems, military 
police platoon equipment, and weapon armoury security alarms.  Sweden 
donated rifles and provided training and assistance on deployment.  Norway 
provided training as well as anti-tank rockets, mortars and medical material.  
Finland provided training and assistance.  All of these organizational decisions 
ensured a division of responsibility which distributed the burden among 
numerous donor states. 
 
With regard to the selection of the Danish/Nordic model for the development of 
BALTBAT, Brett (2001, p. 18) wrote that in early 1994, there were basically two 
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“inter-linked tracks” regarding international support for the Baltic nations.  First, 
with the Nordic countries, there was “an existing close co-operation on UN and 
peacekeeping matters” and second, with the UK, there was cooperation on 
basic military and English language training (Brett, 2001, p. 18).  Those two 
streams of assistance to the Baltic governments merged in a variety of different 
fora.  Nordic Foreign Ministers then agreed to offer support to a Baltic Battalion, 
with subsequent specific proposals for the use of Nordic instructors for training 
in the Baltic states as well as Nordic agreement on efforts to see if other 
countries would be interested in participating (Brett, 2001, p. 18). 
 
As a result, the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding establishing BALTBAT 
noted in Article 3, paragraph 5 that “the Nordic States will provide peacekeeping 
training and will promote the use of UN peacekeeping procedures throughout 
the programme.”  In addition, Article 3, paragraph 6 added that the UK would 
provide English language training and basic military infantry training.   
 
Brett (2001) wrote that the meetings which preceded the formal agreement on 
establishing BALTBAT “produced circumstances that lead to Denmark adopting 
a role as leading supporting nation in the project” (p. 20).  Article 3, paragraph 1 
of the 1994 MOU noted that a multinational group of military experts “under 
Danish chairmanship is responsible for developing the detailed aspects of the 
cooperative programme of assistance…”  Bergman (2000) added that Denmark 
accepted the role as the leading supporting state for BALTBAT, donated more 
material to the initiative than the other Nordic states and “accepted a special 
responsibility of co-ordinating assistance from the supporting nations.” 
 
However, it was not a specific “Danish model” which was adopted.  As indicated 
above, as well as later in this thesis by some interviewees, arrangements for 
BALTBAT were set up on a somewhat ad hoc basis.  As an example, Moeller 
(2000, p. 39) criticized the decision to utilise UK tactics and doctrine as most of 
the Training Team officers came from the Nordic countries.  This was not a 
case of utilising the “British model,” and there was no movement from one 
model (Nordic) to another (UK).  From the origins of BALTBAT, there was 
simply an attempt to utilise the best possible arrangements to optimise the use 
of contributions from donor states.     
 
Some writers highlighted organizational weaknesses in BALTBAT.  Moeller 
(2000) asserted that equipment donations were disorganized, and that it was a 
mistake for BALTBAT Training Teams (TTs) to have moved from a training 
function to an advisory role.  However, the general assessment from the 
literature appeared to support the view of Brett (2001) that there was effective 
coordination in channelling military assistance under BALTBAT (p. 59) and the 
BALTBAT experience “provided a useful model for other initiatives” (p. 56) 
which were subsequently initiated with the Baltic governments.   
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2.10.4 Mechanisms - Political Motivation 
 
Political motivation also appeared to be a Mechanism which has an impact on 
the generation of Outcomes.  Particularly for donor or recipient countries which 
are focussed on a political goal, such as membership in NATO, achieving such 
a goal can provide a political impetus that can be important.  Glantz (1998a) 
asserted that:  
 
NATO’s enunciation of military criteria for entry into its ranks, however 
vaguely couched in terms of interoperability along with the more public 
and transparent political, economic and social requirements, lit a fire 
under the issue of national military reform and made it both a credible 
and important endeavour (p. 5).   
 
Glantz (1998a) stressed that this motivation was critical as:  
 
…reform of the military, including attention to restored military capability, 
became a measure of the countries’ ability to qualify for entry into vitally 
critical Western political and military security organizations, specifically 
NATO and the European Union … (p. 4).   
 
Supporting Glantz (1998a) with regard to motivation as a Mechanism, Krivas 
(2003) commented on the significance of public support, noting that NATO 
enlargement has been “the major external factor influencing military-society 
relations in Lithuania at both popular and political levels” adding that “NATO 
membership is a goal that is strongly supported by Lithuanian society” (p. 120).   
 
At the policy level, Urbelis and Urbonas (2002) addressed the significance of 
motivation, writing that the strategic goal of joining NATO led to “a qualitatively 
new stage in the development of Lithuanian defence policy” (p. 114).  Assessing 
another Baltic state, Trapans (2006) also commented on the issue of motivation 
among policy-makers, asserting that a focus on NATO membership “gave the 
Latvian defence reform process a defined - though not always consistent – set 
of targets to aim for” adding that “it also allowed Latvia to receive extensive 
Western assistance quite early on in its defence reforms” (p. 67).   
 
Trapans (2003) addressed the impact of motivation in an earlier assessment, 
commenting that Latvia’s security policy is based on the principle that joint 
Baltic defence measures “would not only be more effective, but would also 
create a better opportunity for the three Baltic States to gain admittance to 
NATO” (p. 103).  Edmunds, Forster and Cottey (2003) concurred with that point, 
asserting that Western institutions and NATO in particular have acted “as 
lodestones for military reform efforts in those countries which have identified 
Western integration as a key foreign policy goal” (p. 253).        
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2.10.5 Mechanisms - Appropriate Model 
 
Another Mechanism noted in the literature was the importance of adopting the 
appropriate model to be used in providing military assistance.  Supporting the 
view of the significance of adopting an appropriate model, Foot (2001) noted 
that when considering the BALTDEFCOL as a ‘model’ for other regions the key 
issue is transferability and determining whether “(a) these or similar factors are 
available elsewhere, or (b) if these factors are not available, whether they can 
be substituted with others that will make for success and sustainability” (p. 120).  
Foot (2001) framed the question as whether a BALTDEFCOL-type approach is 
only possible “because a degree of regional security already exists, or whether 
– in less benign circumstances – such an institution can help to create the 
conditions necessary to build regional peace and stability” (p. 120).   
 
Some of the literature on the Baltic initiatives addressed the overarching issue 
of military assistance and the specific Mechanism of the advice provided by 
donor states to recipient states and the impact that can have on Outcomes.  
Clemmesen (2000) provided a good example of this type of commentary with a 
broad overview of Western aid to the Baltic capitals.  While including specific 
recommendations to improve assistance, such as holding more military 
exercises, Clemmesen (2000, pp. 11-12) provided five points of general advice 
to donor states.  First, the states must accept the existing situation.  If a system 
is in place, it makes no sense to work to adopt a new system, even if that may 
arguably be a "better" system.  Over time, the recipient nation can select the 
appropriate system based on experience.  Second, recipient states need 
experience in implementation.  Arguments about which equipment or 
organizational pattern to use are irrelevant.  The point is to become familiar with 
whatever is in place.   
 
Third, one must recognize that long-term plans are irrelevant to meeting 
immediate challenges.  Fourth, supporting states have to coordinate their own 
efforts and support each other more strenuously.  Finally, there should be a 
concerted effort to not "reinvent the wheel" constantly, and previous decisions 
should be the basis for future actions.  If there are disagreements, it is 
imperative to have open discussions on the need for a course change.   
 
2.10.6 Mechanisms - Training 
 
There has been research into what Mechanisms could generate greater 
Outcomes with regard to training, which is one aspect of the Intervention of the 
broad political agreement between donor and recipient states.  Without a 
specific focus on training under military assistance programmes, Foxworth 
(2012) utilised “a qualitative grounded theory research process to analyse and 
code data collected on leaders’ ability to influence training transfer in Army 
units” and noted that:   
 
…through constant comparison and coding of collected data, five 
influences - leadership practices, perceived value of training, continuous 
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and quality learning, operational support and shared leadership 
knowledge - emerged as key behaviours and practices that supported 
the Leadership Competence and Support Application model, which 
depicts how senior NCO (Non-Commissioned Officers) leaders use 
training-transfer practices and effective leadership to ensure team 
development (p. 30). 
 
Foxworth (2012) commented that “the findings from the current study 
succeeded in generating a study that addressed behaviors and practices of 
U.S. Army senior NCOs,” adding that “the motivation behind the study was to 
uncover insights into why and how training transfer is manifested back to the 
workplace” (p. 32).  Regarding the need for more research, Foxworth (2012) 
noted that “additional theoretical research is needed on training transfer, as 
evidenced by inconsistencies in the use of models and frameworks by the 
research reviewed” (p. 32).   
 
While Foxworth’s (2012) research was not directed at the question of training as 
a part of military assistance initiatives, it would appear that the findings are 
relevant to that specific area.  Foxworth (2012) asserted that the five core 
themes that emerged from the research conducted in the study “resulted in the 
emergence of the leadership competency and support application theory, which 
supports leaders’ influence on training transfer among senior Army NCOs,” 
adding that “the essence of the theory is the core practices and behaviors that 
senior NCO leaders use to facilitate training-transfer processes in developing 
individual and collective competence within their units” (p. 48).     
 
On another general aspect of improvement of military training, and specifically 
technology-based experiential learning approaches concerning training, Vogel-
Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) asserted that there is a need for “creation 
of improved training systems through the incorporation of a repository of 
research-based instructional strategies that can be employed across the entire 
training cycle” (p. 1490).  Once again, while the research is not directly 
focussed on training as part of military assistance programmes, the findings 
appeared relevant to the discussion of Mechanisms.    
 
Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) asserted that “there is overwhelming 
evidence that direct instructional support is a necessary component of optimal 
training environments,” but that “although this approach is well supported in the 
literature, military training systems are often not designed accordingly” and the 
military often utilises “minimally guided approaches” (p. 1491).  The authors 
therefore asserted that “the design of training systems will be most optimal 
when (a) explicit instructional guidance is provided to notice trainees and (b) 
when guidance is gradually adapted in line with the development of trainee 
expertise” (Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone, 2013, p. 1491).   
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2.10.7 Mechanisms - Negative Factors 
 
While a discussion of Mechanisms usually addresses those factors which can 
enhance the generation of Outcomes from a military assistance initiative, some 
Mechanisms may be factors that need to be avoided to ensure Outcomes arise.  
Glantz (1998b) put forward the proposition that “it is clear that mixing military 
assistance and arms sales promotes volatility in a program that requires greater 
stability” (p. 59) and that the “association of military assistance with arms sales 
often discredits the assistance effort and, in doing so, lessens the program’s 
effectiveness” (p. 55).  Glantz (1998b) therefore recommended that the 
connection between military assistance with arms sales “must cease in order to 
protect the professional ethics of the officer corps and the overall reputation of 
the military assistance program” (p. 60). 
 
2.10.8 Mechanisms - Efficient Planning 
 
One Mechanism which appeared to have an impact on Outcomes is the 
efficiency of the planning and implementation process of the donor state.  
Szayna et al (2004) noted that the demanders of Army International Activities 
(AIA) “operate on the basis of an in-built bias in favour of demanding more AIA 
than can be resourced” and they “do not have a full understanding of the 
resourcing problems and tradeoffs involved in AIA choices” (p. 2).  Szayna et al 
(2004) asserted that the existing systems run by the US military commands “are 
plagued by weaknesses in identifying and communicating the costs incurred by 
conducting AIA and other security cooperation activities” and “there is no 
systematic communication” between the Army and command planners on the 
costs of conducting AIA (p. 36).  Szayna et al (2004) stressed that “The Army’s 
internal resource allocation process is not transparent” and “even experienced 
resource managers cannot calculate the resources devoted to AIA” (p. 36).   
 
Continuing on that point, Szayna et al (2004) asserted that “rather than national 
strategic goals driving the process, the primary determinant of AIA has been 
continuity,” adding that “the main determinant of this year’s budget seems to 
have been last year’s budget” (pp. 66-67).  As a solution, Szayna et al (2004) 
noted “the planning system of AIA needs greater flexibility and efficiency” 
adding that:   
 
the need for flexibility and adaptability in security cooperation, because of 
shifting priorities (new partners, different mix of activities) and in order to 
seize opportunities that may be short-lived, have made essential the 
reform of the security cooperation planning and implementation process 
(p. 68). 
 
2.10.9 Mechanisms - Role of Individuals 
 
One additional Mechanism appeared to return to the fact that military assistance 
projects involve the actions of individuals to implement a policy.  Glantz 
(1998b), who makes a strong case for US policy decisions to be re-assessed, 
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noted that “it is the personnel who man the assistance system who make it work 
as well as it does” (p. 51).   
 
Further on that point, Clemmesen (2000, p. 9) noted that while advisors 
provided by supporting states have the best intentions, they find themselves in 
a difficult situation.  They only have a basic knowledge of the situation, in this 
case, that of the Baltic nations, and are trying to work in a defence 
establishment in the early stages of learning new skills.  Due to short tours and 
rapid turnover, there is a lack of continuity, and advisors, at times, even 
undermine aid programmes of other donor states. 
 
On a specific Baltic initiative, Foot (2001) judged the Baltic Defence College as 
“a remarkable experiment in combined military education” and asserted that 
“there is a prima facie case for considering the BALTDEFCOL as a model that 
could be applied elsewhere within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership community of 
nations” (p. 119).  Indicating the significance of individual initiative and good 
leadership as a Mechanism, Foot (2001) praised the “committed, energetic and 
effective leadership of the founding Commandant - Danish Brigadier General 
Michael Clemmesen- widely accepted by the participant and sponsor states” (p. 
120). 
 
2.10.10 Mechanisms: Review 
 
The specific questions regarding Mechanisms were: What are the particular 
Mechanisms that can cause broad political decisions between the donor and 
recipient states to have an impact on the efficacy of military assistance?  
Political commitment?  Behaviours?  Organizational structures?  Leadership?  
Support? 
 
Glantz (1999) highlighted a number of important factors which have an impact 
on the generation of Outcomes from military assistance projects: national 
commitment; values and interests; a separation of military assistance from arms 
sales; structuring the programme for maximum efficiency; and individuals who 
provide guidance at the top and good administration at lower levels.  Cottey and 
Forster (2004) and Mott (1999) focussed on the significance of donor state 
commitment, namely the need for a long-term commitment.  Mott (1999) also 
highlighted the significance of control by the donor states, and Brett (2001), 
Bergman (2000) and Moeller (2000) provided commentary on the issue of donor 
state control in BALTBAT in particular.   
 
Edmunds, Forster and Cottey (2003), Trapans (2006), Krivas (2003) and 
Urbelis and Urbonas (2002) supported the view of Glantz (1998a) that political 
motivation among recipient states is a key mechanism.   Foot (2001) and 
Clemmesen (2000) placed an emphasis on the need to ensure the appropriate 
model is adopted as a Mechanism which is important in providing military 
assistance.   
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Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) and Foxworth (2012) addressed 
general issues of training and Mechanisms that generate greater Outcomes in 
that particular area.  Szayna et al (2004) noted the significance of donor states 
having efficient planning and implementation processes, while Glantz (1998b) 
and Clemmesen (2000) stressed the importance of individuals in generating 
Outcomes. 
 
In short, there were a number of Mechanisms noted in the literature which have 
an impact on the generation of Outcomes from military assistance initiatives.  
The issue which then arose was whether proper assessment of such Outcomes 
was being conducted.   
 
2.11  CIMO - Outcomes 
 
The final framework for analysis of the literature concerned Outcomes.  As 
noted previously, for this research, the specific question regarding Outcomes 
was:  Are the military and political goals associated with the military assistance 
programme achieved?   
 
2.11.1 Outcomes - No Measurement 
 
There was a substantial amount of commentary highlighting the fact that the 
measurement of Outcomes has not been addressed, and this constitutes one of 
the key problems with military assistance projects.  Cottey and Forster (2004, p. 
76) stressed that there has been little comparative analysis of these various 
programmes and few attempts to judge their effectiveness.  In an extensive 
critique, Cottey and Forster (2004) put forward the proposition that: 
 
Despite the expansion of defence diplomacy activities over the last 
decade, there has been little comparative analysis of such activities and 
there have been few attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of military 
cooperation and assistance….  Similarly, although Western states have 
been seeking to support the democratisation of civil-military relations in 
Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and South America, these projects 
have remained largely separate and there has been little comparative 
analysis of the challenges involved and the effectiveness of different 
forms of assistance.  Western governments can and should do more to 
establish formal procedures and mechanisms for evaluating the 
effectiveness of defence diplomacy activities, and should undertake more 
comparative analysis of the lessons to be learned from experiences in 
different regions and countries (pp. 76-77). 
 
2.11.2 Outcomes - Training 
 
On the specific issue of measuring the Outcomes from training, Read and 
Kleiner (1996) stressed that:  
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The final phase of the training process, and probably the most important 
in terms of increasing effectiveness, is evaluation.  The old adage holds: 
“that which gets measured gets done”.  It is important that someone has 
the responsibility for developing an efficient training programme and that 
this efficiency be measured.  To be considered effective, the dollar value 
of the benefits of training, such as increased productivity, must exceed 
the training costs (pp. 28-29).  
 
Foxworth (2012) noted that “one of the problems identified was that military 
units and businesses conduct training and in several instances do so without 
standardized processes to measure training transfer” (pp. 52-53).  Foxworth 
(2012) added that “another significant problem identified was that organizations 
continually question how dollars invested in training are realized in the 
workplace in tangible ways” (p. 53).  
 
Other writers asked whether the wrong Outcomes had been set with regard to 
training.  Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) asserted that while “the 
military has focused much attention on the development of replicable and 
generalizable training systems,” many are designed “without considering the 
effectiveness and efficacy of embedded instructional strategies”  (p. 1490).  
Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) asserted that military training is 
“generally more concerned with the same training outcomes being achieved in a 
timely and inexpensive manner – that is, effective training in the military may 
mean the same learning outcomes achieved in less time” and proposed that it is 
important for military training systems to move “to a learner-centered approach 
which employs instructional strategies that are consistent with trainees’ 
cognitive architecture and the specific goals of the training environment” (p. 
1492).    
 
2.11.3 Outcomes - Education 
 
Addressing the Outcome of military education in a more general manner, Foot 
(2001) concluded by noting “the positive contribution combined defence 
colleges can make to regional security,” and while conceding that the 
experience “demonstrates some limitations,” provided commentary that: 
 
any educational and training institution in the military and security field 
should be about adding value, exploring potential, developing 
understanding, establishing international linkages and addressing 
security in its widest meaning (p. 127).     
 
2.11.4 Outcomes - Are Measurable 
 
Some of the literature stressed that simply because Outcomes have not been 
measured, that does not mean that they cannot be measured.  Reveron (2010) 
wrote that Outcomes can and have been measured, asserting that:  
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Security assistance programs have clearly measurable objectives 
beyond the good feeling generated by improving people’s lives.  These 
include the strength of regional security arrangements, the types of 
regional cooperation (air, maritime, land, customs, etc.) and the relative 
receptivity of U.S. forces within the partner country.  Internal to countries, 
one can measure how well partners combat security challenges, the 
strength of civil-military relations, and the levels of respect for human 
rights (pp. 174-175). 
 
2.11.5 Outcomes - Measurement by US Africa Command 
 
Reveron (2010) cited as one example the fact that US military commands 
recognise the significance of measuring the effectiveness of their assistance 
programmes.  The US Africa Command, noted Reveron (2010), uses three 
strategic end states that allow for measurement:  
 
1) African countries can provide for their own security and can contribute to 
security on the continent, measured, for example, by participation in 
peacekeeping operations and “the relative ability of the government to combat 
threats.”  
 
2) African governments have the capability to mitigate the threats from 
“organizations committed to violent extremism,” measured, for example, by 
levels of internal violence, or levels of cooperation between nations and 
international organizations regarding security issues, and  
 
3) African countries maintain professional military forces that respect the rule of 
law and the norms regarding human rights, measured, for example, by human 
rights abuses committed by the military (p. 175).  
 
2.11.6 Outcomes - Measurement Regarding GPOI 
 
Another study of a US government programme provided additional detail with 
regard to the effort to determine Outcomes by measuring military and political 
goals.  Assessing the US Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), Serafino 
(2007) noted that members of Congress had expressed concerns over several 
shortcomings of the GPOI concept, including “a lack of a strategic plan and 
evaluation program” (p. CRS-17).  Serafino (2007) reported that Congress had 
four questions of particular concern, which appeared to be metrics for assessing 
the achievement of specific goals: 
 
(1) Is GPOI meeting its target number of trainees? (2) Are those trained 
by GPOI to be trainers actually training other troops?  (3) Are the soldiers 
(and police) trained under GPOI actually deployed to international 
peacekeeping operations? (4) Is the training provided sufficient to enable 
soldiers … to handle the necessary range of peacekeeping tasks 
effectively? (p. CRS-19).   
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Serafino (2007) noted that the US awarded a contract to DFI International to 
develop a system to evaluate GPOI and to monitor its results against those 
metrics, and that data had been gathered to answer the first question with some 
confidence and work was under way to collect data to answer the second and 
third questions (p. CRS-19).  Serafino (2007) concluded that while the numbers 
“indicate that it is possible that US-funded GPOI training efforts may indeed 
reach the GPOI goal of 75,000 troops trained” (p. CRS-19) one area in which 
the numbers may fall short of some expectations, however, “is the proportion of 
numbers of peacekeeping trainers who are trained” noting that “the available 
data show that trainers have comprised only 6% of those trained” (p. CRS-20).    
 
2.11.7 Outcomes - Absence of Clear Aims 
 
The difficulty of measuring Outcomes may be due to the fact that Outcomes 
have not been clearly stated.  Glantz (1998b) commented on the “achievements 
and shortcomings in the US assistance program” (p. 1), and, as noted earlier, 
asserted that four issues “are generating some concern and confusion in the 
countries receiving military assistance” with the first question centred on overall 
US aims (p. 2).  One issue of particular relevance to the discussion of 
Outcomes involved “the continued and persistent absence among the stated 
aims and objectives of US military assistance of any direct reference to 
improving the security posture or defensive capabilities of countries receiving 
the assistance” (Glantz, 1998b, pp. 2-3).   
 
A lack of clarity regarding Outcomes can also arise from organizational and 
procedural shortcomings.  Szayna et al (2004) assessed the US Army’s security 
cooperative activities and asserted that bureaucratic procedures and structures 
prevent the clear delineation of Outcomes.  Szayna et al (2004) judged that the 
Army “does not possess a comprehensive understanding and appreciation of 
the extent of the Army’s activities in security cooperation” (p. xiii) and that under 
the Department of Defense definitions, “security cooperation” broadly covers a 
wide range of activities conducted with allies and friends that build relationships, 
military capabilities and also provide access to US forces (p. 7).   
 
As a result, Szayna et al (2004) asserted that “there is no effective linkage 
between the execution of security cooperation missions and the provision of 
accurate planning information,” which leaves the Army without “effective 
measures to influence resource planning and management for these activities” 
(p. xiii).  The conclusion drawn by Szayna et al (2004) was that the security 
cooperation planning process “is exceedingly complex, includes a multitude of 
actors, and suffers from problematic incentive systems, incomplete information 
exchange, and a difficulty in measuring performance” (p. 2) citing in particular “a 
lack of good measures of effectiveness” (p. 63).   
 
2.11.8 Outcomes - Professional Military Education (PME) 
 
One controversial example highlighted the significance of determining 
Outcomes from military assistance programmes and whether they achieve 
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military and political goals.  Ruby and Gibler (2010) noted that US professional 
military education (PME) had “commonly been blamed for training some of the 
worst abusers of human rights,” but concluded that the US programme has 
proven “to be an important stabilizing force during times of democratic 
transition” (p. 339).  Ruby and Gibler (2010) asserted that their case study 
uncovered very few cases of US PME officers linked to human rights abuses 
and that the programme actually “provided the initial infrastructure needed to 
begin domestic military education programs that encouraged civilian control of 
the military in emerging democracies” (p. 339).   
 
Citing specific participants in US PME training, Ruby and Gibler (2010, p. 340) 
conceded that the School of the Americas trained Argentina’s dictators Roberto 
Viola and Leopoldo Galtieri, Panama’s Manuel Noriega and Omar Torrijos, 
Peru’s Juan Velasco Alvarado and Ecuador’s Guillermo Rodriguez, the leader 
of the Grupo Colina death squad in Alberto Fujimori’s Peru, four of the five 
officers who ran Battalion 3-16 in Honduras which controlled death squads, and 
the commander responsible for the 1994 Ocosingo massacre in Mexico. 
However, Ruby and Gibler (2010) stressed that “while these examples are 
horrifying and constitute some of the worst outcomes of American military 
training, they do not represent the bulk of foreign military education programs in 
the United States” (p. 340).   
 
Instead, Ruby and Gibler (2010) concluded that, contrary to popular opinion, US 
PME “provides an important stabilizing force, especially in emerging 
democracies” and the programme “also provides professional and technical 
education and extensive exposure to democratic values,” commenting that they:  
 
…examine the effects of US PME on the likelihood of military coups 
d’etat, finding that professional military education of foreign officers does 
lead to increased stability abroad.  We support these large-N findings 
with case studies on the effectiveness of US PME in maintaining military 
stability in three countries: Argentina, Greece and Taiwan (p. 340).   
 
In light of their assessment of this particular political goal as an important 
Outcome, Ruby and Gibler (2010) proposed that:  
 
…educating foreign officers through US PME helps strengthen 
developing democratic trends.  In addition to the obvious benefits of 
military to military linkages, the US PME system encourages political 
stability and a democratization for foreign militaries.  Our large-N 
analyses show that foreign officers educated in US PME decrease the 
likelihood of coups d’etat in their home countries, and this finding persists 
despite the addition of individual country controls for alliance with the 
United States, presence of the Cold War, regime type, wealth, or 
changes in wealth.  Our case studies extend these findings – in each of 
our cases, political instability declined with abundant use of US PME, 
and US PME permanently altered the attitudes of military officers toward 
accepting civilian authority (p. 359). 
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2.11.9 Outcomes - Causality 
 
There was also a valuable discussion in the literature regarding the extent to 
which even if Outcomes are measured, whether causality can indeed be 
determined.  Szayna et al (2004) asserted that:   
 
In general, it is difficult to measure objectively the effectiveness of 
security cooperation.  Usually, the goals are vague and/or aim at 
contributing to preventing something from happening.  Proving causality 
for something that did not happen is an almost impossible task with 
regard to security cooperation.  The general principle is that the broader 
the DoD guidelines, the more difficult it is to come up with measures of 
effectiveness (p. 66).   
 
Mott (2002) asserted the need to assess “the relevant features that affect donor 
success in providing military assistance” (p. x).   
 
2.11.10 Outcomes - BALTBAT: General Comments 
 
The issue of Outcomes was particularly significant with regard to BALTBAT.  
Some analysts were critical of the military Outcomes of the initiative.  Austin 
(1999)  judged that the Baltic nations in 1999 were still not prepared to meet 
NATO obligations, and was sharply critical of BALTBAT, calling it politically 
important, but "militarily useless" (p. 1).  Austin (1999) called for the Baltic 
governments to develop standing armies for national defence, and while 
conceding that BALTBAT was useful in learning Western military techniques, 
this could not be the basis for an entire military force (p. 2).    
 
In direct response to Austin (1999), Kazocins (1999) asserted that BALTBAT is 
"one of the most successful examples of military cooperation in the Baltic region 
and serves as a good example of what can be done, given the necessary will 
and determination" (p. 47), adding that the training of hundreds of Baltic military 
personnel into a single unit familiar with Western doctrine was a remarkable 
accomplishment.  Linkevicius (1999) proposed that BALTBAT led to a 
systematic working relationship between the Baltic and supporting states, in 
contrast to a situation that was “spontaneous and chaotic during the preceding 
years.”  Dalbins (1996) stressed that coordinated Baltic defence capabilities, 
supported by integration into Western security structures, were critical to 
Latvian defence, and the most successful example of that cooperation was 
BALTBAT.   
 
Echoing these views, Sapronas (1999) wrote that BALTBAT was an effort that 
produced Outcomes: 
 
In reality, the establishment of a modern Western-type multinational 
battalion from scratch in the countries that basically had no regular 
armed forces was a truly Herculean task.  Looking back to the early days 
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of the project, one tends to conclude that even those who understood the 
complexities and difficulties involved in the project tended to 
underestimate them.  Otherwise they probably would not have started 
the project at all (p. 57). 
 
Sapronas (1999) did not hesitate to outline criticism of the project.  There was 
resistance from the Baltic military forces not working on BALTBAT due to use of 
resources on what was viewed as a political project.  Many Baltic officers 
believed BALTBAT training was not relevant to national defence needs, and 
BALTBAT was viewed as an elite unit where the motivation was financial.  
Moreover, Sapronas (1999) asserted that between 1995 and 1997, the fixation 
of the donor states to find a deployment for BALTBAT generated a situation 
where the Baltic defence structures were working for BALTBAT, rather than the 
reverse (p. 61).   
 
On balance, however, Sapronas (1999) supported BALTBAT and its delivery of 
Outcomes, and emphasized that it provided immediate immersion of the military 
forces of the Baltic countries into the critical requirements for modern defence 
cooperation, with the most valuable result being the spill-over to the remainder 
of the national defence forces.  Sapronas (1999, pp. 59-60) asserted that 
BALTBAT was critical to providing Baltic defence forces with a chance to 
become familiar with Western military forces, and galvanized Baltic defence 
cooperation.  In addition, BALTBAT allowed Western capitals to provide aid to a 
joint programme, rather than three national projects, while not generating 
Russian ire.  Making the point that the political leadership of BALTBAT 
recognized the need for a course change, Sapronas (1999) judged that 
ultimately there was a gradual emphasis on establishing BALTBAT within 
national defence structures and generating the required Outcomes.   
 
Echoing the point about continued reflection on achieving Outcomes regarding 
political and military goals, Kazocins (1999, p. 51) stressed that the political 
leadership was not fixated on original goals, but showed flexibility in addressing 
new challenges “within the context of developing Baltic national self-defence 
capabilities and the emphasis placed on wise use of limited resources.”  
Kazocins (1999, pp. 50-51) cited the “Political Guidance” signed by the Baltic 
Defence Ministers in 1999 with a clear redefinition of priorities regarding 
BALTBAT.  At the top of the list was enhancing development of national forces 
and self-defence capabilities.  The next item was promoting NATO 
interoperability.  The third item was providing a peace support capability.  The 
fourth item was optimising use of resources.  Such decisions, asserted 
Kazocins (1999, p. 51), indicate “responsible defence management” and 
political decision-making critical to the project through continued re-assessment 
of priorities. 
 
2.11.11 Outcomes - BALTBAT: National Defence Capabilities 
 
With regard to the military goal of development of national defence forces as an 
Outcome, Kazocins (1999, p. 52) asserted that BALTBAT contributed to the 
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development of national forces by transmitting training to other parts of the 
national military.  Brett (2001) concluded that BALTBAT not only met its original 
objectives, but contributed to the development of Baltic national defence 
capabilities (p. 7).  Brett (2001) noted that BALTBAT instructors provided 
invaluable support, which the Baltic capitals drew on to put into place national 
training structures that could handle most military training (p. 6).  The project 
also provided Baltic Defence Ministries with the opportunity to work on a 
concrete project under the tutelage of more experienced military forces.  More 
generally, Brett (2001) proposed that such experiences encouraged democratic 
control of military forces (p. 5).   
 
Viksne (2002) asserted that one of the key roles of BALTBAT was to “act as a 
conduit through which western military norms and culture” were introduced into 
Latvia’s military forces and that personnel who served in BALTBAT returned to 
other units of the Latvian armed forces “bringing their experience with them and 
this has proved a particularly successful means to disseminate experience” (p. 
99).  Clemmesen (1999, p. 39) noted that Latvia and Lithuania began their 
efforts to establish military infrastructure and facilities in 1994 in order to have 
national centres for BALTBAT while the larger work to establish quality national 
infrastructure only began in 1998, indicating that BALTBAT provided the 
impetus for work in that area.   
 
Linkevicius (1999) highlighted the fact that BALTBAT played a role in training 
officers and non-commissioned officers, and that the programme turned general 
discussions of aid into concrete military assistance, and turned a chaotic 
process into a systematic project.  Skrastins (1995, pp. 46-47) noted that close 
cooperation among Baltic state military forces was critical not only to address 
practical issues, but also to make the political point that they could reach joint 
decisions and address a wide range of problems together.   
   
Returning to the specific issue of achieving military goals as Outcomes, and the 
challenges faced by the Baltic governments, it appeared that the Baltic military 
forces did well.  Clemmesen (1999) judged the Baltic military forces made 
impressive progress between 1991 and 1999, having received aid that 
significantly increased over the years, which was a perspective shared by 
Bajarunas (2000).  Von Riekhoff (2004) concluded that “the efforts to create 
national defense forces from a zero basis have been impressive, and these 
have advanced in tandem with the establishment of the requisite mechanisms 
for proper democratic civilian control of the military” (p. 135).  Kramer (2002) 
asserted that “the Baltic states had to create their armies from scratch after 
1991, a task that would have been difficult even for much larger countries” (p. 
744).  Analysis of specific assistance, such as Mannik (2002) regarding the 
extent of aid from Finland for Estonia, assessed the impact of particular efforts, 
while Clemmesen (2000) commented that over time there was increasing 
willingness to provide assistance to the Baltic governments.  
 
While there were recommendations for improvements on BALTBAT training 
from Raunio (2002) and Moeller (2000) and suggestions on re-evaluation of the 
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status and mission of BALTBAT from Zalkans (1999), much of the commentary 
was positive, with recommendations for improvements.  Indeed, Brett (2001, p. 
7) agreed that BALTBAT could have done more to assist in the development of 
national defence capabilities, highlighting the importance of bolstering synergies 
which would benefit development of national defence.  Brett (2001, pp. 59-60) 
noted that between 1996 and 1998, there were missed opportunities to provide 
BALTBAT benefits to national forces, and the twin problems were that 
BALTBAT became separated from national defence development and was not 
adequately supported by national defence efforts.  While some of this was 
unavoidable, more could have been done to have BALTBAT bolster 
development of national defence capabilities. 
  
2.11.12 Outcomes - BALTBAT: Deployments 
 
One measure of BALTBAT Outcomes was that approximately 1200 Baltic 
soldiers served in BALTBAT, with training and exposure to modern military 
practices.  There were also overseas missions which provided practical 
experience.  The Estonians deployed in Lebanon alongside the Norwegians.  
Sweden guided the Latvian deployment in Bosnia.  Denmark handled the 
deployment of all three Baltic companies to Bosnia.  Brett (2001) asserted that 
such deployments with Nordic forces provided valuable experience for Baltic 
personnel (p. 5).  Sapronas (2002)  asserted that the effect participation in 
international operations had on the “development and professionalization of the 
Lithuanian armed forces cannot be overestimated” (p. 103), with Urbelis and 
Urbonas (2002) noting that more than 580 Lithuanian military personnel 
participated in international missions, which constituted about 10% of 
Lithuania’s professional soldiers (p. 115).   
 
However, BALTBAT as a whole never deployed for a peacekeeping operation 
(PKO), although this was one of the initial goals of BALTBAT.  This raised the 
question of whether BALTBAT did indeed achieve the desired Outcomes.  
Moller (2000, p. 38) and Sapronas (1999, pp. 61-62) listed the numerous 
reasons why BALTBAT could not deploy as a whole, which involved a variety of 
issues ranging from logistical support to sustainability to the size of BALTBAT 
(700 personnel) which made it difficult to find a suitable UN PKO.  Ultimately, 
the BALTBAT Military Working Group decided to rotate the BALTBAT 
companies within SFOR forces in Bosnia.   
 
However, many commentators asserted that failure to deploy as a whole did not 
tarnish the accomplishments of BALTBAT.  Kazocins (1999) proposed that the 
goal was a Baltic contribution to a PKO, and that is what the Baltic companies 
accomplished.  The Danish view in 1997 was that BALTBAT could handle PKO 
duties on its own and eventually would be able to handle the entire range of 
peace support operations (PSOs), but there simply was not a suitable 
opportunity for BALTBAT, as a whole, to do so.  However, BALTBAT provided 
the basis for deployments of the individual companies.  Kazocins (1999, p. 52) 
asserted that it was not a mark of failure that BALTBAT changed its goals and 
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operations as circumstances required.  Indeed, the BALTBAT leadership 
showed that it was flexible.  
 
Moreover, with regard to achieving political goals, the deployments of BALTBAT 
companies contributed to Outcomes.  Archer and Jones (1999, p. 171) stressed 
that it was apparent the Baltic countries would need to make their case for 
membership, and the concrete work with NATO forces was beneficial and also 
allowed the Baltic governments to make the case that they could contribute to 
providing Western security.  Supporting that view, Asmus and Nurick (1996) 
emphasized the importance for the Baltic states of participating in larger 
Western security efforts, such as peacekeeping, to establish that they were not 
just "consumers" of security, and, indeed, recommending expansion of 
BALTBAT and the other Baltic assistance programmes (p. 131).  Clemmesen 
(2000) noted that it was politically important to have visible participation in 
international operations, but added the caveat that this should not compromise 
the goal of developing a self-defence capability (p. 7).   
 
2.11.13 Outcomes - BALTRON 
 
As the issue regarding Outcomes was whether military and political goals 
associated with the military assistance programme were achieved, the case 
could be made that Outcomes from BALTBAT could also include the other 
Baltic military assistance projects which were subsequently initiated.  If 
BALTBAT proved to be an effective method for donor states to assist the Baltic 
governments, other specialized forms of such cooperation would be possible, 
and would indicate that BALTBAT achieved its political and military goals. 
 
The idea of a Baltic Naval Squadron was first raised in 1995, and, under 
German leadership, BALTRON was inaugurated on 28 August 1998.  It had an 
operational task of mine-countermeasures (MCM) with the goal of raising Baltic 
self-defence capabilities and interoperability with NATO/PfP forces.  BALTRON 
forces participated in various multinational maritime exercises.   
 
Assisting in making the case that the Baltic states were suitable candidates for 
membership in NATO, Alsauskas (2000) noted that BALTRON trained to NATO 
procedures and standards.  Walter (2001, p. 115) asserted that BALTRON 
provided a good start for combined naval force development, noting the 
importance for the Baltic governments of participating in Western training and 
exercises.  
 
2.11.14 Outcomes - BALTNET 
 
Another Outcome from BALTBAT was the Baltic Air Surveillance Network 
(BALTNET) which was first discussed in 1994.  The Baltic Defence Ministers 
made the decision in 1997 to locate the Regional Airspace Surveillance 
Coordination Centre (RASCC) in Kaunas, Lithuania.  Norway took the lead in 
coordinating support, and BALTNET began operations on 6 June 2000.    
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Vaiksnoras (2002) provided worthwhile background on the initiative, noting that 
it originated in the 1994 US proposal of a Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI) 
which funded the establishment of airspace surveillance centres in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  In view of Russian airspace violations, this addressed a key 
concern of the Baltic capitals, and the system was NATO interoperable.  
Vaiksnoras (2002) highlighted the fact that the US opted for a single system for 
the three Baltic countries, rather than creation of national centres, as was done 
in other states.  As a result, the RASCC was located in Kaunas, Lithuania, 
which forced integration of key parts of the three Baltic defence infrastructures 
in the area of airspace surveillance and control.  Vaiksnoras (2002) asserted 
that this was a unique example of cooperation, as air defence still remained the 
responsibility of each Baltic state, but the approach gave the three Baltic forces 
experience and training which would make it easier to integrate air surveillance 
and air defence assets into the NATO system. 
 
Winner (2002) highlighted “sensible and politically savvy joint efforts,” citing the 
“creation of a joint radar station that monitors civilian air traffic but can also be 
linked to NATO’s air–defence network” as having “augmented each country’s 
armed forces construction” (p. 209).  Szayna and Larrabee (1995) noted that 
“regional cooperation is no substitute for membership in Western Security 
organizations but can complement it in important areas,” asserting that 
cooperation in areas such as “airspace management and air defense would 
amount to the maximum use of resources” (p. 49). 
 
2.11.15 Outcomes - BALTDEFCOL 
 
Another Outcome from BALTBAT was the Baltic Defence College 
(BALTDEFCOL), which was first broached in 1996 with a Memorandum of 
Support signed on 12 June 1998.  Sweden took the lead role for this project, 
and the first senior staff course at the BALTDEFCOL was initiated on 16 August 
1999.   
 
Former Swedish Defence Minister von Sydow (1999) stressed that the mission 
of the BALTDEFCOL was to establish the basis for producing educated officers, 
guided by a multinational faculty, who would be the future of the Baltic defence 
forces, adding the aim of having the Baltic governments assume responsibility 
for the BALTDEFCOL.  Clemmesen (1999) noted that all three Baltic states use 
the BALTDEFCOL as the main site for training General Staff officers (p. 37).  As 
cited previously under Mechanisms, Foot (2001) gave high praise to the 
BALTDEFCOL, noting that it “is best viewed as part of the Baltic region’s 
security arrangements and one of the substantially indigenous means of 
sustaining regional security” (p. 119). 
 
Fischer (2003) stressed that the BALTDEFCOL is an excellent example of the 
"Baltification" process, as the clear intent from the start was to give ownership 
to the Baltic governments as soon as they were able to handle the task (p. 13).  
Indeed, some commentators proposed a larger role for the BALTDEFCOL.  
Moeller (2000) asserted that common Baltic doctrine and tactics must be 
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developed at the brigade and battalion level, as using UK doctrine and tactics, a 
topic addressed in Section 2.10.3, would not be the best long-term course for 
the Baltic governments, and this is the natural task for the BALTDEFCOL, with 
advice from officers from the supporting nations (pp. 41-42).   
 
2.11.16 Outcomes - Review 
 
The specific question regarding Outcomes was:  Are the military and political 
goals associated with the military assistance programme achieved?  There was 
substantial disagreement on whether or not definition and measurement of 
Outcomes was being addressed.  Cottey and Forster (2004) asserted that 
mechanisms for evaluating Outcomes are not in place.  Read and Kleiner 
(1996), Foxworth (2012) and Vogel-Walcutt, Fiorella and Malone (2013) all 
shared the view that the military in particular has not considered how to 
measure training Outcomes. 
 
However, Reveron (2010) asserted that it is possible to measure Outcomes, 
and the assessment by Serafino (2007) of the GPOI indicated it is possible.  
Glantz (1998b) and Szayna (2004) emphasized the significance of having clear 
aims to generate Outcomes.  Finally, commentary regarding the Outcomes from 
BALTBAT, from developing national defence capabilities to generating 
subsequent Baltic military assistance initiatives, appeared to indicate that it did 
succeed in generating the required Outcomes. 
 
2.12  Narrative Literature Review on the Political/Historical Context 
 
The systematic literature review conducted on military assistance was 
necessary to examine the state of analysis regarding that particular issue.  It 
was also important to analyse the literature to outline the political, military and 
historical context in which BALTBAT and the Baltic initiatives were generated.  
As indicated in the CIMO questions noted above, the focus of this research was 
on the significance of political decisions between the donor and recipient states 
with regard to the military assistance initiatives.  As a result, the political context 
was relevant.  However, as this was to provide a framework and context, a 
narrative literature review was sufficient. 
 
2.12.1 Russia 
 
The Baltic and Western governments had to decide how to develop the military 
capabilities of the Baltic countries in a delicate political environment.  While the 
Baltic states regained their independence in 1991, Russian forces did not 
complete their withdrawal from Lithuania until August 1993 and from Latvia and 
Estonia until August 1994.  Kramer (2002) noted that “the Russian government 
took numerous steps during the decade after 1991 that caused a good deal of 
unease and acrimony in relations with the Baltic states” (p. 734).  The Baltic 
governments were concerned about Russian policy, as the Russian army 
rehearsed and discussed invasion scenarios for the Baltic nations (Blank, 1997, 
p. 14) and comments from the Russian military indicated they would not 
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withdraw from the Baltic nations under any circumstances (Latter, 1992, p. 2).  
Moreover, even after the Russian troop withdrawals, Dalsjo (1998) asserted that 
“Given the history and geography of the Baltic three, it is understandable that 
the possibility of a major and deliberate Russian attack on them cannot be 
discounted” (p. 41).    
 
In addition, Oznobistchev (1994) and Godzimirski (1999) highlighted Russian 
sensitivity regarding the Baltic nations and objections to their membership in 
NATO.  Velliste (1994) noted that comments from Moscow regarding its 
responsibilities in the “near abroad” generated unease in the Baltic states, a 
point supported by Sapronas (2002).  More generally, Morozov (2003) asserted 
that Russian policy towards the Baltic governments is “deeply entrenched in 
Russian political culture and the domestic political situation" (p. 231).  As a 
result of these points of tension, the Baltic countries sought security guarantees 
from the West (Lejins, 1994, p. 33).       
 
It had been asserted that there was a gap between what the Russians said they 
would do, and what they were capable of doing.  Blank (1997, p. 19) judged that 
Moscow recognised it would not be able to enforce its views by military action, 
and Bodie (1993, pp. 15 and 18) outlined the poor state of the Russian military.  
Dalsjo (1998) concurred that the Russian Army “is only a shadow of the once 
mighty Soviet Army, in quality as well as in quantity, and would be hard-pressed 
to launch a traditional invasion” (p. 41).  However, the critical result of Russian 
statements was the generation of concern in Baltic capitals.  Bodie (1993, p. 13) 
commented that the Baltic nations were confused by the messages coming out 
of Russia, and Latter (1992, p. 17) noted that those messages generated 
unease in the Baltic countries.    
 
With regard to the underlying causes of the strained relations between the Baltic 
capitals and Moscow, Knudsen (1999, p. 5) proposed that two theories drive the 
relationship, without coming down strongly in favour of either theory.  He noted 
that the first theory is great power rivalry (the Baltic nations as part of the US-
Russian rivalry) and the second theory is imperialism (with Russia imposing 
pressure on smaller states due to various factors, such as politics, culture or the 
economy).  Alternatively, Sergeyev (1999, p. 26) asserted that Moscow does 
not have a long-term Baltic policy based on Russian national interests, but 
merely reacts to Russian domestic players which make issues such as Russian 
minorities an issue critical to the nation, with Moshes (1999) supporting the view 
that Moscow does not have a genuine Baltic policy.  Some writers such as 
Kvaerno (2000) and Das Kundu (2003, p. 470) emphasized the change in 
Russian policies toward the Baltic nations over time as the 1990s progressed.  
 
One reason for friction between Russia and the Baltic nations centred on 
Moscow’s security policy concerns.  Oznobistchev (1994) noted that it was hard 
for Moscow to give up the Baltic ports, which gave the USSR access to the 
Baltic Sea and the Atlantic (p. 105).  Godzimirski (1999) commented that in 
1992, the Commander of the General Staff Academy listed the conditions for a 
powerful Russia, one of which was free Russian access to Baltic state seaports, 
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and another was exclusion of other military forces from the Baltic countries and 
non-membership of the Baltic nations in military blocs (p. 37).  Blank (1997) 
stressed that NATO's sea and air launched cruise missiles would pass through 
Baltic air space to get to Moscow, so the early warning and other defence 
systems in the Baltic states were important (pp. 7-8).  Latter (1992) highlighted 
the problem of the isolation of the Kaliningrad region (a map is included at page 
xiii), which served in the early 1990s as the redeployment centre for Russian 
troops departing Poland and the former East Germany (pp. 13-14). 
 
Another cause of friction between Russia and the Baltic countries was the 
Russian minority populations in Estonia and Latvia (there was no sizeable 
Russian community in Lithuania).  Velliste (1994) cited an article written in 1992 
which outlined a proposal to use defence of Russians in non-Russian states as 
a foreign policy tool under the guise of defending human rights (pp. 58-59).  
Asmus and Nurick (1996) addressed the significance of this matter as a cause 
of regional tension, a view supported by Latter (1992).   
 
Viewing the Russian-Baltic difficulties as an issue of behaviour, Lejins (1994) 
asserted that even senior Russian policy-makers had a psychological barrier to 
accepting Baltic independence (p. 33).  Das Kundu (2003) added the 
assessment that “a majority of Russia’s political elite still considers the Baltic 
states as part of Russia’s sphere of influence, and there is still an inclination to 
show big brotherly attitude towards them” (p. 479).  
 
2.12.2 NATO and the West 
 
As a result of concerns regarding Moscow, the Baltic governments sought 
NATO membership.  NATO had expressed in 1991 its support for "the 
expectations and legitimate aspirations of the Baltic peoples" (North Atlantic 
Council, 1991, para. 7).  However, Russia had made it clear that it would not 
accept Baltic state membership in NATO, and even threatened to terminate 
cooperative efforts with the West (Blank, 1997, p. v), which contributed to the 
doubts in key European capitals about the Baltic nations joining NATO (Asmus 
and Nurick, 1996, p. 123).  Blank (2000) commented that this generated 
problems for NATO about challenging Russia (p. 7) and Latter (1994) judged 
that while NATO could not accept a situation where Russia could veto a NATO 
decision to accept new members, it also wanted to avoid aiding Russian 
conservatives criticizing the Yeltsin government.    
 
Germany, noted Blank (1997, p. vi), “steadily backtracked since 1993 on Baltic 
admission into NATO” due to its concern over Russian opposition.  Krohn 
(1999, pp. 114-115) concurred that Germany kept a low profile regarding the 
Baltic countries.  He listed six factors for that policy decision, one of which was 
a desire to help the Baltic governments, but not strain relations with Russia.   
 
Knudsen (1999) asserted that the US sought a separate security arrangement 
in which the Baltic states could be provided security without having to become 
NATO members (p. 6), noting that the Baltic Charter of January 1998 between 
 47 
the US and the Baltic countries was a political document, but certainly not a 
security guarantee (p. 15).   
 
A part of this discussion was the military feasibility of NATO actually coming to 
the aid of the Baltic nations.  Wallin and Andersson (2001) proposed that “the 
proper question is not whether the Baltics can be defended, it is how and 
against which contingencies the Baltics can be defended,” adding that this has 
to do “with what help the international community is prepared to offer the Baltic 
states, both when building up their defence forces and in an actual war” (p. 96). 
 
It was therefore significant that NATO had expressed its emphasis on PKO 
activities, including it as an objective within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
Framework Document (North Atlantic Council, 1994a, para. 3).  In the PfP 
Invitation document (North Atlantic Council, 1994b), NATO proposed 
peacekeeping field exercises within the PfP framework beginning in 1994.  The 
Invitation document also sent the Baltic governments a clear signal, noting that 
"active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in 
the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO."    
 
A focus on peacekeeping had many advantages for the Baltic and donor states.  
Sapronas (1999) asserted that it was easier for Western countries to support 
BALTBAT than provide direct military aid to the Baltic governments, as it could 
not be considered provocative (p. 59).  Djalso (1999) highlighted the fact that as 
late as 1999 Western donors focused their attention on BALTBAT assistance, 
training, non-lethal equipment and light arms, while anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
weapons, night-vision devices, modern communications and heavier equipment 
were not on offer to the Baltic military forces.  Cambone (1994) indicated that 
the US at that time was supportive of PKO activities (p. 75).  Moreover, the PKO 
focus cemented Nordic support, with Dahl (1999) having commented that 
Sweden, which had been scrupulous about its policy of neutrality, was from the 
outset supportive of Baltic efforts to develop PKO capabilities, as well as the 
other Baltic programmes (p. 144).    
   
2.12.3 The Nordic States 
 
Russian statements reinforced the determination of the Nordic and other 
Western nations to support the Baltic countries.  Blank (1997) asserted that 
while Western pronouncements and actions were not security guarantees, they 
were a useful response to aggressive Russian statements (p. 29).  Swedish 
Prime Minister Bildt (1994) provided the justification for multinational support for 
the Baltic capitals, emphasising that assisting the Baltic states would also assist 
the process of reform in Russia, and writing that “the security of the Baltic 
nations needs to be assured by integration with the institutions of the West” (p. 
85).   
 
Vaerno (1999) commented that the Nordic states largely believed that with the 
end of the Cold War, they faced no direct military threat, but were concerned 
about developments in Russia and Moscow’s intentions regarding the Baltic 
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nations.  Archer and Jones (1999) highlighted the objective Nordic interest: a 
Russian-Baltic conflict which spun out of control could generate social and 
economic disruption, and possibly refugees (p. 175).  In addition, Vaerno (1999, 
pp. 194-5) pointed out that the Nordic governments had the responsibility for 
assisting the Baltic countries thrust upon them.  Asmus and Nurick (1996) 
asserted that the ability of the Baltic countries to achieve political, economic and 
military reform depended on enhanced cooperation with the Nordic capitals, and 
a key component of a NATO strategy to assist the Baltic nations was 
encouraging the Nordic states to enhance ties with the Baltic governments (pp. 
132-3). 
 
Lehti (2003) highlighted the responsibilities felt by the Nordic states once the 
Baltic countries regained their independence, and one aspect was a need to 
"control, educate and patronize" the Baltic capitals to manage Baltic-Russian 
tension (p. 25).  Dahl (1999) commented that the Baltic region was central to 
Swedish foreign policy, and Bergman (2006, p. 74) noted that the Nordic states 
worked “to contribute to the solidification of Baltic independence and re-entry 
into the international community” (p. 74).   
 
However, Bergman (2000) and Knudsen (1999) asserted that while there was 
Nordic unity on aid for the Baltic capitals, there was also agreement they would 
not accept regional responsibility for Baltic security.  Vaerno (1999) concurred, 
asserting the Nordic states wanted to support security for the Baltic countries, 
but within a larger security structure, as they wanted to avoid anything 
resembling a regional arrangement that would involve them in Russian-Baltic 
disputes as well as any arrangement that would have them negotiating alone 
directly with Moscow (p. 200).  Bergman (2000) highlighted the comments from 
then-Danish Defence Minister Haekkerup in 1997 at the Second Annual 
Stockholm Conference on Baltic Sea Security and Cooperation, which stressed 
that while the Nordic countries have a role to play, they cannot do it alone, and 
security for the Baltic governments must be within a comprehensive security 
structure. 
  
In addition, there were policy differences among the Nordic states.  Vaerno 
(1999) noted that Finland had a very careful Russia-first policy, while Sweden 
had a much more supportive policy towards the Baltic countries, emphasizing 
the need to develop Nordic-Baltic cooperation and Norway had a greater focus 
on Barents Sea cooperation as a framework for Russian cooperation (pp. 193-
194).  Archer and Jones (1999, p. 179) commented that Denmark was the most 
pro-Baltic nation, particularly on Baltic state membership in NATO, and that 
Norway was more cautious about NATO membership for the Baltic countries.   
Archer (1999) noted that the Nordic states “have demonstrated some noticeable 
differences in their involvement in security cooperation with the Baltic states” 
adding that “these have not detracted from the elements of complementarity 
and overlap in Nordic policies” (pp. 48-49).  In that respect, the focus on PKO 
was a basis for Nordic unity, as Brundtland (1994) noted that increased Nordic 
military cooperation was generated by common enthusiasm for PKO activities.    
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2.12.4 Unity of the Three Baltic States 
 
The extent and nature of unified policy among the Baltic states was an 
important aspect of the Baltic military initiatives.  Archer and Jones (1999) 
highlighted the common desire of the Baltic nations to be grounded in the 
overall context of European security, specifically NATO (p. 170). However, 
Baltic unity was often problematic.  Vayrynen (1999) noted the extent to which 
the three Baltic governments emphasized their differences to serve individual 
national interests, such as Estonia's effort to pursue EU membership (p. 208), 
resulting in a split among the Nordic states, with only Finland supporting the 
Estonian move.  Vayrynen (1999) asserted that Lithuania sought to move away 
from the Baltic countries and closer to Poland and Denmark (pp. 211-212), 
leaving Latvia to press for Baltic solidarity (p. 215).   Indeed, Vayrynen (1999) 
recounted that one former Lithuanian Foreign Minister noted that the Baltic 
governments should not be treated as a single entity, and that Lithuania hoped 
to be viewed as a Central European, rather than a Baltic state (p. 213).   
 
Supporting that assessment, Kolga (2006) commented that Baltic military 
cooperation faded after the three Baltic nations joined NATO.   Malakauskas 
(2000, p. 136) emphasized that “cases occur when the parties in the Baltic 
cooperation behave as if it were a zero-sum game where one participant can 
win only as much as the rest of the players lose” (p. 136).   Von Riekhoff (2004) 
noted that “in historical and cultural terms, diversity rather than unity has been 
the prevailing Baltic experience” (p. 109) highlighting the fact that Estonia and 
Latvia are ethnically and linguistically different, but have a common Protestant, 
Nordic heritage and a long affiliation with Germany and Scandinavia, while 
Lithuania is a Central European country with a Catholic, Baroque culture and 
close historical ties with Poland (p. 109).  Von Riekhoff (2004) asserted that 
“while an element of cooperation has continued,” the historical ties of the Baltic 
states has become more apparent.  Estonia has drawn closer to Finland, 
Lithuania is drawing closer to Poland and “it has not been as easy for Latvia to 
find an identifiable partner” (p. 109).  
 
2.12.5 Baltic State Military Capabilities 
 
It was important to highlight the very low baseline from which the Baltic nations 
developed their military forces.  The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS) (1992) provided the following numbers for the three Baltic countries in 
1991 at the time they regained their independence: 
 
Table 1 – Military Personnel Levels of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and 
Number of Stationed Russian Personnel in 1991 
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Total Armed 
Forces 
2,000 2,550 7,000 
Foreign Forces 
(Russia) 
23,000 40,000 43,000 
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The IISS (1992) noted that Estonia (p. 75) had Ground Forces consisting of a 
border guard, rapid reaction force and territorial defence unit.  Latvia (p. 78) had 
Ground Forces composed of one border guard brigade, one rapid reaction 
battalion and one coastal defence unit.  It had a Navy consisting of one Coast 
Guard division.  It had a home guard of 12,000 that could be mobilised.  
Lithuania (p. 79) had Ground Forces consisting of a border guard, a rapid 
reaction force and a territorial defence force. It had a National Guard of 12,500. 
 
By the time that BALTBAT was inaugurated in 1994, the Baltic governments 
had made some progress, although it was apparent that they remained militarily 
weak and lacking in capabilities.  Skrastins (1995, p. 43) cited a 1994 report 
which indicated the following military capabilities for the Baltic countries: 
 
Table 2 – Military Capabilities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1994 
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Regular Forces 5,300 11,600 10,000 
Reserves 8,000 15,100 10,400 
Aircraft (including 
helicopters) 
2 10 34 
Fleet (ships and 
boats) 
6 15 6 
 
Beyond the quantity of military forces, there was concern about the quality of 
the forces.  Skrastins (1995, pp. 39-40) noted that the Estonian military was 
equipped with items such as infantry weapons, anti-tank weapons and 38 
armoured vehicles.  The Latvians had only materiel such as infantry weapons 
and 14 armoured vehicles (p. 41).  Lithuania had an inventory which was largely 
infantry weapons, anti-tank grenade launchers and 36 armoured vehicles (p. 
38).  Skrastins (1995) asserted that "the weakest aspect in all three nations is 
the shortage of weapons and combat equipment, resulting from the little money 
which the nations can allocate to the re-establishment of their armies during the 
period of transition" (p. 43). 
 
The poor state of Baltic military forces at that time was also apparent in areas 
beyond equipment.  Former Lithuanian Defence Minister Linkevicius (1999) 
wrote that at independence the military was short of everything and there was 
no national security concept.  Former Latvian National Security Advisor Zalkans 
(1999) wrote that at the time of independence, the Latvian military had no threat 
analysis, defence concept, defence plan, knowledge of budgetary processes or 
force planning.  Clemmesen (2002) highlighted the fact that a majority of the 
people in the Baltic nations and most politicians considered it "futile to attempt 
to create independent self-defence forces” (p. 89), a point on which Djalso 
(1999) concurred.   
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With regard to the state of Baltic military capabilities at the time they joined 
NATO, the IISS (2004) provided the overall totals for the Baltic countries as 
follows: 
 
Table 3 – Number of Military Personnel and Reservists in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania in 2004 
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Total Armed 
Forces 
4,980 4,880 13,510 
Reserves 24,000 13,050 246,200 
 
The specific notations for each Baltic state indicated the progress that was 
made.  In the case of Estonia (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004, 
p. 47), the Army in 2004 had one infantry brigade (five battalions), 25 armoured 
personnel carriers, and a good supply of mortars, towed artillery and other 
modern equipment.  The Navy had three patrol and coastal combatants.  The 
Air Force had three fixed-wing aircraft and four helicopters.  In the case of 
Latvia (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004, p. 58), the Army forces 
included one mobile rifle brigade with one infantry battalion, 13 armoured 
personnel carriers, 26 towed artillery pieces and a good supply of other modern 
equipment.  The Navy had four patrol and coastal combatant vessels.  The Air 
Force included 14 fixed-wing aircraft and five helicopters.  In the case of 
Lithuania (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004, pp. 59-60), the 
Army had one reaction brigade with two mechanised infantry, two motorised 
infantry and one artillery battalion, with 22 armoured personnel carriers, 72 
pieces of 105 mm towed artillery and a substantial supply of other modern 
equipment.  The Navy had five patrol and coastal combatants.  The Air Force 
had 11 transport aircraft, six trainers and ten helicopters. 
 
2.13 The Lacuna 
 
A review of the literature indicated that while there were numerous models, 
such as organizational elements, which could be utilised, the CIMO model 
appeared to be most suitable for this research topic.  Moreover, there were 
numerous issues with regard to military assistance which could have been 
studied.  The use of military assistance as a tool of foreign policy, the decision-
making process within donor states and the impact of assistance on recipient 
state support for donor state policies were all critical topics.  It could also have 
been valuable to study the impact of military assistance on recipient states in 
areas such as economic and political development and human rights.   
 
However, without questioning the significance of all these issues, it was also 
apparent from the literature that another critical aspect of military assistance 
projects is the relationship between donor and recipient states.  It was also 
apparent from the literature that a significant component of this relationship 
involves political decisions regarding an initiative, as they constitute the 
foundation of the programme. 
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Utilising the CIMO model, with regard to the Context, as noted by Cottey and 
Forster (2004) and others, a critical aspect of any military assistance project is 
the relationship between donor and recipient states.  With regard to an 
Intervention for study, the literature from Mott (1999) and others highlighted the 
significance of broad political decisions on these initiatives.  With regard to 
Mechanisms, Glantz (1999) and others addressed the various factors which 
have an impact on these programmes.  Finally, on Outcomes, while there was 
debate about whether Outcomes can be defined and measured, Reveron 
(2010) made a good case that they can be measured, although other writers 
made a strong case that while this “can” be done, whether it actually “is” done 
by participants is questionable. 
 
To summarize, the review of the literature on military assistance programmes 
indicated a gap with regard to the significance of the Intervention of broad 
political decisions between donor and recipient states with regard to BALTBAT 
and the Baltic military assistance programmes.  In light of the comments 
regarding the significance of the Context of the donor-recipient relationship, it 
appeared that this topic was worthy of analysis.  There had been no historical 
study of the broad political decisions concerning BALTBAT and the other Baltic 
initiatives, or research into the extent to which this was a factor in the Outcomes 
from BALTBAT and the other projects.  The conduct of such a study indicated 
what factors (subsequently called Mechanisms) arose from the specific 
Intervention and generated Outcomes from the Baltic projects.  These 
Mechanisms are the elements of a model for effective military assistance 
projects which could be developed through further research.  The research 
conducted in this thesis therefore fills a gap in the body of knowledge regarding 
military assistance, and provides a contribution to academic work in this area, 
as well as practical guidance to those working on such initiatives.
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CHAPTER THREE:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters set forth the rationale concerning the academic 
value of researching the genesis and establishment of the Baltic military 
assistance programmes.  They outlined the importance of examining the 
political decisions reached by the donor and recipient states which provided the 
foundation for these initiatives.  They also established that these decisions have 
only received cursory attention from those working in the area of military 
assistance and no thorough academic review.  The proposition put forth for this 
thesis was that these decisions were essential for the success of BALTBAT and 
the other Baltic projects and that they were worthy of extensive research and 
analysis.  Referring back to the CIMO model highlighted in the Literature 
Review, these political decisions were a critical Intervention which, through 
various Mechanisms, were important in achieving the Outcomes desired from 
these military assistance initiatives.  
 
This chapter addresses the issue of how this research was conducted.  As 
BALTBAT was inaugurated in 1994, it was still possible to interview individuals 
who worked on the establishment of the Baltic programmes and directly obtain 
their views and recollections.  This indicated two reasons why this was a 
propitious time to conduct research on this topic.  The first reason was that the 
opportunity existed to interview and gather data from those who were "present 
at the creation."  Such an opportunity was of particular value to academics as 
well as those working on the operational aspects of military assistance, and was 
utilised while it remained available.  The second reason was that enough time 
had passed since the Baltic projects were initiated so that the participants had 
sufficient opportunity to reflect on what was decided, what was accomplished, 
and whether, in retrospect, they would have made a different decision. 
 
There were also numerous public documents regarding the Baltic initiatives 
which provided political statements on these projects, the processes put into 
place, and various other aspects of their implementation.  These documents 
provided a good source of primary material which could be compared with the 
information provided by interviews of those who established and worked on 
these programmes.  As will be outlined below, they provided for a degree of 
triangulation to compare and possibly validate the points made by the 
interviewees.   
 
In short, the opportunity existed to directly interview the people who worked to 
establish BALTBAT and the other initiatives, review many of the public 
documents regarding these projects, and assess the importance of the political 
decisions made by the donor and recipient states with regard to these 
programmes as an Intervention which, due to various Mechanisms, had a 
critical impact on the Outcomes of these military assistance projects.  The 
specific details regarding the conduct of the research are outlined below, 
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following a review of the overarching theoretical basis for the research 
methodology which appeared to be most appropriate for this thesis. 
 
3.2 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Analysis 
 
It is worthwhile at the onset of this analysis to highlight the admonition by 
Plummer (2005) that “research - like life - is a contradictory, messy affair” 
continuing with the comment that “only on the pages of 'how-to-do-it' research 
methods texts or in the classrooms of research methods courses can it be 
sorted out into linear stages, clear protocols, and firm principles” (p. 357).  
However, while recognizing that an excessively formal methodology generates 
a false sense of assurance regarding process and results, it remains important 
to outline the theoretical underpinnings for the methodology selected for this 
research, and the steps taken to generate validity and reliability, as well as 
results which could be potentially generalised. 
With regard to the selection of a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach 
for this research, Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011, p. 17) noted that “The 
outcomes of quantitative research lead to the identification of statistical trends, 
patterns, averages, frequencies or correlations” while “the purpose of qualitative 
research is to understand or explain behaviour and beliefs, identify processes 
and understand the context of people’s experiences.”  Neuman (2011, p. 172) 
added that “In a qualitative study, we can use the data to help narrow the 
focus.”  Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 141-142) commented that “quantitative 
research methods are primarily concerned with gathering and working with data 
that is structured and can be represented numerically,”  while “qualitative 
research methods are primarily concerned with stories and accounts including 
subjective understandings, feelings, opinions and beliefs.”   
On the issue of what should drive the selection of qualitative or quantitative 
methods, Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 12) asserted that “the research question 
should dictate the methodological approach that is used to conduct the 
research.”  Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 141) agreed that “the choice of 
research data collection methods should be determined by the hypotheses or 
research questions and the aspects of the research topic that are the prime 
focus and interest of the researcher.”   
With regard to the aim of this research (identifying elements for a model on 
effective military assistance initiatives), a qualitative approach appeared to be 
preferable.  Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 12) noted that qualitative research 
“allows researchers to get at the inner experience of participants, to determine 
how meanings are formed through and in culture, and to discover rather than 
test variables (italics added).”  Lindlof and Taylor (2011, p. 4) noted that 
“qualitative researchers study the performances and practices of human 
communication (italics in original).”   
 
On the issue of data collection and analysis, Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 147) 
noted that quantitative approaches gather and work with data that is “structured” 
(can be counted) and separately “structured by the researcher” (researcher 
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decides on the questions and the answers that can be given) while qualitative 
approaches gather and work with data that is “constructed by the research 
participant in their own way” and “interpreted and structured by the researcher 
as part of the analytical process.”   
 
Davies (2007, p. 135) highlighted another advantage of the qualitative approach 
for this thesis, noting that “Qualitative research uses its gathered data to create 
theoretical ideas, compared with experimental research that starts with a 
theoretical position and accumulates data in order to test its validity.”  Grix 
(2010, p. 121) took a similar view, writing that qualitative researchers seek to 
gather information “with a view to discerning patterns, trends and relationships 
between key variables.”  Grix (2010, p. 120) also noted, in contrast, that “a 
dependence on quantitative methods can lead to a neglect of the social and 
cultural context in which the ‘variable’ being ‘measured’ operates.”   
 
Bryman (2012) provided a number of contrasts between quantitative and 
qualitative research, several of which point to the selection of a qualitative 
approach for this thesis.  First, Bryman (2012, p. 408) noted that quantitative 
data are depicted as “robust and unambiguous, owing to the precision offered 
by measurement while “qualitative researchers claim, by contrast, that their 
contextual approach and their often prolonged involvement in a setting 
engender rich data.” 
 
Second, Bryman (2012, p. 408) wrote that “whereas quantitative researchers 
conduct research in a contrived context, qualitative researchers investigate 
people in natural environments.”  Finally, Bryman (2012, p. 408) noted that 
while “quantitative research is typically highly structured, so that the investigator 
is able to examine the precise concepts and issues that are the focus of the 
study,” in qualitative research “the approach is invariably unstructured, so that 
the possibility of getting at actors’ meanings and of concepts emerging out of 
data collection is enhanced.”     
 
There were certainly disadvantages to adopting a qualitative approach.  Davies 
(2007, p. 151) wrote that “All qualitative research methods begin with the 
assertion that social researchers are located in a subjective context, and cannot 
lay claim to neutral or scientific objectivity.”  However, there was no intent to 
claim scientific objectivity in this research.  The goal was to generate elements 
of a model for effective military assistance programmes out of original data from 
individuals involved in the Baltic initiatives, and as Walliman (2011, p. 130) 
noted, qualitative research “is based on data expressed mostly in the form of 
words – descriptions, accounts, opinions, feelings etc. – rather than on 
numbers.” 
   
In light of the academic literature noted above and the focus of this thesis, it 
was apparent that a qualitative approach was preferable for this research.  As it 
involved an assessment of a variety of political and other factors within a unique 
historical context, it did not lend itself to a quantitative methodology.  More 
important, the Intervention and Mechanisms which comprised the lessons to be 
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learned from the Baltic military assistance programmes were most suitably 
captured through the use of qualitative methods, which allowed for assimilation 
and analysis of a wide range of data.  In contrast, the use of quantitative 
methods would have constricted and possibly eliminated data and Mechanisms.  
 
In short, flexibility was critical with regard to the methodology required for this 
research.  As noted by Denzin and Lincoln (2005), a research design “describes 
a flexible set of guidelines that connect theoretical paradigms first to strategies 
of inquiry and second to methods for collecting empirical materials” (p. 25).  The 
writers later emphasized that qualitative research is “endlessly creative and 
interpretive” and that “qualitative interpretations are constructed” (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005, p. 26).  These points appeared to apply to the research 
methodology utilised for this thesis. 
 
3.3 Theoretical Framework - Positivism vs. Emotionalism vs. 
Constructivism 
 
Allison and Pomeroy (2000) provided a useful optic through which to view the 
appropriate research methodology for this thesis, analysing epistemology 
(which they defined as the nature of knowledge) and ontology (which they noted 
as being concerned with the nature of reality) with regard to the specific area of 
experiential education (p. 92).  The authors made the case that it is important to 
address "the experiences of individuals and the meanings they make of their 
experiences" (Allison and Pomeroy, 2000, p. 91).  Allison and Pomeroy (2000) 
added that, with regard to their particular area, "there are more and less 
appropriate research methods, depending on the question and the context in 
which the research is taking place" (p. 95) and that research can focus on input, 
process or outcome, or any combination of these areas (p. 95).  Moreover, "in 
doing so, it will present a specific perspective on a specific situation" (Allison 
and Pomeroy, 2000, p. 95).  Allison and Pomeroy (2000) concluded by making 
a recommendation in their specific field which appeared to be relevant to 
research on the Baltic initiatives, asserting that:   
 
[I]t may be more appropriate to employ a constructivist epistemology.  
This approach embraces a broader range of research questions, moving 
away from the singular, limited question, 'Does it work?'  A constructivist 
epistemology typically utilises approaches such as ethnography, case 
studies, biographies, and phenomenology in order to develop 
understanding, or verstehen, of experiences.  These experiences are 
necessarily subjective and are owned by, or belong to, the individual and 
the collective group (p. 97).    
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005) highlighted the range of overarching views of 
research critical in selecting an appropriate methodology, and there appeared to 
be a good case for supporting the use of the constructivist paradigm for this 
thesis (p. 24, Table 1.2).  Drawing on the table generated by the authors, the 
constructivist view of research (and a focus on the substantive-formal) would 
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focus on the use of interpretive case studies with an emphasis on the criteria of 
trustworthiness, credibility, transferability and confirmability.     
 
The other paradigms noted by Denzin and Lincoln (2005), such as positivist and 
post-positivist theory, did not appear to be of great value regarding this 
research.  However, that did not eliminate the criticisms from positivists 
regarding the constructivist paradigm.  For example, it was certainly valid to 
note that there are problems in relying on interviews to elicit objective facts.  
Silverman (2006, p. 131) wrote that the problem with the approach is that it 
focuses on the ability of the interviewee to recall events, rather than whether 
they have accurately recounted the historical event.   
 
As this is a valid point, it was important to introduce mechanisms to assess 
whether the narrative was in line with objective facts.  Triangulation through 
comparison with documents was utilised to attempt to address the problem.  For 
this thesis, it was important to be able to rely on the substance of the 
recollections of the interviewees.  However, the examination and analysis of 
documents regarding the Baltic military assistance programmes allowed for 
triangulation to check the data provided by interviews.   
 
It is worth noting that there were problems with adopting a pure positivist 
approach to the conduct of this research.  Taken to the extreme, it would have 
limited the extent to which unanticipated fruitful points of information might have 
been gathered and assessed, and which might have become the basis for new 
or modified theories.  In the case of this thesis, such limitations would have 
brought into question the validity and reliability of the research.   
 
The constructivist approach provided for flexibility in the conduct of interviews.  
This weakened, if not eliminated, the standardization which positivists view as 
essential to good research methodology.  However, it was important to keep in 
mind that what may be viewed as variations are part of the interaction between 
interviewer and interviewee, and are part of the effort to make sense of 
observations and events (Silverman, 2006, p. 130).    Thus, the weaknesses 
cited by positivists of the constructivist approach did not appear to be 
significant, and, indeed, highlighted the strengths of the constructivist approach 
for this particular research. 
 
In contrast, it appeared that supporters of the emotionalist view would argue 
that the focus should be on getting the most accurate reports of what happened.  
Their position appeared to be that the goal should be an atmosphere in which 
the interviewee can freely and openly recount what happened (Silverman, 2006, 
p. 123).  Generating such an atmosphere would be hindered by a rigid interview 
structure, and enhanced by a flexible interview setting.   
 
While the case could be made regarding the advantages of open-ended 
interviews, its application to this thesis was questionable.  This was not a 
biographic research project.  The goal was to acquire the most authentic views 
of those involved in the Baltic projects regarding the considerations which 
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generated important political decisions between the donor and recipient states 
(the Intervention) as well as the Mechanisms which caused those decisions to 
generate Outcomes from the initiatives.  In that regard, a semi-structured 
interview allowed for the requisite flexibility and avoided foreclosing possible 
areas or topics of interest, while allowing for sufficient focus of the overarching 
issues to be investigated.     
 
Such a research approach was important due to the fact that the interviewees 
were from different nationalities and backgrounds, and also held differing 
positions regarding policy or operations as the Baltic military assistance projects 
were initiated and developed.  To cite one example: with regard to the potential 
threat of aggressive action by Russia against the Baltic states, the views of 
officials from the Baltic governments were expected to differ from those of the 
donor countries, and it was important to be able to note those differences.  
 
3.3.1 Constructivism in International Relations Theory 
 
The preceding discussion in Section 3.3 involved an analysis of the utility of 
constructivism for this thesis within the context of qualitative research theory.  It 
is important to note that there was also literature on constructivism in 
international relations (IR) theory.  Within that context, constructivism held the 
position that critical aspects of IR are historically and socially constructed (Onuf, 
1989).  While realist and neorealist views in IR asserted that the anarchic nature 
of the international system and the sovereignty of the nation-state means that 
power politics and the pursuit of national interests dominate IR (Waltz, 1959), 
the constructivist school asserted that critical aspects of IR are actually socially 
constructed and arise from social processes and interaction (Wendt, 1999).          
 
It was significant that the constructivist view in IR asserted that national 
interests do not exist as some type of fixed, objective reality, but are actually the 
result of social interaction (Finnemore, 1996).  Under the constructivist view of 
IR, new political entities like the European Union or the increasing role of 
international organizations have an impact on shaping the calculation of 
national interests. 
 
However, with regard to the research undertaken in this thesis, two points need 
to be made.  First, constructivism within qualitative research theory was relevant 
for this thesis and the research methodology utilised.  Second, constructivism 
as applied to IR was not a critical consideration as the focus of this research 
involved military assistance programmes.  The proposition is put forth that 
whether those arise from objective national interests, as proposed by realists, or 
from social interaction, as asserted by constructivists, was not an essential 
question.  Whatever the reason for the perceived need to support or seek to 
benefit from a military assistance initiative, the topic addressed by this thesis is 
how best to ensure successful Outcomes which support national interests. 
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3.4 Case Study Method – Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
Within the paradigm of constructivist theory within qualitative research theory, it 
appeared that the case study method was most appropriate for this research 
topic.  Matthews and Ross (2010, 475) defined a case study as “the study of a 
single entity, often a person, an organisation, a situation or a country, wherein 
the subject is explored in detail and great depth.”  It is useful to cite two parts of 
the technical definition of a case study as outlined by Yin (2003), both of which 
indicated the suitability of the case study method for this research.  Regarding 
the first part of the definition, Yin (2003) noted that "a case study is an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident" (p. 13).  With regard to the second part of the definition, Yin 
(2003) wrote that: 
 
[T]he case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in 
which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and 
as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from 
the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection 
and analysis (pp. 13-14).   
 
With regard to advantages of the case study method, Davies (2007, p. 34) 
noted that “the case study approach offers an attractive way of using a variety 
of research methods to produce a rounded portrayal of an identified subject.”  
Johnson and Reynolds (2012, p. 200) added that the case study design 
“permits a deeper understanding of causal processes, the explication of general 
explanatory theory, and the development of hypotheses regarding difficult-to-
observe phenomena.” 
 
Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2010, p. 74) cited the following advantages and 
disadvantages to use of the case study method.  With regard to the advantages, 
they: 1) are “seen to be strong in reality,” 2) allow for “generalizations from a 
specific instance to a more general issue,” 3) allow the researcher to “show the 
complexity of social life,” 4) can provide “a data source from which further 
analysis can be made,” 5) can be “linked to action and their insights contribute 
to changing practice,” and 6) can be “more persuasive and more accessible.”  
The disadvantages are that: 1) “the very complexity of a case can make 
analysis difficult,” and 2) while the “contextualization of aspects of the case 
strengthens this form of research, it is difficult to know where ‘context’ begins 
and ends.” 
 
Further addressing advantages and disadvantages of the case study method, 
George and Bennett (2005, p. 19) noted four advantages: “their potential for 
achieving high conceptual validity; their strong procedures for fostering new 
hypotheses; their value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized 
role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and their capacity 
for addressing causal complexity.”  With regard to disadvantages, they noted: 
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Recurrent trade-offs include the problem of case selection; the trade-off 
between parsimony and richness; and the related tension between 
achieving high internal validity and good historical explanations of 
particular cases versus making generalizations that apply to broad 
populations.  The inherent limitations include a relative inability to render 
judgments on the frequency or representativeness of particular cases 
and a weak capability for estimating the average ‘causal effect’ of 
variables for a sample.  Potential limitations can include indeterminacy 
and lack of independence of cases.  (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 22). 
 
Grix (2010, p. 52) asserted that “One in-depth case-study of a relatively under-
researched area can be embedded in, and compared with, the existing body of 
literature and studies to gain useful insights into a particular region or to 
establish similar patterns between well-researched regions and the chosen 
study.”  Kumar (2011, p. 126) noted that in a case study the selected case 
“becomes the basis of a thorough, holistic and in-depth exploration of the 
aspect(s) that you want to find out about.”   
 
Neuman (2011, p. 42) noted that case study research “allows us to link abstract 
ideas in specific ways with the concrete specifics of cases we observe in detail.”  
He went on to note three strengths of the case study method, all of which 
appeared to be relevant to this thesis.  First, “as we become very familiar with 
the in-depth detail of specific cases, we can create/build new theories as well as 
reshape current theories to complex cases or new situations.”  Second, “the 
intricate details of social processes and cause-effect relations become more 
visible.”  Finally, case studies “provide evidence that more effectively depicts 
complex, multiple-factor events/situations and processes that occur over time 
and space” (Neuman, 2011, p. 42). 
 
Addressing the issue of generalizability of case studies, Bryman (2012, p. 71) 
noted that “the crucial question is not whether the findings can be generalized to 
a wider universe but how well the researcher generates theory out of the 
findings.”  May (2011, p. 226) wrote that “The goal for many proponents of case 
studies … is to overcome dichotomies between generalizing and particularizing, 
quantitative and qualitative, deductive and inductive techniques.” 
 
In short, while there were advantages and disadvantages to the case study 
method, it appeared that the advantages were well suited to the goal of this 
research, which was to generate elements of a model for effective military 
assistance initiatives.      
 
3.4.1 Additional Points on Utility of The Case Study Method For 
This Research 
 
It is important to note that the case study method constitutes more than just a 
historical analysis, but provides the opportunity to include interviews of people 
involved in the events (Yin, 2003, p. 8).  Indeed, that was the particular reason 
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this method was most appropriate: it provided the opportunity to utilise 
interviews, supported by documents, to provide an analysis which went beyond 
a simple historical study (Yin, 2003, p. 8). 
 
Stake (2005) wrote that the case study method has been criticized, particularly 
for its inability to produce results which have more general applicability (p. 448).  
While conceding that a case study will not have the same type of general 
applicability as other types of research, Stake (2005) asserted that case studies 
make a valid contribution to findings of general applicability, and, more 
important, that general applicability is not the ultimate goal of research (p. 448).  
It is worth citing the comment from Stake (2005) that:  
 
the case to be studied is a complex entity located in a milieu or situation 
embedded in a number of contexts or backgrounds.  Historical context is 
almost always of interest, but so are cultural and physical contexts.  
Other contexts often of interest are the social, economic, political, ethical, 
and aesthetic (p. 449).   
 
In addition, Stake (2005, p. 445) provided his identification of three different 
types of case studies.  The first was an “intrinsic case study” pursued with a 
primary goal of an extensive examination and understanding of a specific case.  
The second was an “instrumental case study” where the focus is generating 
insights into a particular issue or theory.  The third was a “multiple case study” 
in which a study is extended to several cases.  With regard to Stake's 
taxonomy, the predominant category appeared to be that of an “instrumental 
case study” with a goal of generating insights into a particular theory.  Applying 
that taxonomy to this research, the Baltic programmes were analysed in great 
detail, and the contexts, practices and processes were outlined in order to 
generate elements of a theory which could be of utility to academics and 
practitioners in the area of military assistance.  This was done, as Stake (2005) 
noted, “all because this helps us pursue the external interest.  The case may be 
seen as typical of other cases or not... Here the choice of case is made to 
advance understanding of that other interest” (p. 445).   
 
As noted above, case study analysis can be applied for both single and multiple 
case studies.  The distinction was not critical for this research topic, as it 
constituted both a single and a multiple case study.  There were four distinct 
Baltic military assistance initiatives.  However, the case could also be made that 
the focus of the research was on one topic: the Western effort to assist the 
Baltic governments in developing modern military forces, which was composed 
of four separate initiatives.  Moreover, as the template established for BALTBAT 
was then used for the other three projects, the case could be made that they 
were different examples of utilization of one set of overarching political 
decisions.  As a result, whether this research was viewed as a single or multiple 
case study was worth noting, but was not critical to the research or analysis of 
the resulting data.  For purposes of clarity, however, it was considered a single 
case study, with BALTRON, BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL serving to test 
the validity of the Mechanisms derived from the analysis of BALTBAT. 
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Finally, Stake (2005) noted the value of case studies in both academic research 
as well as public policy, which was of particular relevance for this thesis.  On 
academic research, Stake (2005) wrote that case studies are of value in 
“refining theory, suggesting complexities for further investigation as well as 
helping to establish the limits of generalizability” (p. 460).  On public policy, 
Stake (2005) asserted that case studies can also be “a disciplined force in 
setting public policy and in reflecting on human experience” (p. 460).  The 
comments regarding public policy reinforced the point that analysis of the Baltic 
initiatives can be of use to academics working in the area of military assistance, 
but can also hopefully provide assistance to practitioners who are working on 
the initiation and development of military assistance projects and that the use of 
a case study approach was of utility in achieving these results.  
 
3.5 Research Protocol 
 
In light of the academic literature which has been cited, the research 
methodology most appropriate for this thesis came into focus.  Yin (2003) 
emphasized that it is beneficial to have flexible research designs so that new 
data uncovered during data collection can significantly improve the existing 
design (p. 55).  With that recommendation in mind, the protocol used to conduct 
this research is outlined below. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to gather data from a number of 
different groups of individuals.  The rationale for the use of semi-structured 
interviews is set forth in Section 3.5.3.  The first group was composed of the 
policy-makers who established the foundation and framework for the Baltic 
military assistance programmes.  The second group involved those who were 
critical to setting up and working on Baltic initiatives.  The third group involved a 
broad category of academics and other specialists in the Baltic area who were 
in positions which allowed them to provide commentary on the assistance 
projects.  The rationale for the interview sample is set forth in Section 3.5.2.    
 
There was an initial contact in which the purpose of the research was presented 
to the interviewee.  The request was made for an interview.  The strong 
preference was to conduct face-to-face interviews.  However, this was not 
always possible due to limitations on the amount of travel that could be 
undertaken.  As a result, when a face-to-face interview was not possible, the 
second option was to conduct the interview over the phone.   
 
It was also possible to conduct the interview in other ways, such as by e-mail or 
Skype, if that was the preference of the interviewee.  In two specific instances 
outlined in Chapter Four, the decision of two interviewees was to conduct the 
interview solely by e-mail.  It should be noted that, as was always the case, the 
interviewees approved the final write-up of the interview. 
 
An extensive questionnaire listing a broad range of issues was provided in 
advance to the interviewee.  A copy is included in Annex A in the Appendices.  
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In an effort to reduce bias, the point was emphasized to the interviewee that the 
questionnaire was not intended as an all-encompassing list of topics, each to be 
addressed in detail, but merely a guide on the types of topics that could be 
considered.  The point was also stressed to the interviewee that he/she was 
welcome to raise other topics not included on the questionnaire.   
 
The interview was written up and submitted to the interviewee for edits.  They 
were asked to ensure they were fully satisfied with the account of their 
comments.  It was noted that they had complete freedom to add, delete or 
otherwise modify the draft transcripts of the interview.  The point was also made 
that should the interviewee, upon reflection, recall other relevant points which 
he/she would have raised, but did not, there was no prohibition to adding those 
points in the final write-up.  While this issue was also raised at the onset of the 
interview, a clear decision was also requested from the interviewee at the time 
of final editing on whether he/she could be quoted, or whether any (or all) of the 
transcript was not for attribution.  An example of a final write-up of an interview 
is provided in Annex B in the Appendices.    
 
With regard to other methods that might have been helpful, but were not 
utilised, there appeared to be no benefit to be gained from a video record of the 
interview for this particular research.  Such techniques could be worthwhile 
should the body language or voice of the interviewee be a critical factor, but that 
was not the case with regard to this data.  There was therefore no reason to run 
the risk that use of such recording equipment might have a chilling effect on the 
interview setting and inhibit the interviewee.   
 
On the issue of whether an audio record might have been more valuable as a 
verbatim transcript of all the commentary of the interviewee, it was not apparent 
that such a verbatim account was critical to the research.  As noted above, the 
interviewees were given complete latitude to edit their comments for the final 
version.  In short, the process utilised to record the information from the 
interview ensured that the views, recollections and opinions of the interviewees 
were fully and faithfully noted.     
 
3.5.1 Theoretical Sampling 
 
With regard to the general issue of sampling, George and Bennett (2005, p. 31) 
made the overarching point that statistical researchers focus on trying to make 
the sample as representative as possible, but that “While useful and necessary 
in statistical studies, these practices are inappropriate and sometimes 
counterproductive when extended to case study methods or used to judge 
these methods.”  Davies (2007, p. 152) noted the advantages of a small number 
of interviewees, writing that “The distinctiveness of working with a small sample 
is important to grasp from the outset.  Your aim is to emerge with feelings, 
ideas, described experiences, opinions, views attitudes and perspectives that 
have a breadth and depth to them extending beyond that which a structured 
questionnaire would deliver.” 
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As noted by Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10), qualitative analysis consists of 
data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/verification, with the 
additional comment that the sampling in qualitative studies is not done in a 
manner in which the samples are pre-specified, “but can evolve once fieldwork 
begins” (p. 27).  Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 30-31) noted that sampling 
decisions involve settings, actors, events and processes.  Those sampling 
parameters provide guidance with regard to selecting the sample, and, just as 
important, change as the research process unfolds.   
 
Purposive sampling approaches, primarily theoretical sampling, were utilised for 
this research.  Neuman (2011, p. 267) defined purposive sampling as “A non-
random sample in which the researcher uses a wide range of methods to locate 
all possible cases of a highly specific and difficult-to-reach population.”  Davies 
(2007, p. 57) noted that “Purposive sampling invites the researcher to identify 
and target individuals who are believed to be ‘typical’ of the population being 
studied.”   
 
Bryman (2012) defined purposive sampling as “a non-probability form of 
sampling” (p. 418, Key concept 18.1).  He listed a number of purposive 
sampling approaches, including theoretical sampling, snowball sampling, and 
opportunistic sampling.  For this thesis, theoretical sampling was utilised, 
although a discussion of opportunistic and snowball sampling is included as 
they played a practical role in this sampling which was conducted for this thesis. 
 
With regard to theoretical sampling, Walliman (2011, p. 178) defined it as 
“Selection of a sample of the population that you think knows most about the 
subject.  This approach is common in qualitative research where statistical 
inference is not required.”  Bryman (2012, p. 419, Key concept 18.3) asserted 
that “Theoretical sampling differs from generic purposive sampling … in that its 
practitioners emphasize using it to provide a springboard for the generation of 
theory and the refinement of theoretical categories.  It is iterative in the sense 
that it is not a one off but an ongoing process that entails several stages.”  He 
added that theoretical sampling is “an ongoing process rather than a distinct 
and single stage, as it is, for example, in probability sampling” adding that “it is 
important to realize that it is not just people who are the ‘objects’ of sampling” 
(2012, p. 419, Key concept 18.3).   
 
Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 145) noted that “Theoretical sampling is concept 
driven.  It enables researchers to discover the concepts that are relevant to this 
problem and population, and allows researchers to explore the concepts in 
depth” and that it is “especially important when studying new or unchartered 
areas because it allows for discovery.”  The authors (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) 
asserted that “With theoretical sampling, interview and observational guides are 
not as relevant as they are to structured forms of research because they tend to 
evolve and change over the course of the research” (p. 152) adding the later 
comment that “in other words, the researcher takes who or what he or she can 
get in terms of data” (p. 153).  Continuing on this theme, Corbin and Strauss 
(2008, p. 146) wrote that “The procedures for theoretical sampling are simple: 
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the researcher follows the analytic trail.”  Moreover, the authors (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008, p. 148) noted that “In theoretical sampling, the researcher is not 
so much concerned with consistency as following up on important theoretical 
leads.”   
 
Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 167) commented that purposive sampling and 
theoretical sampling are approaches which are “non-probability based samples 
and are quite deliberately so,” noting that the approach is “generally associated 
with small, in-depth studies with research designs that are based on the 
gathering of qualitative data and focused on the exploration and interpretation of 
experiences and perceptions” including case studies.  The authors added that 
“people or cases are chosen ‘with purpose’ to enable the researcher to explore 
the research questions or develop a theory” (Matthews and Ross, 2010, p. 167).  
As outlined by the various authors noted above, theoretical sampling appeared 
to be suitable for this thesis. 
 
However, other closely related purposive techniques also played a part in this 
research due to the practical challenge of trying to contact senior officials who 
worked on the Baltic military assistance initiatives.  With regard to opportunistic 
sampling, Bryman defined it as “capitalizing on opportunities to collect data from 
certain individuals, contact with whom is largely unforeseen but who may 
provide data relevant to the research question“ (2012, p. 419, Key concept 
18.2).   
 
With regard to snowball sampling, Grix (2010, p. 129) commented on the 
technique, whereby the interviewer asks “whether the interviewee could name 
any useful contacts, thus allowing you to get in touch with important people 
using the interviewee’s name and without having to resort to ‘cold calling’.”  
Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2010, p. 170) described snowball sampling as 
“building up a sample through informants.”   
 
Lindlof and Taylor (2011, p. 114) asserted that snowball sampling is well suited 
to studying “people who have certain attributes in common” going on to note 
that “It is also sometimes the best way to reach an elusive, hard-to-recruit 
population.”  Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 166) commented on snowball 
sampling and asserted that “given that people who have certain characteristics 
or behaviour are often part of a network of similar people, this approach to 
sampling can be quite fruitful.”   
 
Johnson and Reynolds (2012, p. 239) noted that with a purposive sample, “the 
goal is typically to study a diverse and usually limited number of observations 
rather than to analyse a sample representative of a larger target population.”  
The authors added that in a snowball sample “respondents are used to identify 
other persons who might qualify for inclusion in the sample.  These people are 
then interviewed and asked to supply appropriate names for further 
interviewing” (Johnson and Reynolds, 2012, p. 240) 
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In short, while theoretical sampling was utilised for this thesis, there was also 
use of “snowballing” and “opportunistic sampling” techniques to seek out offers 
from interviewees concerning other individuals who could be contacted who 
worked on the Baltic military assistance programmes.  The use of such 
techniques was not in opposition to theoretical sampling and was utilised to 
generate a more robust sample which would aid in achieving theoretical 
saturation, which is discussed below.  As Bryman noted “purposive sampling 
often involves more than one of the approaches outlined above” adding as an 
example that “it is quite common for snowball sampling to be preceded by 
another form of purposive sampling” (2012, p. 427).   
 
With regard to the practical steps which were taken to conduct theoretical 
sampling, policy makers and implementers for the Baltic assistance 
programmes were contacted and an interview was requested.  When an 
interview was granted and then completed, a request was made to see whether 
the interviewee might recommend other officials from the donor or recipient 
states who might be contacted regarding an interview.   
  
3.5.2 Sufficiency of Interview Sample 
 
Bryman noted that theoretical sampling “emphasizes theoretical saturation … 
as a criterion for deciding when to cease collecting new data” (2012, p. 419, 
Key concept 18.3) and that saturation means “new data no longer suggest new 
insights into an emergent theory” (p. 421, Key concept 18.4).  Bryman (2012) 
asserted that “the criteria for deciding when theoretical saturation has been 
achieved are more or less absent” (p. 426, Thinking deeply 18.1) and 
“Essentially, the criterion for sample size is whatever it takes to achieve 
saturation” (p. 426).   
 
Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 168) commented that theoretical sampling 
“continues until there is no new theory emerging and theoretical ‘saturation’ is 
reached.”  Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011, p. 88) added that saturation “is 
simply the point at which the information you collect begins to repeat itself” and 
“further data collection becomes redundant.”  Kumar (2011, p. 213) wrote that 
the data saturation point “determines the sample size,” adding that “the concept 
of data saturation point is highly subjective.  It is you who are collecting the data 
and decide when you have attained the saturation point in your data collection.” 
 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) stressed that saturation “also denotes a 
development of categories in terms of their properties and dimensions” (p. 148) 
adding that “A researcher knows when sufficient sampling has occurred when 
the major categories show depth and variation in terms of their development” (p. 
149).”  In short, the theoretical sampling for this research continued until 
saturation had been achieved. 
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3.5.3 Structured, Unstructured and Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
With regard to the gathering of information via interviews, Fontana and Frey 
(2005) were sceptical of the objectivity of the structured interview.  They 
asserted that unstructured interviews “can provide greater breadth than do the 
other types given its qualitative nature” (p. 705).  The authors indicated the 
distinction between the two is that a structured interview seeks to gather 
specific data that can be coded to explain behaviour within specific categories 
that have been prepared.  An unstructured interview tries to grasp the behaviour 
of individuals without imposing a specific categorization that could restrict the 
research.  As a result, Fontana and Frey (2005) noted that unstructured 
interviews vary widely (p. 712). 
 
Fontana and Frey (2005) appeared to have valid points regarding the problems 
of the structured as well as the unstructured interview, which indicated why the 
semi-structured interview was used for this research.  Once again, the focus 
was on the richness of the perspectives which the interviewees could bring to 
the policy decisions regarding BALTBAT and the other Baltic military assistance 
projects.  That was the value of the data provided by the interviews.  As 
Perakyla (2005) commented: 
 
Most qualitative research probably is based on interviews.  There are 
good reasons for this.  By using interviews, the researcher can reach 
areas of reality that would otherwise remain inaccessible such as 
people’s subjective experiences and attitudes.  The interview is also a 
very convenient way of overcoming distances both in space and in time; 
past events or faraway experiences can be studied by interviewing 
people who took part in them (p. 869). 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) noted that there are arguments for minimal 
structure in the interview format, maximum structure in the interview format, or 
what they pragmatically title “it depends,” which emphasizes that flexibility is 
important for researchers (p. 35).  While the benefits of a tightly-controlled 
interview process are clear, they have the potential to exclude valuable lines of 
inquiry or data.  While standardisation would be enhanced, that is not the goal 
of the research.  As Miles and Huberman (1994) highlighted, the bulk of 
research work involves note-taking, recording of conversations and collection of 
documents, which means that framework questions and categories are all that 
is required for the interviews (p. 35).   
 
In discussing what he calls semi-standardized interviews, Flick (2002) noted 
that the various topics are introduced by an open question, include theory-
driven, hypothesis-directed questions and end with confrontational questions to 
challenge the views put forth by the interviewee (p. 81).  There is a reason to be 
concerned about being too rigid in applying a prepared interview guide (Flick, 
2002, p. 92).  An overly-restrictive view of sticking to the document generates 
interruptions in the flow of the interviewee's statements and limits possible 
information.  On the other hand, it should be noted that Flick (2002, p. 93) 
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commented on the benefits of the consistent use of an interview guide in 
generating more data on particular points and enhancing the ability to compare 
data.   
 
While such a result is a worthy goal, it appeared that for this research the more 
compelling interest was to ensure the broadest possible means of getting 
information, views and recollections from the interviewees.  As a result, semi-
structured interviews conducted for this research were done with an interest in 
not circumscribing the ability of the interviewee to raise any and all points which 
he/she believed were relevant. 
 
3.5.4 Analysis of Documents 
 
As noted previously, there were numerous documents regarding BALTBAT and 
the other Baltic initiatives which provided additional data regarding the initiation 
and establishment of these programmes.  Silverman (2006) noted that 
documents also serve as naturally occurring data, generated independently of 
the research-provoked data (p. 201).  This appeared to apply to the documents 
regarding the Baltic military assistance programmes, as they provided 
information generated independently of the interviews. 
 
The data in these documents therefore allowed for a degree of triangulation with 
regard to the data provided from interviews.  Stake (2005) wrote that 
triangulation is “generally considered a process of using multiple perceptions to 
clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation,” in 
order to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of data (p. 454).  Stake 
(2005) noted that triangulation “helps to identify different realities” by 
highlighting ways in which the case is viewed (p. 454).  Thus, it was important to 
utilise analysis of documents as well as analysis of interview material to 
triangulate and enhance the reliability of research. 
 
Referring back to the discussion of positivism, emotionalism and constructivism, 
similar differences of view arise regarding the use and analysis of documents.  
As Silverman (2006, p. 158) noted, there are four types of analysis of texts: 1) 
content analysis, 2) analysis of narrative structures, 3) ethnography, and 4) 
ethnomethodology.  The first, content analysis, has a focus on quantitative 
methodology, and centres on the establishment of categories and an analysis of 
the number of instances in which words fall into those categories.     
 
The second type of analysis, narrative structure analysis, addresses the way in 
which the various elements of a narrative fulfil certain functions.   The third type 
of analysis, ethnography, moves farther away from specific words, and has a 
larger concern with texts as resources from which to understand broader social 
relationships.  The final type of analysis, ethnomethodology, or analysis by 
consideration of membership categorization, uses membership categorization 
devices.    
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With regard to these four types of analysis of texts, neither ethnography nor 
ethnomethodology appeared to be of utility for this research.  Moreover, the 
focus for this thesis was how documents could assist in triangulation of the data 
gathered in the interviews.  In that respect, the case could be made that the 
"what" addressed by content analysis was more relevant than the "how" which 
is the focus of narrative structure analysis.   
 
However, it is important to note that the conduct of the content analysis of the 
documents regarding the Baltic initiatives was not done in a rigid, formal 
manner.  As Perakyla (2005) noted, “in many cases, qualitative researchers 
who use written texts as their materials do not try to follow any predefined 
protocol in executing their analysis” (p. 870).  Perakyla (2005) asserted that an 
informal approach may well be the best method of analysing written texts, 
particularly in the case of research “where the qualitative text analysis is not at 
the core of the research but instead is in a subsidiary or complementary role, no 
more sophisticated text analytical methods may be needed” (p. 870).  Such an 
approach appeared to apply to this thesis.  Certainly, in research where the 
predominant or sole focus is examination of documents, a more rigorous 
analysis may be required.  However, when analysis of text is merely a 
complement to research which has a heavy focus on interviews and 
questionnaire data, no more exacting examination of text is needed (Perakyla, 
2005, p. 870). 
 
With regard to other options to content analysis of documents, one possibility 
was critical discourse analysis, cited by Perakyla (2005, p. 871) which analyses 
how texts indicate the distribution of power and inequalities in society.  
However, while it was important for this research to note the positions of 
authority held by interviewees, the focus was on the political decision as an 
Intervention, rather than the power distribution.   
 
Finally, Perakyla (2005, p. 871) noted the school of thought which stresses the 
importance of statements as objects and subjects to be analysed within a 
particular historical context to assess their significance.  Such a perspective 
was of particular relevance to this research, as it addressed the significance of 
statements within documents generated in a particular historical context which 
were relevant to an analysis of the Intervention and Mechanisms which 
generated Outcomes from the Baltic military assistance programmes. 
 
3.5.5 General Points on Coding of Interviews 
 
The results of the interviews were coded so that they could then be analysed.  
However, before going into detail about the coding process, it is worthwhile to 
note the general assertion by Stake (2005) that “perhaps the simplest rule for 
method in qualitative casework is this: ‘Place your best intellect into the thick of 
what is going on’” (p. 449).   
 
Matthews and Ross (2010, p. 475) defined coding as “The process of ‘marking’ 
or identifying data for later analysis.”  Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 65) defined 
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coding as “Deriving and developing concepts from data” and expanded on that 
definition by noting that it is “Extracting concepts from raw data and developing 
them in terms of their properties and dimensions” (p. 159).  Walliman (2011, p. 
133) noted that “codes are labels or tags used to allocate units of meaning to 
the data.” 
 
With regard to concrete steps, Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 160) outlined a 
process of 1) breaking the data into manageable pieces, 2) taking those pieces 
and exploring for ideas contained within and 3) giving those ideas conceptual 
names.  Bryman (2012, p. 247-8, Key concept 11.1) highlighted two main 
stages for coding.  First, the unstructured material must be categorized.  
Second, the researcher must assign numbers to the categories that have been 
created, adding that “the numbers themselves are simply tags that will allow the 
material to be processed quantitatively.”   
 
As Lindlof and Taylor (2011, p. 248) asserted, codes “are the linkages between 
data and the categories the researcher creates” adding that “A major purpose of 
codes is to characterize the individual elements constituting a category.”  
Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011, p. 227) noted that coding “enables 
researchers to focus analysis on specific issues in the data” adding that coding 
“provides the foundation for data analysis.” 
 
For this research, it was important to continuously reassess the data base as it 
grew, particularly as it generated new possible issues to be considered.  As a 
practical matter, the material needed to be reviewed and interpreted against 
new data in an iterative process.  In short, the assertion by Stake (2005) that 
this is a constant process of examination, reflection and revision (p. 450) 
applied to this research. 
 
Regarding this iterative process, Yin (2003, p. 120) cited explanation building as 
an analytic technique which was suitable for this research.  The effort is to 
analyse the data by building an explanation about the case being studied.  In 
contrast to other strategies, such as pattern matching, time-series analysis, 
logic models or cross-case synthesis, explanation building had numerous 
advantages, including the fact that the process of developing the explanation is 
iterative.   
 
On the coding process, the raw data from the interviews were analysed so that 
the data were linked.  The relevant data segments were put together so that 
they could be analysed as clusters, categories or networks of information.  As 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 44, Figure 3.2) noted, content analysis is 
required, counting the frequencies of specific words or phrases, which is 
important with regard to drawing the appropriate conclusions.  There are 
descriptive codes, interpretive codes and pattern codes, and the method of 
generating codes proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994) is simply to create 
an initial list of codes prior to the data gathering process (p. 58).   
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For this research, pattern codes were generated, which were explanatory and 
generated themes.  Miles and Huberman (1994) noted that they serve key 
functions which are relevant to this research, such as reducing data into smaller 
numbers of units, prompting the researcher into analytical thinking, and 
assisting in generation of a cognitive map (p. 69).           
 
3.5.6 Details on Coding 
 
The data were coded from the interview transcripts.  As the coding proceeded 
and possible Mechanisms arose as cited by interviewees, the list of 
Mechanisms expanded.  The final tabulation for the various codes also 
indicated the frequency with which the particular possible Mechanism was cited 
by interviewees.  NVIVO 8 software was used to code the interviews.  One 
example of coding is included in Appendix D of the Appendices. 
 
A modified coding procedure was used with regard to the sample of public 
documents regarding BALTBAT and the other Baltic military assistance 
programmes.  There was analysis of which possible Mechanisms generated 
from the interview coding were present in the documents.  The modified coding 
of the documents was done manually, as there was no software suitable for this 
part of the research process.  Thus, the process was a review of the extent to 
which the possible Mechanisms derived from the interviews appeared in the 
documents. 
 
As the baseline of coded data grew and possible Mechanisms emerged, it was 
important to analyse whether initial theories regarding the significance of the 
Intervention of political decisions and their impact on the Outcomes of the Baltic 
programmes appeared to be valid.  In short, the list of possible Mechanisms 
grew or shrank as coding proceeded.  Such an approach was proposed by Flick 
(2002), who asserted that it is important “to design methods so open that they 
do justice to the complexity of the object under study” (p. 5).     
 
The goal of this research was to determine the significance of the Intervention 
and uncover Mechanisms for success derived from the Baltic initiatives.  
Relating that to the issue of validity, the test of the coding was not abstract 
academic criteria, but assessment with reference to the object of analysis: 
BALTBAT and the Baltic projects.  Ultimately, as noted by Flick (2002), the key 
points concerning qualitative research were “whether findings are grounded in 
empirical material and whether the methods have been appropriately selected 
and applied to the object under study” (p. 5).  As Flick (2002) noted:   
 
According to this understanding, coding includes the constant 
comparison of phenomena, cases, concepts and so on and the 
formulation of questions which are addressed to the text.  Starting from 
the data, the process of coding leads to the development of theories 
through a process of abstraction.  Concepts or codes are attached to the 
empirical material.  They are formulated first as closely as possible to the 
text, and later more and more abstractly.  Categorizing in this procedure 
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refers to the summary of such concepts into generic concepts and to the 
elaboration of the relations between concepts and generic concepts or 
categories and superior concepts.  The development of theory involves 
the formulation of networks of categories or concepts and the relations 
between them.  Relations may be elaborated between superior and 
inferior categories (hierarchically) but also between concepts at the same 
level (p. 177). 
 
As a large number of codes were generated, they were categorized by grouping 
them, as appropriate, around certain specific topics, issues or phenomena.  The 
ultimate goal was to represent the content of the interviews in as structured and 
ordered a manner as possible to identify the Mechanisms which allowed for 
Outcomes and which can be the elements of a model for effective military 
assistance programmes.   
 
"In vivo" codes drawn from the interviews were utilised rather than constructed 
codes already developed in the social sciences, as noted by Flick (2002, p. 
178).  The level of detail needed with regard to open coding was determined as 
the coding process unfolded.  Once the open coding was completed, the next 
step was axial coding, or the differentiation or refinement of the categories 
produced by open coding as noted by Flick (2002, p. 181).  The most significant 
categories were identified which appeared to have the most potential for further 
analysis, and relationships between various categories (or sub-categories) were 
analysed.   
 
To be clear, there were risks involved with this coding process.  In theory, the 
open coding could have been endless.  Moreover, the open-ended nature of the 
coding did not provide a useful framework with regard to criteria for coding the 
selected passages.  The rebuttal to these criticisms was that it is important to 
ensure the coding is pursued in a pragmatic manner.   
 
3.5.7 Initial Categories 
 
The initial set of categories for coding was derived from the general literature 
regarding BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives, as outlined in Chapter Two.  
They naturally appeared to fall into certain categories.  The first category was 
simply Russia.  The second category was NATO.  The third category was 
development of national defence.  The fourth category was "Baltification," or 
transfer of responsibility to the Baltic nations.  Once again, these were merely 
the initial categories utilised to begin the coding process and the final result of 
the process was many more categories.        
 
3.5.8 Use Of a Matrix 
 
A matrix is provided in Appendix C in the Appendices.  The clustering of the 
Mechanisms raised by the interviewees can provide a visual guide.  Moreover, 
a matrix can assist in recognizing patterns from the data.  A very basic form of 
matrix is utilised, with the Mechanisms listed along the vertical axis (as 
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numbered in Chapter Five) and the interviewees listed along the horizontal axis 
(as numbered in the Dramatis Personae on pp. xiv-xv).          
 
For the purposes of this research, such a basic approach appeared suitable, 
and there was no reason for the use of other methods noted by Miles and 
Huberman (1994), such as a conceptually clustered matrix (p. 127), a checklist 
matrix (p. 105) or a role-ordered matrix (p. 122).  A chronological display was 
another possibility, and a simple listing of events might have assisted in 
providing an overview of the work of the Baltic programmes.  A chronology of 
BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects is provided on pp. xxi-xxiii to assist in 
clarifying the developments from 1991 to 2004.  While a chronological construct 
could be accomplished with a critical incident chart, event-state network, activity 
record or decision modelling (Miles and Huberman, 1994, pp. 115-117), it was 
not apparent that the sequence of events for the Baltic initiatives was a salient 
point in uncovering the significance of the Intervention of political decisions 
between the donor and recipient states and the Mechanisms which generated 
positive Outcomes. 
 
3.5.9 Models, Modelling and Elements of a Model 
 
The research aim was to identify the elements of a model for effective military 
assistance programmes.  As a general definition, Johnson and Reynolds (2012, 
p. 208) noted that a model is “a simplified and abstract representation of reality 
… that purports to show how variables or parts of a system tie together.”  Grix 
(2010, p. 20) defined a model as “a representation of something” and “can be 
both a descriptive and an exploratory device.”  Giddens and Turner (1987, p. 
164) provided the admonition that the term ‘model’ is “highly ambiguous in the 
social sciences.”   
 
Wilson (1990) provided a definition of a model which is relevant to this thesis: 
 
A model is the explicit interpretation of one’s understanding of a situation, 
or merely of one’s ideas about that situation.  It can be expressed in 
mathematics, symbols or words, but it is essentially a description of 
entities, processes or attributes and the relationships between them.  It 
may be prescriptive or illustrative, but above all, it must be useful (p. 11). 
 
He stressed that “the model is only part of a process of analysis and not the 
outcome” (Wilson, 1990, p. 11).  Wilson (2001, p. 4) added that “Models (of any 
kind) are not descriptions of the real world they are descriptions of ways of 
thinking about the real world (italics in original).”  Wilson (2001, p. 4-5) went on 
to note that an analyst “will make sense of what is being observed by using a 
set of concepts or intellectual constructs.  Dependent upon the nature of the 
real-world situation a selection of concepts will be made.”   
 
With regard to the purpose of a model, Walliman (2011, p. 107) asserted that a 
model “aims to isolate and simplify an event in order to inspect it in detail and 
gain useful data.”  He added that “it is essential to understand the system that 
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lies behind the phenomena to be modelled and what are the important variables 
and how they interact,” noting that “qualitative models emphasize the 
relationships between entities without trying to quantify them” (Walliman, 2011, 
p. 108).  Grix (2010) asserted that “a model is a representation of reality 
imposed on raw data so as to draw out possible relationships among variables” 
(p. 22).  May (2011, p. 125) commented that models “allow assessment of 
different characteristics where there are multiple independent variables and 
interactions.” 
 
Addressing the issue of modelling, Giddens and Turner (1987, p. 164) wrote 
that in social theory, modelling involves “a variety of activities, ranging from the 
construction of formal equations and computer simulations to graphic 
representations of relations among phenomena.”  Giddens and Turner (1987, p. 
164) added that in sociological theory, there are two types of models: empirical-
causal models and abstract-analytical models.  Empirical-causal models involve 
“statements of correlation among measured variables, ordered in a linear and 
temporal sequence” (Giddens and Turner, 1987, p. 165) which was not the 
focus of this thesis.    
 
On the other hand, abstract analytical models develop “context-free concepts” 
such as centralization of power or differentiation, and then “represent their 
relations in a visual picture.”  Giddens and Turner (1987, pp. 164-165) noted 
that “such relations are usually expressed in causal terms, but these causal 
connections are complex, involving varying weights and patterns (such as 
feedback loops, cycles, mutual effects and other non-linear connective 
representations).”  The approach taken in abstract analytical models appeared 
to be of utility for this thesis.   
 
Continuing on the issue of modelling, Wilson (1990, p. xv) wrote that there are 
various “modelling languages appropriate to various parts of a problem 
spectrum” noting that this spectrum “extends from the well defined (hard) 
problems, in which the modelling language may be mathematically oriented, to 
soft, ill structured problems in which a modelling language is required which is 
capable of a richer description of the real world than mathematics can provide.”  
With regard to this thesis, a “richer description” of the real world was more 
suitable for this particular research.  
 
Finally, with regard to the aim of this research, Kirke (2009, p. 12) noted that 
“Models of any kind are usually needed because the investigator cannot 
understand the totality of something.  In order to start to make sense of what is 
apparently overwhelmingly complex information, they need to break it down and 
give it some sort of shape.”  Kirke (2009) went on to note that “A model, 
therefore, is created for a specific purpose – to find the guiding principles in a 
particular process, for instance – and it inevitably contains assumptions and 
artificial boundaries that allow the user to make sense of the relevant part of the 
picture” (p. 13).  In this thesis, the aim was to determine the elements of a 
model for effective military assistance projects out of large amounts of 
information regarding the Baltic military assistance initiatives.       
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The goal for this research was to analyse the significance of a specific 
Intervention (political decisions), and determine the various Mechanisms (such 
as political commitment) which allowed that Intervention to generate specific 
Outcomes from military assistance programmes.  Such a process allowed for 
the generation of elements for a model with regard to the Intervention, 
Mechanisms and Outcomes.  It is necessary at this juncture to be clear about 
the expectations regarding the utility of the model which can be developed and 
what benefits it can provide academics and practitioners in the area of military 
assistance. 
 
The intention was to generate as much meaning as possible from the data and 
identify Mechanisms apparent in BALTBAT and the other projects.  A model 
with significant predictive ability would be desirable as the final product.  
However, that is beyond the scope of this research.  Similarly, it would have 
been valuable to draw conclusions regarding the Mechanisms which would 
have allowed them to be categorized as antecedent (or starting) variables or 
mediating variables.  However, this again was beyond the ambitions of this 
research, although it would certainly appear to be a worthwhile subject of future 
research.  Finally, those working in the field would welcome a model which 
could be applied precisely in other states or regions to assure successful 
Outcomes.  However, that was well beyond the goals of this research and 
raised the question of whether such a model is indeed feasible, a point which is 
left to future researchers.  Instead, the intention of this thesis was to identify the 
elements which can constitute parts of such a model, highlight the key 
questions which policy-makers need to ask, and focus attention on the 
decisions they need to reach to ensure they have a solid foundation for their 
initiatives and the best possible chance for successful Outcomes.   
 
Re-phrasing the preceding points another way, there was no intention within 
this thesis of generating a model which can provide mathematical predictability 
with regard to successful military assistance programmes.  Instead, the goals 
for the research were more modest.  Assuming the proposition is accepted that 
BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives were successful, their genesis, 
establishment and development indicate there was an Intervention and there 
were Mechanisms which were the cause of successful Outcomes.  Admittedly, 
the Mechanisms which comprise the elements for a model were generated in a 
particular geographic area at a specific time in a unique political environment.  
However, the proposition is put forth that the difficulties involved with that time 
and that environment indicated that the Mechanisms which generated the 
desired Outcomes in such challenging circumstances provided a reason to 
believe that they are of value in future military assistance projects.   
 
In view of the significance of the issue of transferability, a topic addressed in the 
Literature Review in Chapter Two, the interviewees were asked to provide their 
views on whether the experience of the Baltic initiatives can (or should) be 
transferred to other areas.  This generated a substantial amount of 
commentary.  The results are analysed in Chapter Five, but at this juncture, the 
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proposition is put forth that this set of data was of particular importance to work 
in this area.  The point was made in Chapter One that there has been 
insufficient analysis of military assistance projects, whether they were 
successful or not.  This thesis addressed that issue, and provided a detailed 
analysis of the Baltic military assistance programmes, which appeared to have 
generated the Outcomes desired by the donor and recipient states.   
 
In short, the goal of the research was to identify the Mechanisms apparent in 
the Baltic programmes which generated successful Outcomes and are the 
elements of a model applicable to military assistance projects.  Such a model 
could be of use to academics and practitioners in the area.  The goal was 
modest, but it addressed a topic which has not been analysed, and provided a 
foundation from which further research can be conducted.     
 
3.6 Evaluating the Quality of the Research 
 
Although the issues of the quality (also addressed with regard to reliability) and 
validity of research tend to blur, there is an advantage in trying to address the 
two topics separately.  Silverman (2006, p. 276) provided his set of criteria for 
evaluating qualitative research: 
 
1. Are the methods of research appropriate to the nature of the question 
being asked? 
2. Is the connection to an existing body of knowledge or theory clear? 
3. Are there clear accounts of the criteria used for the selection of cases for 
study, and of the data collection and analysis? 
4. Does the sensitivity of the methods match the needs of the research 
question? 
5. Were the data collection and record keeping systematic? 
6. Is reference made to accepted procedures for analysis? 
7. How systematic is the analysis? 
8. Is there adequate discussion of how themes, concepts and categories 
were derived from the data? 
9. Is there adequate discussion of the evidence for and against the 
researcher’s arguments? 
10. Is a clear distinction made between the data and their interpretation?  
 
With regard to reliability, Flick (2002) cited procedural reliability, commenting 
that reliability is critical against the backdrop of the theory of the research topic 
and the use of methods (p. 220).  The proposition put forward by Flick (2002) is 
that reliability comes down to two issues: first, the "genesis of the data needs to 
be explicated in a way that makes it possible to check what is a statement of the 
subject on the one hand and where the researcher's interpretation begins on the 
other;" and second, procedures regarding the interview and the text must be 
made explicit to improve comparability of different conduct by interviewers or 
observers (p. 221).   
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For this thesis, the issues noted above regarding the quality and reliability of the 
research were addressed.  The author conducted all the interviews.  The 
interview transcripts are available for examination, and substantial amounts of 
data from the interviews are provided in Chapter Five.  Finally, the rationale 
behind the specific steps taken to conduct the research (such as use of semi-
structured interviews and coding) were presented earlier in this Chapter. 
 
3.7 Evaluating the Validity of the Research 
 
Turning to the validity of the research, Yin (2003, p. 97) provided three 
recommended principles to maximize the benefits from the various data 
sources: use multiple sources of evidence; create a case study data base; and 
maintain a chain of evidence.  With regard to multiple sources, the use of 
interviews and documents concerning the Baltic programmes bolstered the 
validity of the research and served as triangulation.  With regard to a case study 
data base, all the interviews and documents are available for review and 
assessment.  Finally, with regard to chain of evidence, all interviews are in a 
final form approved by the interviewee and handled only by the author. 
 
It is useful to return to the issue of triangulation, or the use of multiple methods, 
to determine a more accurate portrayal of the objective truth (Silverman, 2006, 
p. 291). That could involve use of interviews, observation, surveys or other data.  
Triangulation does not necessarily result in one method offsetting the 
weaknesses of other methods (Silverman, 2006, p. 291).  However, 
triangulation has utility, especially if done with a particular theoretical 
perspective in mind and with methods which can provide critical data within that 
perspective.       
 
As Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 36) noted, there is great weight on validity 
based on the factors of “construct (are the concepts well grounded?), 
descriptive/contextual (is the account complete and thorough?), interpretive 
(does the account connect with the ‘lived experience’ of people in the case?), 
and natural (is the setting mostly undisturbed by my presence?).”  Miles and 
Huberman (1994) generated a list of 13 methods by which the findings can be 
tested or confirmed (p. 263).  Specifically with regard to assessing data quality, 
they cited four methods: checking for representativeness; checking for 
researcher effects; triangulating; and weighting the evidence.  They listed four 
methods which address looking at what lies outside the expected pattern: 
checking the meaning of outliers; using extreme cases; following up surprises; 
and looking for negative evidence.  The final group of four methods to test 
explanations were: making if-then tests; ruling out spurious relations; replicating 
a finding; and checking out rival explanations.  The thirteenth and final method 
was getting feedback from informants who supplied the original data, which was 
done for this particular research.  While not all 13 methods were utilised in this 
research, all 13 were considered to see if any particular method should be 
utilised to enhance the quality of the research. 
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3.8  Evaluating the General Applicability of the Research 
 
Perhaps the most problematic issue regarding this research was the ability to 
generalise about the findings of this particular case study.  In short, the question 
was: can the significance of the Intervention (political decisions) and the 
Mechanisms utilised to generate Outcomes from the Baltic military assistance 
initiatives serve as the elements of a model for effective military assistance 
projects which can be applied to programmes in other states?  As a starting 
point for discussion of this question, the literature on the general issue of 
applicability of case study findings was instructive.   
 
The question posed by positivists and other critics was fundamental: can the 
results from a case study be generally applied?  Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 
31) noted that it is easier to generalise when taking results from a small sample 
to a larger sample, as opposed to moving from a single case to a larger set.  
However, Stake (2005, p. 450) commented on two different types of general 
purposes for case study methodology.  The first is developing general theories 
which have substantial applicability.  The second is pursuing an intrinsic interest 
in the case and developing conclusions which are specific lessons from the 
case.  As Stake (2005) noted, even intrinsic case studies cannot avoid the test 
of general applicability.  However, the key point is that this was not the ultimate 
goal of this research.  The assertion by Stake (2005) is that the methodology for 
an intrinsic case study is “to learn enough about the case to encapsulate 
complex meanings into a finite report but to describe the case in sufficient 
descriptive narrative so that readers can experience these happenings 
vicariously and draw their own conclusions” (p. 450).  To a large degree, this 
describes the process and outcome regarding this particular research into the 
Baltic programmes.  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
The salient points regarding the methodology chosen for this research were 
addressed by the broad, overarching principles regarding good qualitative 
research.  As Flick (2002) wrote: 
 
It does not make sense to argue that a specific method should be used in 
qualitative research as the right and only method.  This form of 
commitment is not appropriate to qualitative research.  But there are 
some other forms of commitment necessary in qualitative research.  
Research should be planned methodologically and based on principles 
and reflection.  Notions like fixed and well-defined paradigms rather 
obstruct the way to the issue under study than they open new and 
appropriate ways to do it.  Decisions for theory and method in qualitative 
research should be taken and reflected in a knowledge-based way (p. 
274). 
 
The methods and specific procedures utilised in this research emphasized the 
focus on a flexible, iterative process by which the interviews were coded and, 
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augmented by analysis of numerous documents, Mechanisms were identified 
which could be the elements of  a model for successful military assistance 
programmes.  In fulfilling those criteria, the methodology met the requirements 
for valid and reliable research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: COLLECTED DATA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The effort was made to interview as broad a range of individuals as possible 
who could provide insights into the initiation and development of BALTBAT and 
the other Baltic military assistance initiatives.  This included individuals who 
were in senior positions in the 1990s which allowed them to make the political 
decisions regarding these projects, those who played a key role in the 
development of the Baltic programmes, and those who could provide insights 
into the Baltic nations in general and the Baltic initiatives in particular.   
 
The first and most important group of interviewees consisted of policy-makers 
who were "present at the creation" of BALTBAT and were intimately familiar 
with the critical issues which dominated the thinking of those who established 
these programmes: the concern regarding Russia; the need for the Baltic 
capitals to act in unison; the focus on establishing the qualifications of the Baltic 
states to become members of NATO; and many similar concerns.  These 
individuals were particularly well-suited to judge the significance of the 
Intervention of political decisions, the Mechanisms which were utilised and their 
impact on the generation of Outcomes from the Baltic military assistance 
programmes. 
 
The second group of interviewees consisted of individuals who played an 
important role in turning that overarching political framework into concrete 
military assistance projects.  There was particular value in obtaining the views 
of civilian and military personnel who worked to develop the project details 
which allowed the Baltic governments to develop the foundation for modern 
military forces, and eventually join NATO. 
 
The third and final group of interviewees who provided valuable data for this 
research were those individuals who worked on general issues related to the 
Baltic countries, including the Baltic initiatives.  One benefit of including such 
individuals was to obtain a perspective from those who are experts on the Baltic 
area, but were not directly involved in the military assistance programmes, and 
may therefore be more objective about their impact and efficiency.  These 
interviewees were familiar with the challenges which faced the Baltic capitals 
and the political environment of the 1990s, but were able to provide a broader 
overview of the context in which the Baltic military programmes were 
undertaken, possibly providing a different assessment of the Outcomes.  
 
With regard to the number of interviews which were conducted, more interviews 
and more data enhance the quality of any piece of research.  However, two 
responses should be made on that point.  The first response is that the key 
issue was whether a sufficient number of individuals from the three categories 
noted above were interviewed and provided enough information to conduct 
sufficiently rigorous analysis.  The second response is that while the quantity of 
interviews was important, it was the quality of the information from the 
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interviews which was more critical.  The proposition put forth is that the data 
which was received were of sufficient quality to support solid research findings.    
 
Finally, with regard to the geographical distribution of the interviewees, special 
efforts were made to contact Baltic and Nordic policy-makers as they played a 
central role in these initiatives.  Individuals from the UK, US and other 
supporting states who worked on these programmes were also interviewed.  It 
should be noted that there was no concerted effort to ensure that at least one 
individual from each of the supporting states was interviewed.  Once again, the 
critical factor was contacting individuals who could provide high quality 
information, rather than simply ensuring geographic distribution.   
 
The list of interviewees was provided in the Dramatus Personae on pages xiv-
xv which also included the date on which the interview was conducted.         
 
4.2 Policy Makers 
 
On the first category of senior officials who established the political foundation 
for the Baltic programmes, the twelve individuals who were interviewed and 
agreed that their comments would be for attribution were: 
 
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen - (Denmark)  Former Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson - (Iceland)  Former Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
Bjorn Tove Godal - (Norway)  Former Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister 
for Defence. 
 
Hans Haekkerup - (Denmark)  Former Minister for Defence. 
 
Linas Linkevicius - (Lithuania)  Former Minister for Defence. 
 
General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie - (UK)  Former Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe. 
 
Per Carlsen - (Denmark)  Former Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for 
Defence. 
 
Margus Kolga - (Estonia)  Ambassador to the UN, former Deputy Secretary 
General of Policy in the Ministry of Defence, former Director General, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
Kristian Fischer - (Denmark)  Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for Defence. 
 
General Sir Garry Johnson - (UK)  Former Commander, Allied Forces Northern 
Europe. 
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Chris Donnelly - (UK)  Former Special Advisor for Central and Eastern Europe 
to the NATO Secretary General. 
 
Walter Andrusyszyn -- (US)  Former Director of the Office of Regional Political 
Military Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, former 
Political Counselor in Stockholm and former Charge d'affairs in Tallinn. 
 
4.3 Implementers 
 
On the second category of individuals who were critical to setting up and 
developing specific Baltic programmes, the six individuals who were interviewed 
and agreed that their comments would be for attribution were: 
 
Brigadier General Alar Laneman -- (Estonia)  Former and First Commander of 
BALTBAT. 
 
Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen -- (Denmark)  Former and First 
Commandant of the Baltic Defence College. 
 
Captain Igor Schvede -- (Estonia)  Commander of the Estonian Navy and 
former BALTRON commander. 
 
Brigadier General Gunnar Abols -- (Latvia)  Former Commandant of the Baltic 
Defence College. 
 
Brigadier General Valeri Saar -- (Estonia)  Commander of the Estonian Air 
Force. 
 
Julian Brett -- (UK)  Former UK Exchange Officer at the Danish Ministry of 
Defence. 
 
4.4 Other Interviewees 
 
On the third and final category of specialists who have worked on general 
issues related to the Baltic countries, including the Baltic military assistance 
programmes, the five individuals who provided comments for attribution were: 
 
Dr. Graham Herd -- (UK)  Head of International Security Programme, Geneva 
Center for Security Policy. 
 
Erkki Tori -- (Estonia)  Head of Outreach and Baltic Cooperation Section, 
Ministry of Defence. 
 
Dr. Arunas Molis -- (Lithuania)  Former Chairman, International Relations 
Studies, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. 
 
Professor Eric Sibul -- (US)  Assistant Professor, Military Theory and Military 
History, Baltic Defence College. 
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Anthony Lawrence -- (UK)  Directing Staff, Higher Command and Studies 
Course, Baltic Defence College. 
 
4.5 Not for Attribution 
 
There were four individuals (one from Latvia, one from Estonia and two from the 
US) who were willing to be interviewed, but made clear that their comments 
would not be for attribution.  When their views are cited, they are simply 
identified as a Latvian official, an Estonian official, a US official and a retired US 
military officer. 
 
4.6 Process 
 
As noted in Chapter Three, recognising that the quality of the data is best when 
the interview is conducted face-to-face, this was the process of choice for this 
research and done whenever possible.  However, there were practical financial 
limitations which made it impossible to conduct all interviews in-person.  As a 
result, when a face-to-face interview was not possible, it was conducted on the 
phone.  Such a process admittedly did not provide the same quality of data as 
an in-person interview.  However, a telephone interview allowed for an 
immediate give-and-take between interviewer and interviewee.  
 
In two instances (Hannibalsson and Herd), the interviews were write-ups of 
exchanges conducted by e-mail.  It is emphasized that both began with an offer 
of a phone interview, which was declined by Hannibalsson and Herd.  In both 
cases, the interviewees felt that the e-mail exchanges were sufficient to capture 
all of their thoughts and commentary on the issue.  This was buttressed, as was 
the case for all the interviews, by the fact that the interviewees were always 
reminded that they had complete freedom to edit the write-up of their 
comments, including the provision of subsequent thoughts which arose after the 
exchanges.  In one other instance (Clemmesen), the interview write-up was 
augmented with specific commentary addressing the individual points on the 
questionnaire.   
 
In all instances, the write-up of the face-to-face interview, phone interview or e-
mail exchange was sent back to the interviewee for final edits.  In all instances, 
the specific question of attribution was raised and noted in the write-up.   
 
4.7 Original Documents 
 
The research drew on 37 original documents regarding the Baltic military 
assistance programmes.  The intention was to compare the statements 
provided by the interviewees and the Mechanisms that appeared to arise with 
official pronouncements regarding BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET and the 
BALTDEFCOL.  Once again, the argument could be made that there are any 
number of other documents critical to an extensive analysis of these 
programmes.  The response to that point is that the documents listed below 
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provided a sufficient foundation to allow for data triangulation through a 
comparison of the data collected from interviews with the decisions which were 
reached and the documents that were issued.  All of this strengthened the level 
of confidence in the findings.   
 
As noted in the List of Documents at pp. xvi-xviii, the titles given below will, at 
appropriate times, use an informal formulation such as "The Baltic Republics" or 
"The Ministers for Defence of the Three Baltic Republics" rather than the full 
official title in order to save space without reducing the ability to identify the 
document. Where appropriate and necessary to identify the document, the level 
of the signatories was also included.  The documents were: 
 
The 2 June 1992 Communique of the Republics of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania 
Ministries of Defence Delegation Meeting. 
 
The 1994 Agreement on Baltic Parliamentary and Governmental Cooperation 
(governments of the Baltic States). 
The 3 June 1994 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Nordic-Baltic Co-
operation on the formation of a Baltic Peace-keeping Battalion (Ministers for 
Defence of the Nordic and Baltic States). 
 
The 13 June 1994 Terms of Reference for the Baltic Council of Ministers 
(Heads of Government of the Baltic States). 
 
The 11 September 1994 Memorandum of Understanding concerning 
Cooperation on the formation of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Ministers for 
Defence of the Baltic and Supporting States). 
 
The 13 September 1994 Agreement Between the Three Baltic Republics 
concerning the Establishment and Formation of Joint Peacekeeping Unit 
(governments of the Baltic States). 
 
The 13 September 1994 Regulations for the Committees of Senior Officials 
(Baltic Council of Ministers, adopted by the heads of government of the Baltic 
States). 
 
The 13 September 1994 Resolution of the Heads of Government of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania on Cooperation of the Governments of the Baltic States. 
 
The 1 November 1994 Resolution of the Heads of Government of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania on cooperation of the Governments of the Baltic States. 
 
The 27 February 1995 Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Defence and 
Military Relations (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic States). 
 
The 3 April 1997 Joint Communique of the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic 
States. 
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The 10 December 1997 Joint Statement on Ministerial Guidance of the 
Ministers of Defence of the Baltic Republics. 
 
The 10 December 1997 Agreement Between the Governments of the Baltic 
Republics Concerning the Baltic Battalion. 
 
The 10 December 1997 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministers 
of Defence of the Baltic Republics Concerning the Ministerial Committee and 
the Baltic Military Committee Established in Connection with the Cooperation on 
the Baltic Battalion. 
 
The 16 April 1998 Joint Statement on Ministerial Guidance of the Ministers of 
Defence of the Baltic States. 
 
The 16 April 1998 Agreement between the Baltic Republics concerning the 
Establishment of the Baltic Naval Squadron (governments of the Baltic States). 
 
The 16 April 1998 Protocol between the Baltic Republics Concerning the Status 
of the Baltic Battalion Headquarters and the Personnel of the Baltic Battalion 
(governments of the Baltic States). 
 
The 12 June 1998 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation on 
the Development of the Baltic Naval Squadron (Ministers for Defence of the 
Baltic and Supporting States). 
 
The 1998 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperation in the 
Establishment, Operation, Administration and Initial Funding and Secondment 
of Staff to a Baltic Defence College in the Republic of Estonia (Ministers for 
Defence of the Baltic and Supporting States). 
 
The 12 June 1998 Agreement Between the Governments of the Baltic States 
Concerning the Baltic Defence College. 
 
The 8 December 1998 Joint Statement of the Baltic Military Committee. 
 
The 11 December 1998 Joint Communique of the Ministers of Defence of the 
Baltic Republics. 
 
The 1 February 1999 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperation 
on the development of BALTBAT into an Infantry Battalion (Ministers for 
Defence of the Baltic and Supporting States). 
 
The 31 March 1999 Joint Statement of the Baltic Military Committee. 
 
The 22 April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the 
Development of the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) (Ministers for Defence of the 
Baltic States). 
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The 7 May 1999 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministries of 
Defence of the Baltic Republics Concerning the Operation, Funding and 
Administration of the Baltic Battalion (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic States). 
The 14 June 1999 Protocol concerning the Status of the Baltic Defence College 
and its Personnel (governments of the Baltic States).  
 
The 1999 Agreement Between the Governments of the Baltic Republics on the 
Establishment of the Baltic Air Surveillance Network. 
 
The 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development 
of the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) (Ministers for Defence of the 
Baltic States). 
 
The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Organisation, 
Operation, Funding and Administration of the Baltic Naval Squadron. 
 
The 5 October 1999 Terms of Reference for BALTRON Military Coordination 
Group (Baltic Military Committee). 
 
The 1999 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministries of Defence of 
the Baltic Republics concerning the Organisation, Operation, Funding and 
Administration of the Baltic Naval Squadron. 
 
The Terms of References for Commander BALTRON. 
 
The 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development 
of the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) (Ministers for Defence of the Baltic 
States). 
 
The 6 December 2001 BALTBAT Annual Report 2000. 
 
BALTBAT Standing Orders - Chapter 3 on Training. 
 
BALTBAT Standing Orders - Chapter 6 on Logistics. 
 
The Baltic Battalion - Status and future development (from the Baltic BALTBAT 
Military Co-ordination Group). 
 
4.8 Analysis and Consistency of Views 
 
Analysis of the data from the interviews is provided in Chapter Five.  NVIVO 8 
software was used to code the information drawn from the write-ups of the 
interviews.  There was a particular focus on those apparent Mechanisms which 
appeared to have been most important in allowing the Intervention of political 
decisions to generate successful Outcomes from the Baltic military assistance 
programmes.  There was also attention to the concerns of implementers as they 
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turned that political framework into reality.  The analysis also outlined the errors 
and weaknesses which the interviewees, upon reflection, would correct in the 
development of the Baltic initiatives if they had the opportunity.  There was also 
a focus on whether the lessons from the Baltic assistance projects could be 
utilised in similar efforts in other regions, and, if not, why they believed that 
would not be possible. 
 
Those findings were compared to various parts of the original documents noted 
in Section 4.7.  As an example, if the data from the interviewees indicated that 
peacekeeping was selected as the mission of BALTBAT as it was a key area of 
NATO's PfP, and an area which would not engender Russian objections, it was 
anticipated that the official statements from some of these documents would 
highlight the NATO PfP aspect, or use language which would highlight the 
commitment of the international community to robust PKO capabilities. 
 
The original documents on the Baltic projects were not coded with the use of 
NVIVO 8.  Instead, the documents were analysed to serve to triangulate against 
the findings which arose from coding of the interviews and the resulting 
Mechanisms.  To take an example, if the political framework for BALTBAT was 
modified by the late 1990s to generate more "Baltification," or greater control 
and responsibility for the Baltic nations, it was anticipated that aspects of 
"Baltification" would also be apparent in documents from that period regarding 
BALTBAT and the other initiatives.   
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
The number of interviews conducted and the original documentation regarding 
the Baltic programmes provided a sufficiently broad data base from which to 
generate reliable findings.  These results involved the significance of the 
Intervention of political decisions and the various Mechanisms which promoted 
the generation of Outcomes.  These findings were checked against the official 
pronouncements in the documents regarding the Baltic military assistance 
projects.  As a result of this process, credible data regarding the Baltic initiatives 
were collected which identified elements to be used as the basis for 
development through further research of a model for effective military 
assistance programmes.  
 89 
CHAPTER FIVE - DATA ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Overview 
 
The coding of the information from the 27 interviews indicated 12 Mechanisms 
derived from the experience of BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives which 
appeared to be important in allowing the Intervention of broad political decisions 
between the donor and recipient states to generate the desired Outcomes from 
these military assistance projects.  These Mechanisms therefore appeared to 
be the identified elements of a model for effective military assistance 
programmes.  They were: 
 
(1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns 
(2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance 
(3) - A Constant Source of Support 
(4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment 
(5) - Connection to Larger Goals 
(6) - Development of New Leadership 
(7) - Direction and Control by Donor States 
(8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States 
(9) - Flexibility in Planning 
(10) - Good Organizational Structures 
(11) - A Strong Lead Nation 
(12) - Leadership From Key Individuals 
 
5.1.1 Mechanisms - General 
 
Mechanisms involved those specific items from the coding noted by at least 
seven interviewees.  The rationale for this threshold was that for an item to be 
considered a Mechanism, it should be raised by at least one-quarter of all 
interviewees.   
 
On setting the threshold at seven interviewees, Hennink, Hutter and Bailey 
(2011, p. 17) noted, in general, that “Qualitative data analysis is interpretive.”  
Corbin and Strauss (2008) stressed that “Qualitative analysis is many things, 
but it is not a process that can be rigidly codified” (p. 16) adding that the 
researcher believes the findings “represent one logical interpretation of data, as 
seen through the eyes of this particular analyst” (p. 47).   
   
Davies (2007, p. 196) stressed that “the task of data analysis cannot be 
reduced to a perfect formula.”  Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (2010, p. 245) noted 
that “In more general terms, significance has to do with how important a 
particular finding is judged to be.”  Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 45) highlighted 
“feeling right,” noting that it is the point at which the researcher “believes that 
the findings arrived at through reflective analysis express what participants are 
trying to convey through word and action and emotions, as seen through the 
‘eyes’ of the analyst.” 
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Davies (2007, p. 133) noted that “It is better to have an approximate measure of 
significance than none at all – so long as due caution is emphasized.”  George 
and Bennett (2005, p. 133) commented on the inductive statistical model which 
“argued for using high likelihood as the standard for explanation, but did not 
specify how likely an outcome must be to be considered law-like.” 
 
Bryman (2012, p. 403) commented that “Many qualitative researchers are 
disdainful of approaches to research that entail the imposition of pre-determined 
formats on the social world.”  Johnson and Reynolds (2012, p. 425) noted that a 
researcher must “Ask what will be just enough to support or refute a 
hypothesis.”  Lindlof and Taylor (2011) noted that data reduction “means that 
the use value of evidence is prioritized according to emerging schemes of 
interpretation” (p. 243) and data analysis “can provide focus and shape to the 
body of material gathered during a project” (pp. 243-244). 
 
Lindlof and Taylor (2011, p. 274) noted that a possibly indefinite number of 
interpretations can arise from research, but the ones the researcher elects to 
develop “are hopefully ones that other people find plausible, insightful and/or 
useful.”  Thus, the literature indicated that there is no “magic number” at which 
significance is established and the decision to set the threshold at seven 
interviewees was appropriate to focus on the most important items.    
 
These Mechanisms appeared to be determinative in the success or failure of 
the Baltic military assistance initiatives.  The 12 Mechanisms are presented 
roughly in order of the frequency with which they are cited by interviewees.  The 
general sequence is from most frequently to least frequently noted.  However, 
to be clear, there is no intention of implying some rough prioritization of the 
significance of the Mechanisms.  Moreover, the sequence of most frequent to 
least frequent is not strictly followed in certain instances, to allow for the 
juxtaposition of different Mechanisms which complement or augment one 
another.  
 
It is worth noting that the analysis in this chapter focusses on outlining the data 
supporting the 12 Mechanisms, drawing on both interview material and text 
from relevant documents.  While some commentary is provided in this chapter 
as appropriate, extensive comments on the Mechanisms are provided in 
Chapter Six, when they are put forth as the identified elements of a model for 
effective military assistance projects.  This structure allows for a clearer 
delineation between what arises from analysis of the data, and the implications 
of the 12 resulting Mechanisms.    
 
In Chapter Six, the discussion of the identified elements of a model reiterates 
that the goal of this research was simply to identify Mechanisms which allowed 
an important Intervention to generate Outcomes from military assistance 
programmes.  There was no attempt to provide relative weight or significance of 
individual Mechanisms.  There was also no assertion of a particular 
chronological sequencing in which it would be most effective to have certain 
Mechanisms addressed before other Mechanisms.  Moreover, there was no 
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attempt to ascertain if the various Mechanisms were moderating or mediating 
variables.  Finally, as the effort was to identify the elements that could serve as 
the basis for a model, there was no assertion that any type of predictive ability 
can be generated from the elements.  These are all issues for which more 
research would appear to be needed in order to develop a model for effective 
military assistance projects from the elements identified in this thesis.      
 
5.1.2 Extent of Data Reporting 
 
The following are the Mechanisms which arose from analysis of the interview 
material.  There was no intention of including all the comments provided on any 
particular point.  While an extensive number of statements were included, this 
was intended to indicate the breadth of opinion on any particular topic.  Positive 
and negative comments were included to highlight the diversity of views and 
ensure that there was no false sense of certainty, or an erroneous assumption 
of unanimity among interviewees.  Indeed, the proposition is put forward that 
the diversity of views on such an important set of issues added to the credibility 
of the findings. 
 
The issue raised previously of the general applicability of the Mechanisms from 
the Baltic projects is addressed at the end of this chapter.  It was one of the 
important questions with regard to the utility and validity of the identified 
elements of a model for effective military assistance initiatives.  There was a 
diversity of opinion among interviewees about the transferability of the Baltic 
experience to other regions.  Some of the interviewees asserted that an attempt 
to replicate the experience elsewhere through use of the Mechanisms would be 
a grave error.  Others took issue with that position and believed that the 
Mechanisms for success in the Baltic initiatives could be transferred to other 
countries.  Other interviewees took a position between those two views and 
asserted that there are worthwhile lessons to be learned from the Baltic 
experience, but it would not be prudent to believe that can be simply replicated 
elsewhere.   
 
Particularly because of the lack of unanimity of views on this issue, it is 
important to note in detail the caveats or concerns that were raised.  It is 
arguably beneficial for practitioners in the area of military assistance in 
particular to have the Mechanisms and the caveats in mind, and for academics 
working in this field to consider whether the Mechanisms and accompanying 
caveats indicated areas that are worthy of additional research. 
 
5.1.3 Text From Documents 
 
Immediately following the analysis of interviewee comments, the relevant points 
from the documents on the Baltic projects listed in Chapter Four are noted.  
There was no intention of including all relevant text from all documents, as that 
would make this chapter unwieldy.  The text from the documents was included 
to indicate the extent to which it supplemented (or contradicted) the data from 
the interviews, thus providing triangulation of data.  
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5.1.4 Other Baltic Projects 
 
A separate section is included with regard to BALTRON, BALTNET and the 
BALTDEFCOL.  The intention was to provide a point of comparison for the 
Mechanisms which arose from the analysis of BALTBAT, as well as a certain 
amount of triangulation of data and results.  To cite an example, to the extent 
that “Baltification,” or transfer of responsibility to recipient states, was a key 
Mechanism in BALTBAT, it would be expected to show up in the planning for 
subsequent projects.  Thus, there are separate sub-sections on those projects 
which bolster or modify the consideration of each Mechanism.  The analysis is 
centered on the interview data, although material from relevant documents is 
also included. 
 
5.2 First Mechanism - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns 
 
The data from the interviews indicated the first Mechanism which contributed to 
the success of military assistance programmes was assessment of regional 
security concerns and recognition of the role of significant regional players.  
Once again, within the CIMO framework, the issue was the extent to which, 
within a particular Context, this Mechanism was important with regard to how 
the Intervention of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient 
states had an impact on generating relevant Outcomes from the military 
assistance initiatives.  With regard to the BALTBAT experience, the specific 
political decision was the need to address the concerns of Russia, the dominant 
regional power, and it would seem logical that as a general point, a focus on 
regional or broader security concerns by policy-makers was a required 
Mechanism to generate successful Outcomes.   
 
On this Mechanism, 21 interviewees indicated that Russian views and possible 
actions were considered in planning Western assistance to the Baltic capitals.  
These interviewees were: Abols, Andrusyszyn, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Donnelly, 
Ellemann-Jensen, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Hannibalsson, Johnson, Kolga, 
Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Saar, Schvede, an Estonian official, a 
Latvian official, a US official, and a retired US military officer.  While the 
expressions of concern varied, even the most dismissive comments noted that 
reactions from Moscow were in the minds of the people working to establish a 
structure for the Baltic projects.  In short, this was a key political decision 
regarding the foundation for Baltic assistance, and an important Mechanism for 
consideration in any future initiatives.     
 
Former Danish Defence Minister Hans Haekkerup stressed in a 2008 interview 
that the primary concern was to get Russian forces out of the Baltic nations as 
quickly as possible.  He added that a focus on the ability to conduct 
peacekeeping operations was a good way to train Baltic military forces, and was 
also less threatening to Russia.  Former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie, commented in a 2010 
interview that the Baltic countries were tiny, but important, and that Kaliningrad 
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added to the special sensitivity of the area.  He stated that at this point in time, 
Russia was "imploding."  General Garry Johnson, former Commander of NATO 
Allied Forces Northern Europe, supported those views in a 2011 interview, 
noting that concern about Russia was an overwhelming and motivating force.   
 
Walter Andrusyszyn, former Charge d'affairs at the US Embassy in Tallinn, and 
Director of the Office of Regional Political-Military Affairs in the Bureau of 
European Affairs at the US Department of State, agreed in a 2010 interview that 
the immediate policy challenge was to ensure Russia completed the troop 
withdrawal, stressing that there were grounds to believe Moscow at times was 
ready to find an excuse to halt the withdrawal.  He noted that during this critical 
period, people were still hedging their bets on how Russian relations with the 
Baltic governments would develop.   
 
A Latvian official emphasized in a 2010 interview that the Baltic nations were 
still afraid of Russia when BALTBAT began, and an Estonian official concurred 
in a 2010 interview that Russia was certainly on the minds of people working on 
these issues.  Kristian Fischer, Danish Deputy Permanent Secretary of State for 
Defence, noted in a 2010 interview that there were concerns about the reaction 
from Russia to Western military assistance to the Baltic capitals.  However, he 
added that there was also a general consensus among participants that they 
would deal with Russian reactions if and when they arose. 
 
Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen, the first Commandant of the 
BALTDEFCOL, commented in a 2010 interview that Russia was, for him, 
always a concern.  When he first arrived in the Baltic countries, it was a tense 
time in which cars and monuments were being blown up and in which security 
was a major consideration. Generally, added Clemmesen (interview 2010), 
Russia could not accept the idea of the independence of the Baltic 
governments.  However, Russia was so disorganized and focused on domestic 
concerns that it did not have a real policy regarding the Baltic nations.  Brigadier 
General Alar Laneman, the first BALTBAT commander, emphasized in a 2010 
interview that Russia was always in the background as people made decisions, 
if for no other reason than geography.   
 
Chris Donnelly, former Special Advisor for Central and Eastern Europe to the 
NATO Secretary General, stressed in a 2011 interview that the Baltic capitals 
were afraid that Russia would send in tanks, adding that in his view, the Baltic 
governments had good reason to be afraid Moscow would take such action. 
The Russians had a lot of tanks in the Baltic nations, and there was a real fear 
of bloodshed.  With regard to the Western response, Donnelly (interview 2011) 
conceded that they were afraid of what to do.  There was no idea of how to 
control Moscow.  As a result, he admitted, the Baltic governments got no official 
support, only a little practical assistance and lots of discouragement from the 
West.   
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5.2.1 Differing Assessments Regarding Russia 
 
Some of the interviewees had different perspectives on the issue of Russia and 
the extent to which a concern about a response from Moscow dominated 
thinking about military assistance to the Baltic capitals.  Former Norwegian 
Foreign (and later Defence) Minister Bjorn Tove Godal stated in a 2011 
interview that Norway counseled the Baltic governments to take a patient 
attitude.  He added that Oslo was not overly concerned about whether Russia 
would have issues with military assistance to the Baltic nations, which did not 
make unreasonable requests for aid.  Similarly, Brigadier General Gundars 
Abols, former Commandant of the BALTDEFCOL, commented in a 2009 
interview that the West was perhaps too cautious about Russian concerns.   
 
In a 2008 interview, former Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen 
echoed Godal's views, stating that in formulating Danish policy in the years up 
to Baltic independence, "We really did not give it much thought if Russia was 
offended."  He noted that at that time, even within his own Ministry, there were 
words of warning that he was perhaps pushing the Russians too hard.  Indeed, 
Ellemann-Jensen (interview 2008) conceded that, perhaps in retrospect, 
Denmark should have been more concerned about Russian views.  He 
commented that the Baltic capitals were always worried about a Russian 
invasion.  However, Ellemann-Jensen (interview 2008) stated that he never 
thought Russia would invade the Baltic countries.    
 
Ellemann-Jensen (interview 2008) noted that up to August 1991 and the failed 
attempted putsch in Moscow, there was resistance to an overly-energetic Baltic 
policy.  Some larger European countries made it clear that they did not want to 
move too fast to embrace the Baltic nations as this might create problems for 
then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.  Former Icelandic Foreign Minister Jon 
Baldvin Hannibalsson concurred in a 2011 interview, noting that despite official 
rhetoric, Baltic independence leaders were told to not rock the boat, to restrain 
demands, and to settle for a compromise. 
 
5.2.2 First Mechanism - Documents 
 
In their 2 June 1992 Communique, the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic States 
expressed the position that: 
 
In examining the issue of security policy of the Baltic countries, the 
delegates agreed upon the need for close cooperation between the 
Ministries of Defence.  It was noted that the armed forces under the 
Russian Federation's jurisdiction are presently stationed illegally in the 
territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  These forces blatantly violate 
laws and government resolutions, illegally supplement their bases with 
new recruits and disregard general regulations by exploiting air space 
and sea borders and trespassing upon sovereign nation territories.  The 
operations of the armed forces under the Russian Federation's 
jurisdiction continue to threaten the civil population and impede the 
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operations of the state defence establishments.  In this situation, the 
delegates regard it necessary for joint policy to secure control and 
suppress potential instability. 
 
The statement indicated the extent to which the presence of Russian forces on 
the territory of the Baltic states was of primary significance to the Baltic 
governments and a sign of the general concern with the actions and intentions 
of the Russian government. 
 
5.3 Second Mechanism - Focus on Optimal Area of Military Assistance 
 
The second Mechanism which emerged from the interviews was determining 
the optimal area in which to provide military assistance.  This was cited by 19 
interviewees, who referred to the significance of having BALTBAT focus on 
PKO capabilities.  These interviewees were: Andrusyszyn, Carlsen, 
Clemmesen, Donnelly, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Johnson, Kolga, Laneman, 
Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Molis, Saar, Schvede, an Estonian official, a Latvian 
official, a US official and a retired US military officer.   
 
The goal of developing PKO capabilities as the basis for military aid to the Baltic 
capitals was a major political decision between the donor and recipient states.  
It should be noted that this Mechanism could be asserted to proceed naturally 
from the first Mechanism of considering regional security concerns.  Worries 
about Russian reactions would lead policy-makers to find the least controversial 
way of providing military assistance.  Development of PKO capabilities, certainly 
in the early 1990s, would have been a logical choice.   
 
However, the proposition is put forth that the second Mechanism was not 
merely a corollary of the first.  There are two points to be made regarding this 
issue.  First, there are a wide variety of options available to provide military 
assistance.  They can range from exchanges of officers, to training, to the 
stationing of troops from one country onto the soil of another.  Even if there is 
no dominant regional state, it remains important to decide on the best method of 
providing military aid.  The option which is selected may be influenced by 
whether there is a dominant country in the region and possible reactions from 
that country.  However, the fact that there is influence due to the first 
Mechanism does not mean that it determines the outcome of the second 
Mechanism.  
 
This leads to the second point regarding this Mechanism.  The use of the word 
"optimal" in deciding on the form of provision of military assistance implies a 
calculation of the various issues that must be considered.  These can include 
cost, political support, and, most relevant for BALTBAT, political and military 
goals.  Referring back to the CIMO framework, within the specific Context in 
which the participating states agreed to pursue military assistance initiatives, 
the Intervention of broad political decisions agreed upon between donor and 
recipient states required a specific Mechanism of focussing on an optimal area 
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of military assistance in order to generate the desired Outcomes, which can be 
political and/or military goals.   
 
The decision to focus on PKO served the political goal noted later (Mechanism 
five) of buttressing the case of the Baltic nations for NATO membership.  
Moreover, development of PKO capabilities was an effective way of meeting the 
military goal of developing national defence forces.  Certainly, the case can be 
made regarding the latter point that more direct assistance on developing 
conventional defence forces could have been a more efficient way of achieving 
that military goal.  However, this reinforces the significance of the use of the 
word "optimal."  The second Mechanism indicated the importance of 
considering numerous issues in deciding on the best way to provide aid and 
meet multiple goals.  In short, the data from the interviews indicated that this is 
a separate Mechanism which involves an effort to select the best way to provide 
military assistance.      
 
5.3.1 Avoiding Russian Objections 
 
Drawing on the data from the interviews, it appeared that those who made the 
political decisions between the donor and recipient countries regarding the 
Baltic initiatives carefully considered which forms of military assistance would 
be “optimal.”  Haekkerup (interview 2008) stressed that development of PKO 
capabilities was less threatening to Russia, a good way to train Baltic military 
forces, and an area which allowed Baltic forces to "learn by doing."  Godal 
(interview 2011) agreed that BALTBAT was well-suited to help the Baltic nations 
develop military capabilities, fit neatly with the focus of the Nordic states on 
PKO, and would not raise concerns in Russia.  Former Lithuanian Defence 
Minister Linas Linkevicius commented in a 2011 interview that there was not an 
excessive concern about Russian reactions to these Baltic military initiatives, 
but it was a good idea to have "some political cover."  Thus, the focus on PKO 
was wise, noted Linkevicius, which was particularly true as PfP included Russia.  
   
Mackenzie (interview 2010) concurred that the political concern about not 
offending Russia was important in selecting PKO as the focus of initial activity 
for the Baltic governments.  Former Danish Deputy Permanent Secretary of 
State for Defence Per Carlsen noted in a 2010 interview that PKO was a "safe" 
area in which to support the development of Baltic military capabilities.  An effort 
to generate additional UN PKO forces was not contentious.  Carlsen (interview 
2010) added that the PKO focus, particularly for UN missions, made the general 
push for military assistance to the Baltic governments acceptable.   
 
A US official emphasized in a 2011 interview that it probably would not have 
been possible in the early years for Russia to have accepted the Baltic capitals 
moving to develop the type of conventional military forces outlined by a 1998 
report prepared for the US Department of Defense.  It was important that the 
Baltic projects focused on areas in which opportunities were available, and PKO 
was the only good starting point for Baltic governments to develop military 
forces and receive aid from the West.   
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Donnelly (interview 2011) stated that NATO did not want to antagonize Russia, 
and the Baltic countries "did not get an enthusiastic response" from Brussels on 
establishing a territorial defence force.  In view of Russian politics, BALTBAT 
might have been about all that was possible.  A Latvian official (interview 2010) 
stressed that there was always a concern about Russia, which was why PKO 
was chosen.  However, he added, there was a debate within the Baltic states 
about whether to focus resources on "hard defence" rather than PKO 
capabilities.  Moreover, commented an Estonian official (interview 2010), while 
there were reasons for the Nordic countries to assist the Baltic governments, 
the Nordic states were also wary of giving the impression that aid was directed 
against any particular nation.  Sweden and Finland were worried about the 
provision of military assistance, so PKO was the best area in which to focus 
efforts. 
 
5.3.2 Buttressing the Case for NATO Membership 
 
The selection of development of PKO capabilities to help make the case for 
Baltic state membership in NATO was an important political goal regarding this 
second Mechanism.  Fischer (interview 2010) noted that BALTBAT allowed the 
Baltic capitals to make a real contribution to peace support operations, 
establishing that they were not just consumers of security, but producers of 
security.  He added that BALTBAT also made a concrete contribution to the 
development of national defence capabilities for the Baltic countries, and was a 
clear political manifestation of securing closer connections to Western 
governments, NATO and the UN.  Carlsen (interview 2010) also made the point 
that it was in NATO's interest that BALTBAT put "meat on the bones" of PfP.   
 
The model used for BALTBAT, stressed Mackenzie (interview 2010), was 
"excellent."  The Baltic capitals could be seen to be a part of the Western effort 
to generate security.  Agreeing with Carlsen, Mackenzie (interview 2010) added 
that NATO was in need of PKO forces, so any state which could make a 
contribution was viewed positively.  A small but effective force was important, 
noted Mackenzie (interview 2010), so BALTBAT was useful and carried political 
weight.  In short, the second Mechanism of selecting the optimal form of military 
assistance can also involve achieving important political goals, as indicated by 
the impact of BALTBAT on the desire of the Baltic nations to join NATO.    
 
5.3.3 Developing National Defence Forces 
 
It would seem apparent that for military assistance programmes, one of the 
goals should be development of military forces.  This can involve the generation 
of what could be characterised as niche capabilities (such as for PKOs), or 
more traditional national defence forces.  The example of BALTBAT indicated 
that it might not be prudent to draw too hard a line between the two, and that a 
political decision to focus on a niche capability could also generate traditional 
defence forces. 
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In a 2010 interview, a retired US military officer concurred on the practical 
importance of the PKO focus, noting that the deployment of the BALTBAT 
component companies allowed their personnel to see and experience real 
operations, which furthered their training and development.  Johnson (interview 
2011) agreed that PKOs are a good way of developing military skills.  Moreover, 
the BALTBAT focus on PKO was in line with territorial defence, noted Donnelly 
(interview 2011). It is, he added, what Poland does, as territorial defence and 
PKO are not mutually exclusive.  There was a general political consensus, 
commented Fischer (interview 2010), about PKO as an area which would allow 
for generation of real military capabilities.  This allowed for the development of 
forces from a low, initial base, as PKO was a solid, practical way to focus 
military training and provision of support.   
 
To be clear, there was not total agreement on the PKO focus at that time.  
Margus Kolga, former Deputy Secretary General of Policy in the Estonian 
Ministry of Defence and Estonian representative in the BALTBAT Steering 
Group, noted in a 2009 interview that some in the Baltic states thought PKO 
was a less "useful" area of focus, although the supporters of PKO won the 
argument.  One reason they may have carried the day is that there was a 
political aspect to the decision on the optimal form of assistance.  This led to the 
general proposition that a key question recipient states need to consider is what 
type of military assistance donor states are willing to provide.  Dr. Arunas Molis, 
former International Relations Studies Chair of the BALTDEFCOL, stressed in a 
2009 interview that the Nordic countries were looking for a niche military 
capability, and the BALTBAT focus on PKO served that goal as well as 
providing a prudent way of developing Baltic military forces.   
 
5.3.4 Second Mechanism - Documents 
 
With regard to the political decision to focus on development of PKO capabilities 
as the optimal means of providing military assistance, the 13 September 1994 
document on the agreement of the Baltic states concerning the establishment of 
BALTBAT noted in the preamble that the Baltic states do so "striving to make 
their contribution, according to their capacity, to the efforts of the UN and/or 
CSCE in regulating crises, preventing war and maintaining peace."   
 
In Article 1, paragraph 1 of that document, it was written that they establish 
BALTBAT "in order to exercise mandates given by the UN and/or CSCE for 
peacekeeping, also cooperating with NATO and WEU (note: Western European 
Union) in the field of peacekeeping."  Further in that paragraph, it was noted 
that BALTBAT "shall be organised in accordance with internationally recognized 
military and peacekeeping principles." 
 
In addition, in the BALTBAT MOU, Article 1, paragraph 1, it was written that the 
program is "designed to put in place mechanisms by which the Baltic States can 
themselves in the future maintain a peacekeeping capability."   
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Finally, the preamble to the Agreement Between the Baltic States on 
Cooperation in the fields of Defence and Military Relations from 1995 included 
the text that the states are "seeking to contribute to peacekeeping, security and 
stability in Europe and in the Baltic region in particular."  
 
In short, there was a repeated emphasis in numerous documents on the 
political decision reached between the donor and recipient states (the 
Intervention) to focus on PKO and contributing to international PKO capabilities 
as the optimal area of military assistance for the Baltic governments (the 
Mechanism).  This Mechanism can be asserted to have had an impact in 
deflecting Russian objections while allowing for the achievement of political 
goals for donor and recipient states and generating national defence forces for 
the Baltic nations. 
 
5.4 Assessing The First Two Mechanisms - Russian Non-Reaction 
 
It is worthwhile to assess at this juncture the extent to which the wisdom of the 
political decisions on these first two Mechanisms was validated by events.  One 
measure of the significance of the attention to Russian concerns and the 
decision to have BALTBAT focus on PKO capabilities was the absence of a 
reaction from Moscow.   
 
Certainly it could be argued that the lack of a reaction could have indicated that 
there was no reason for concern about Russia in the first place.  However, in 
view of the Russian statements included in earlier chapters, and the 
assessments noted in the Literature Review in Chapter Two, it appeared that 
there was ample reason for the Baltic and supporting nations to anticipate 
negative responses from Moscow.  The proposition is therefore put forward that 
the absence of a reaction was an indication of good analysis and planning by 
the Baltic and supporting states with regard to the first two Mechanisms, and 
validated the extent to which these Mechanisms were important elements of a 
model for effective military assistance projects. 
 
Returning to the data from the interviews, Godal (interview 2011) made the 
comment that he did not recall that the Russians gave him a difficult time 
regarding BALTBAT.  Haekkerup (interview 2008) stressed that there was no 
direct opposition from Moscow to BALTBAT at the outset, although Russia 
increasingly turned negative on the project as criticism of NATO enlargement 
fed criticism of BALTBAT.  He added that Russia later tried to dissuade and 
even split the Nordic states; an attempt which failed, noted Haekkerup, due to 
Nordic solidarity.   
 
Carlsen (interview 2010) stated that Russia was informed about BALTBAT 
developments and that he briefed Russian defence attaches.  At the start, 
Russia was at ease with BALTBAT as there was no discussion about NATO 
membership for the Baltic countries.  In contrast to Haekkerup, Carlsen 
(interview 2010) asserted that Russian views on BALTBAT never fundamentally 
changed, in contrast to Moscow's views on the Danish-Polish-German corps, 
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which generated increasingly negative commentary, as it had a decidedly 
NATO angle.  He noted that the Danes had expected more difficulties and a 
negative reaction from Moscow, which ultimately were not realized.   
 
In addition, Kolga (interview 2009) commented that Denmark had informed 
Russia about BALTBAT, and the understanding among the Baltic capitals was 
that Moscow was not opposed to the initiative.  He added that Russia did not 
say anything to the Baltic countries directly about BALTBAT, and the 
assumption in the Baltic nations was that if Russia did object, it would voice 
those objections to the US.   Kolga (interview 2009) also noted that the donor 
states needed to ensure Moscow was aware of the Baltic projects, but there 
was no "excessive concern" by the donor states regarding Russia.   
 
Even during disputes on issues such as Russian minorities in Estonia and 
Latvia, continued Kolga (interview 2009), Moscow never made a connection to 
Baltic military assistance efforts.  As an example, he cited the 1996 BALTIC 
CHALLENGE military exercise, which was sensitive, particularly due to its size.  
Russia simply sent observers at the defence attache level.  In a 2011 interview, 
a US official agreed that Russia basically left the Baltic nations alone to work on 
these military projects.  Moreover, an Estonian official (interview 2010) added 
the comment that he was not surprised by the lack of a strident Russian 
reaction to BALTBAT.  One factor was that Russia was more at ease as the 
assistance came from the Nordic states.  Having a US flag on the projects, he 
commented, would have made things more difficult.    
 
In short, the proposition is put forward that the political success of ensuring no 
negative Russian reaction to BALTBAT was a result of the two carefully 
considered Mechanisms.  The first Mechanism was assessment of the views 
and possible responses of the dominant regional power, and what reactions 
would be anticipated to particular steps.  The second Mechanism was 
consideration of which form of military assistance would be optimal in terms of 
achieving political as well as military goals.  On both counts, the decisions with 
regard to BALTBAT and the reactions from Russia indicated the significance of 
the Mechanisms and the success of the political decisions taken by the 
founders of BALTBAT. 
 
5.5 Third Mechanism - A Solid Source of Support 
 
A Mechanism which interviewees noted frequently was the decision of the 
Nordic states to make the strong commitment to assist the Baltic nations.  While 
there was broad-based Western support from the UK, US and others, it was 
critical that the Nordic countries provided the constant and consistent political 
and military support needed to make BALTBAT and the other projects work.  
This point was raised by 14 interviewees: Anduryszyn, Carlsen, Clemmesen, 
Ellemann-Jensen, Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Mackenzie, Saar, 
Schvede, an Estonian official, a US official and a retired US military officer. 
 
 101 
While some of the following Mechanisms were cited more frequently in 
interviews, the rationale for placing this Mechanism third lies in its juxtaposition 
with the fourth Mechanism which follows.  In its basic form, the third Mechanism 
addressed the following question: Are there nations which are genuinely 
committed to ensuring the success of this military assistance programme?  The 
fourth Mechanism addressed the follow-on question: How long will that 
commitment last?  For that reason, the significance of the support provided by 
Nordic states is listed third. 
 
The case can admittedly be made that all military assistance initiatives have a 
basic level of political backing, or they never would have been started.  Even 
projects which have failed usually can cite initial enthusiastic support from a 
number of donor countries.  However, such examples validate a point which 
was critically different with the Baltic military assistance projects: there was a 
solid foundation of support from the Nordic governments which was apparent 
from the initial decision to proceed.  Returning to the CIMO framework, within 
the Context of the various challenges facing the Baltic nations at that time, the 
specific Intervention of the broad political decisions agreed upon between donor 
and supporting states required the specific Mechanism of a solid source of 
donor support in order to achieve the desired Outcomes.   
 
Moreover, there was a broader base of Western support which was also critical.  
That involved countries like the UK, which provided substantial amounts of 
assistance from the start, and countries like Germany, which later became the 
lead nation for BALTRON.  In short, a consistent source of donor support 
appeared to have been a factor for success for the Baltic programmes, and 
could be significant for any military assistance project. 
 
Turning to the data from the interviews, Haekkerup (interview 2008) 
emphasized that there was substantial Nordic solidarity on BALTBAT, noting 
that there had been extensive Nordic cooperation on efforts to bolster PKO 
capabilities, as exemplified by the work on the Stand-by High Readiness 
Brigade (SHIRBRIG) that could be called upon by the UN.  He also stated that 
there were domestic political advantages to Denmark which arose from the 
larger Nordic assistance framework.  One Danish political party objected to 
military sales, recalled Haekkerup, so the label of a "Nordic package" made it 
easier to get Parliamentary approval.   
 
Supporting Haekkerup on this point, Godal (interview 2011) agreed that there 
was overall unity among the Nordic states on policy, and they were committed 
to assisting the Baltic nations.  He noted that the Nordic countries worked well 
together, although there was no organizational framework or existing process 
that could be used with regard to implementing the military assistance 
programmes in the Baltic states.  Godal (interview 2011) added that there was 
also unity on the part of the Nordic states.  Certainly, Denmark and Sweden 
were more in the vanguard of the effort to help the Baltic nations, while Finland 
was more cautious.  In the end however, the Nordic states were in agreement 
on policy regarding the Baltic governments.  Godal (interview 2011) 
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emphasized that the Baltic military assistance projects were part of a grand 
scheme.  As a result, one successful project could lead to the next effort.  
Moreover, it was notable that the Nordic countries were all committed from the 
outset to assisting the Baltic nations.  
 
Carlsen (interview 2010) added the point that the Nordic states had worked 
together to establish training courses in their countries, and the cooperative 
framework that had been used provided a sort of a template for the Baltic 
projects.  The Military Working Group (MWG) mechanism, for example, was 
used effectively for the Baltic initiatives.  Mackenzie (interview 2010) stated that 
another factor was the Nordic/Baltic brotherhood which developed, noting that it 
was different from the ties which are generated between countries which only 
have land borders. The Nordic and Baltic states share a littoral area, and, 
Mackenzie (interview 2010) stated, while borders change, coastlines do not.     
 
Buttressing these points, Andrusyszyn (interview 2010) asserted that the Nordic 
effort to assist the Baltic capitals was important.  The US had a positive view of 
Nordic-Baltic efforts which allowed the Baltic countries to profile themselves.  
BALTBAT and the other projects, stressed Andrusyszyn (interview 2010), were 
vehicles to display that the Baltic governments were working to develop military 
capabilities.  An Estonian official (interview 2010) emphasized that the Baltic 
initiatives also provided a gateway for aid from the Nordic states to be 
effectively channeled and utilised by the Baltic governments.  At this particular 
time, the Baltic nations had political-military importance for the Nordic countries.   
 
Echoing the other interviewees, the Estonian official (interview 2010) continued 
by stating that there was extensive Nordic coordination to assist the Baltic 
nations.  They, along with the other donors, were committed to the projects.  It 
is worth noting that other countries are also praised by interviewees for 
providing solid Western support.  A Latvian official (interview 2010) stated that 
due credit should be given to the UK for the role it played in the early stages of 
establishing BALTBAT, which also served to encourage and embolden the 
Nordic states in their support of the Baltic nations.      
 
Kolga (interview 2009) noted that the Nordic governments took the lead, and 
they had an understanding of the Baltic countries that was beneficial.  To be 
frank, he commented, if the US would have led the effort, it would have just 
"come in and given us the package and said 'do it.'"  Instead, under Nordic 
guidance, the projects promoted a maturation process for the Baltic 
governments.  Kolga (interview 2009) added that it was valuable to have had a 
broad-based assistance community for the Baltic initiatives, and the number of 
donor countries was more than sufficient for the task. Indeed, Kolga (interview 
2009) stated that while there could have been more donor states, a significantly 
larger number could have generated more complications than benefits. 
 
In short, a Mechanism for success for BALTBAT and the later initiatives 
appeared to be the fact that the Nordic states provided a strong, constant 
source of support.  This generated two significant results.  The first was that it 
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ensured donor and recipient nations that the Nordic capitals would not only take 
the lead, but would do much of the hard work needed to have BALTBAT and 
the other projects generate successful Outcomes.  That was manifest in the 
provisions of the BALTBAT MOU addressed below in Section 5.5.2.  The 
second result was that, based on the comments from interviewees, it reassured 
the Baltic governments that, with a solid foundation of Nordic support, overall 
Western support would be maintained.  The proposition is therefore put forward 
that these results indicated why this Mechanism would be of value in ensuring 
the achievement of Outcomes from any future military assistance programme.   
 
5.5.1 Nordic Disunity 
 
To ensure an accurate picture is provided of Nordic unity with regard to aiding 
the Baltic capitals, it is worth noting the existence of Nordic disunity on many 
issues.  Haekkerup (interview 2008) admitted that there were disagreements 
among the Nordic states, citing the example of the concern expressed by some 
Nordic capitals when he pushed to get Baltic forces immediately involved in 
PKO efforts in Croatia.  Taking a different perspective, Carlsen (interview 2010) 
stressed that within Nordic governments, the Ministries of Defence were 
supportive of BALTBAT, but that in some capitals, there were policy debates 
between Defence and Foreign Ministries, particularly due to the concern over 
Russian reactions.  Moreover, Fischer (interview 2010) noted that there were 
probably different political goals among participating states in 1994 when 
BALTBAT was initiated.   
 
On this issue, Ellemann-Jensen (interview 2008) stressed that it would be 
erroneous to provide too sharp an image of early, constant Nordic unity on 
policy regarding the Baltic nations.  Citing an example, at an August 1991 
Nordic Foreign Ministers meeting, soon after the attempted putsch in Moscow, 
one counterpart criticized Ellemann-Jensen for pushing too hard on the Baltic 
issue.  In retrospect, he noted, he was extremely pleased with what the Nordic 
states did at that time to support the Baltic capitals.  After some initial divisions, 
events generated a situation in which there was a Nordic competition to provide 
assistance to the Baltic states.  Such competition, noted a US official (interview 
2011) may have even promoted Nordic disunity.  The official (interview 2011) 
recalled that the Nordic states seemed to find reasons to argue about the Baltic 
programmes, citing one instance in which the routine handover of chairmanship 
from a Danish official to a Norwegian official generated heated, behind-the-
scenes clashes.   
 
5.5.2 Third Mechanism - Documents 
 
On this Mechanism, the best indication of the strong Nordic commitment to 
BALTBAT and the other initiatives could be found in the BALTBAT MOU.  That 
was particularly true as the BALTBAT template was largely replicated for the 
other Baltic projects.  Article 1, paragraph 2 of the MOU indicated that "each 
supporting State will provide assistance according to its national fields of 
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expertise, within the limits of its national legislation and according to its own 
resources and budgetary procedures."   
 
However, on specific responsibilities undertaken by the Nordic states, Article 3, 
paragraph 3 noted that the Nordic states "will assist in administrative and 
legislative preparatory work for the formation of the Battalion."  It also indicated 
in paragraph 5 that they would "provide peacekeeping training and will promote 
the use of UN peacekeeping procedures throughout the programme."   
 
The requirements for the Supporting States were listed in Article 3, paragraph 4 
as assisting with "organization, recruitment and training of the Battalion as well 
as with planning of its logistics system and also with training equipment."  
Moreover, in Article 3, paragraph 7, the Supporting States would "endeavour to 
assist the Baltic States in providing training, communication, personal and other 
equipment with the aim of maximizing when appropriate the opportunities for 
operational compatibility." 
 
In addition, in Article 4, paragraph 1 of the MOU, the Nordic countries agreed to 
"assign places on existing Nordic UN peacekeeping courses or will establish 
special ad-hoc courses for Baltic officers and non-commissioned officers at 
Nordic UN training centres."   
 
The Nordic capitals also assumed many of the costs involved with BALTBAT.  
With regard to peacekeeping training, Article 4, paragraph 2 of the MOU 
indicated that while the Baltic governments would need to meet the costs of 
travel for their personnel, "other costs and administration associated with the 
provision of peacekeeping training of key personnel will be met by the Nordic 
states."   
 
Similarly, with regard to the Basic Military Infantry Training noted in Article 6, 
paragraph 3 of the MOU, the Baltic nations would provide host nation support, 
but the UK and Nordic states would cover administration and other costs 
associated with the training they provided.  Furthermore, with regard to UN 
leadership training covered in Article 7, the arrangement, noted in paragraph 2, 
was once again that the Baltic capitals would provide host nation support, but 
the UK and Nordic countries would cover costs for training they provided.  Once 
again, with regard to UN unit training, Article 8, paragraph 3 of the MOU 
indicated that the Baltic governments would provide host nation support but the 
Nordic countries would pick up the costs for its instructors.   
 
Finally, with regard to Article 9 of the MOU on Mission Specific Peacekeeping 
Training and Deployment to UN or CSCE peacekeeping missions, paragraph 1 
included the provision that "the Nordic States are willing to provide mission 
specific peacekeeping training to Baltic officers and non-commissioned 
officers."  With regard to joint deployment for peacekeeping missions, "the 
participants will enter into a Memorandum of Understanding concerning matters 
related to deployment of personnel from the Baltic States to the mission area." 
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To summarize, the Nordic governments clearly indicated their firm support for 
BALTBAT by making specific commitments to the initiative, embodied in the 
MOU which was utilised as a template for the subsequent Baltic assistance 
programmes.  Such an indication of a constant source of Nordic support for the 
Baltic projects appeared to have been an important Mechanism which, critically, 
instilled confidence in the Baltic states that donor support would remain solid, 
and ensured the achievement of the desired Outcomes from the initiatives. 
 
5.6 Fourth Mechanism - Long-Term Commitment 
 
One Mechanism apparent from the interviews was the long-term commitment 
by the supporting states, particularly the Nordic governments, to assist the 
Baltic capitals.  This would appear to be an important element in a model for 
effective military assistance projects drawn from the experience of the Baltic 
projects.  The long-term commitment was a topic raised by 18 interviewees: 
Abols, Andrusyszyn, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Donnelly, Fischer, Godal, 
Haekkerup, Kolga, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Molis, Saar, Schvede, Sibul, an 
Estonian official, a Latvian official and a US official.     
 
To re-phrase the point made previously, the third Mechanism of a strong source 
of support can be characterized as the question "Who?" with the answer "the 
Nordic states, and more generally the West."  The fourth Mechanism of a long-
term commitment can be characterized as "For how long?" with the answer "for 
the long haul," and it appears this was critical to the success of BALTBAT and 
the other Baltic military assistance projects.  Utilising the CIMO framework, 
within the Context of the significant challenges facing the Baltic military forces, 
the Intervention of a broad political agreement between the Western and Baltic 
governments required the Mechanism of a long-term commitment by the donor 
states in order to achieve the desired Outcomes.    
 
While there was no binding obligation on the supporting states in the BALTBAT 
MOU beyond the three years formally noted in the MOU, the data from the 
interviews indicated that it was clear that BALTBAT was part of a lengthy 
process to assist the Baltic countries.  Haekkerup (interview 2008) emphasized 
that it was critical that the Nordic states, in signing up to BALTBAT, understood 
they were making a long-term commitment to support the Baltic capitals, a point 
on which Linkevicius (interview 2010) concurred.  The Baltic assistance projects 
were part of a larger effort, stressed Godal (interview 2011), and the long-term 
Western commitment to the Baltic programmes was important to the success of 
the initiatives.   
 
Mackenzie (interview 2010) asserted that the long-term support of assisting 
states is significant and is possibly the most difficult item to obtain.  The cost of 
the support is normally underestimated, and nations usually want to get out of 
commitments early.  There is always an initial rush of enthusiasm, stated 
Mackenzie (interview 2010).  Then costs and problems pile up and enthusiasm 
wanes.  It is necessary, he stressed, to set out the time-frame for the assistance 
effort at the start.  However, he added, it is important to have a long-term 
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commitment from those providing aid, just as it is critical for the political aspects 
to be synchronized with the military goals.  
 
Fischer (interview 2010) echoed the point that donor states knew they had to 
make a long-term commitment to BALTBAT in particular, and to military aid to 
the Baltic governments in general.  This was one of the keys to success.  Abols 
(interview 2009) concurred that a key factor was the long-term commitment 
from the West, which was readily apparent to the Baltic capitals.  Andrusyszyn 
(interview 2010) characterised Western support for the Baltic nations as sound 
policy decisions provided through “patient, concrete” aid to the Baltic 
governments. 
 
Taking a different perspective on the significance of time, Molis (interview 2009) 
added that development of PKO capabilities requires extensive assistance from 
donor states.  Moreover, an Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that the 
supporting nations were certainly committed to the projects for the long term.  
He provided another perspective on the importance of long-term backing, noting 
that US support was important, even in the absence of a major military 
contribution. The political support from the US, he asserted, served as an 
important tool to provide self-confidence to all involved in the Baltic assistance 
effort.   
 
Kolga (interview 2009) also cited the long-term commitment by the donor 
countries as an important factor for the success of the initiatives, and 
highlighted one of the reasons why this was significant: it generated trust 
among the participating states.  The donor states trusted that the Baltic capitals 
would work hard to make these projects a success, and the Baltic governments 
trusted that the West would stay committed to the projects for the long haul.  A 
Latvian official (interview 2010) emphasized that this was not a short, quick 
effort, and the supporting countries had to be determined in order to ensure 
goals were achieved.  The Nordic states had made a long-term commitment to 
BALTBAT, especially as the UK had indicated its commitment.  A US official 
(interview 2011) added that it was valuable that there was long-term support 
from the donor nations to the Baltic capitals, although he noted that the level of 
commitment varied among supporting states. 
 
To summarize, it appears that a Mechanism which had an impact on the 
Outcomes generated by the Baltic initiatives was the readiness of supporting 
states to make a long-term commitment to aiding the Baltic governments.  
There were various reasons why this Mechanism was important in allowing the 
Intervention of broad political decisions between donor and recipient states to 
generate the desired Outcomes.  The point noted by Kolga (interview 2009) 
appears critical: the Western commitment enhanced trust between donor and 
recipient states.  In addition, Molis (interview 2009) raised another major aspect 
of the issue of time: development of military capabilities, such as for PKO 
operations, does not arise overnight and requires a lengthy commitment if the 
Outcome is to be achieved.  While more research may be warranted to see 
whether either of these reasons, or some other reason, is the basis for the 
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impact of a long-term commitment, what appeared from the Baltic experience 
was the significance of such a commitment as a Mechanism to generate 
successful Outcomes.   
 
5.6.1 Questions On A Long-Term Commitment 
 
Taking a different view, Carlsen (interview 2010) commented that it was made 
clear to supporting countries that this would be a commitment of some three 
years, and all of the states agreed.  Moreover, Clemmesen (interview 2010) 
asserted that in the early stages, the anticipation was of a limited Western 
commitment to the Baltic nations, so there was no need to twist Western arms.  
There was recognition that the task would not be easy and that it would take 
time, but there was no sense that this would become a commitment to a major, 
long-term set of military assistance programmes.  Donnelly (interview 2011) 
echoed Clemmesen's comments, stating that the initial Western view was not a 
strong commitment to the Baltic governments, although that later changed due 
to the people who took charge and pushed hard to get Western aid to the Baltic 
countries.   
 
With regard to the statistical requirement that at least seven interviewees must 
raise a particular issue to qualify as a Mechanism, 18 interviewees highlighted 
the issue of a long-term commitment.  Even though Carlsen (interview 2010), 
Clemmesen (interview 2010) and Donnelly (interview 2011) spoke negatively 
about that issue and did not believe it contributed to the success of BALTBAT, 
15 interviewees cited a long-term commitment as a positive factor in what 
BALTBAT accomplished.  It therefore qualified as a Mechanism. 
 
5.6.2 Fourth Mechanism - Documents 
 
It is important to reiterate that the extent of a long-term commitment by the 
donor states was not made manifest by legally binding agreements.  Instead, it 
was apparent by the practical military, financial and political support which was 
maintained throughout the 1990s on BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives.   
 
With regard to the one concrete indication of a Western commitment to a time-
table, Article 2, paragraph 1 of the BALTBAT MOU included the provision that 
"the programme is intended to support the formation of a Baltic Peacekeeping 
Battalion over a period of three years."  Additional documents regarding the 
duration of donor state support are noted in the subsequent sections covering 
the other Baltic projects. 
 
5.7 Fifth Mechanism - Connection to Larger Goals 
 
Another Mechanism apparent from the interview data was the significance of 
having a focus on long-term goals, whether political or military.  While 
immediate problems about housing, training and salaries can come to dominate 
official efforts, such a focus can undermine the long-term prospects of a 
programme if they become the all-encompassing concerns of policy-makers.  
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The interviews indicated the extent to which the Baltic programmes were 
connected to overarching goals and objectives, which appeared to be an 
important Mechanism and an element of a model for effective military 
assistance projects.  Returning to the CIMO analytical framework, the 
challenges which constituted the Context in which these assistance 
programmes were initiated made it important to have an Intervention of broad 
political agreement between donor and supporting states which required a 
Mechanism of a continued connection to larger goals in order to achieve the 
desired Outcomes.   
 
This is not to diminish the importance of addressing problems affecting the lives 
of soldiers, but to emphasize the significance for policy-makers in particular of 
staying focused on the ultimate goal or desired Outcome.  With regard to the 
Baltic initiatives, the goals and Outcomes were clear: making the case for Baltic 
state membership in NATO and developing national defence capabilities for the 
Baltic countries.  Each of these issues is addressed separately below. 
 
5.7.1 Reprise - The State of Baltic Military Forces 
 
Drawing on the comments of interviewees regarding the state of Baltic military 
forces, it is worthwhile to revisit the situation faced by the Baltic countries at the 
time they regained their independence.  Such a review indicates the importance 
to the Baltic capitals of making their case for NATO membership and also taking 
practical steps to develop capable national defence forces.  Linkevicius 
(interview 2010) stressed that Lithuania had nothing in 1994 and there were no 
resources available.  It was clear that the situation was "a mess."  Haekkerup 
(interview 2008) commented that the Baltic states had serious problems 
regarding their military forces, adding that their professional soldiers were 
Soviet-trained and needed substantial re-training.  Godal (interview 2011) 
concurred that the Baltic governments had little to start with upon regaining 
independence.    
 
Speaking candidly, Mackenzie (interview 2010) judged that the Baltic states 
were almost in as bad a condition as Albania, adding that he could visit the 
entire Estonian army in one afternoon.  In his view, the Baltic capitals had a 
lower starting-point than the other countries that regained independence with 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and USSR.  Kolga (interview 2009) also 
stressed that the Baltic nations did not have indigenous defence structures at 
the time, and General Valeri Saar, Commander of the Estonian Air Force, and 
former Chief of Staff of the Estonian Air Force when BALTNET was established, 
stated in a 2010 interview that Estonia had no military forces, just some home 
guard units, with no military equipment.   
 
Finally, attempts by interviewees to assess the poor state of the Baltic military at 
the time of regaining independence indicated general agreement.  Johnson 
(interview 2011) judged that the Baltic states "started from zero," a score also 
given by Abols (interview 2009).  A retired US military officer (interview 2010) 
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assessed the Baltic forces in 1994 "were at 1 on a 1-10 scale of military 
capabilities." 
 
5.8 Fifth Mechanism - First Example: NATO Membership 
 
One important aspect of the Baltic military assistance projects was the desire by 
Baltic capitals to obtain membership in NATO and the role played by the 
initiatives in making that case to Brussels.  This topic was noted by 19 
interviewees: Andrusyszyn, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Donnelly, Fischer, Godal, 
Haekkerup, Herd, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Molis, Saar, 
Schvede, Sibul, an Estonian official, a US official and a retired US military 
officer.  While it would seem apparent that it is necessary for a military 
assistance programme to have a clear objective, some interviewees noted that 
for many projects, this factor is not adequately considered.  Certainly such an 
objective was set out in the focus on having the Baltic initiatives buttress the 
effort to achieve the goal of Baltic state membership in NATO.   
 
Turning to the data from interviews, Godal (interview 2011) stressed that the 
Baltic projects had a natural connection to the desire of the Baltic states for 
NATO membership.  The Baltic programmes, commented Haekkerup (interview 
2008), were developed to make the case that the Baltic governments were 
ready for NATO membership, and the range of initiatives was important in 
helping Baltic self-assurance and improving capabilities.   
 
Mackenzie (interview 2010) noted that from the NATO perspective, the task was 
to have the Baltic countries take small steps to improve their military 
capabilities, stressing that the Baltic capitals were very clear about their desire 
for NATO membership.  Referring to the overarching issue of objectives noted 
above, he stated that military assistance projects often lack a goal or definition 
of success, but that this was not the case with BALTBAT and the Baltic projects.  
Clear political goals, reiterated Mackenzie (interview 2010), are essential, and 
problems arise if those are not established.  The absence of clear goals can, at 
a minimum, generate delays and efficiencies.  
 
Other interviewees echoed the points about the focus on NATO membership.  
Linkevicius (interview 2010) noted that the Baltic governments were aware they 
needed collective security and certainly wanted membership in NATO.  Kolga 
(interview 2009) added that the Baltic projects were important with regard to the 
overarching Baltic concern with NATO membership.  When the Baltic capitals 
began intensified dialogue with NATO in 1995, BALTBAT and the other military 
assistance initiatives were concrete examples of defence efforts.  He conceded 
that they may not have generated "meaningful military capabilities," but 
asserted that they were important to development of the necessary culture, an 
awareness of procedures, and education and training for military personnel.  
Kolga (interview 2009) went on to emphasize that the Baltic programmes were 
key to developing people who could handle the NATO Membership Action Plan 
(MAP) process and could later work within the NATO framework and processes. 
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An Estonian official (interview 2010) emphasized that these initiatives were 
foreign policy tools and not just military projects, as they raised the profile of the 
Baltic governments and proved they could be providers of security.  He noted 
that Estonia did not hide, and indeed was quite clear about, the political goal of 
NATO membership.  Taking a broader perspective, the Estonian official 
(interview 2010) asserted that the essential elements for success of such 
initiatives are shared values and shared strategic objectives, and for the Baltic 
projects, the goals and objectives of the Nordic and other donor states were in 
agreement.   
 
Andrusyszyn (interview 2010) noted that in the early 1990s, there was 
resistance in the US government to the idea of NATO membership for the Baltic 
nations, as senior officials focused on completing the Russian troop withdrawal.  
At that time, the Eastern European states wanted to be in NATO, which led to 
the generation of PfP, which laid the foundation for BALTBAT and the other 
Baltic programmes.  The general perception, stated Andrusyszyn (interview 
2010), was that the Baltic capitals would be consumers of security.  A clear US 
policy came with the 1998 Baltic Charter, which indicated US support for NATO 
membership of the Baltic countries.  He agreed that initiatives like BALTBAT 
made a contribution to mollifying those in the West who were skeptical about 
Baltic military contributions, as there were concerns about whether the Baltic 
capitals were committed to doing what was needed to develop military 
capabilities.   
 
Fischer (interview 2010) concurred, noting that the projects allowed the Baltic 
nations to make a real contribution to PKO, establishing that they were not just 
consumers of security.  He stressed that the overarching goal of all three states 
was NATO membership and the Baltic projects were a clear political 
manifestation of securing closer connections to the Western nations and NATO. 
A retired US military officer (interview 2010) noted that the goal for the Baltic 
governments was to get into NATO, and this was the chance for the Baltic 
countries to show the West what they could do.  NATO had said it needed 
infantry forces, and the Baltic capitals should focus on generating these 
capabilities, so BALTBAT sent the right message to Brussels by addressing that 
goal.   
 
Molis (interview 2009) emphasized that the focus for the Baltic capitals at that 
time was simply to get military support, but that the Baltic projects were also 
crucial to making the political case for NATO membership for the Baltic 
countries.  They were concrete examples of training and performance which 
exemplified cooperation on international missions.  He added that the Baltic 
capitals appreciated the fact that "Western support came at all,” and the supply 
of military assistance to the Baltic nations at that time was a "challenge."  
Addressing the importance of practical cooperation with NATO, Saar (interview 
2010) noted that there were extensive meetings with the NATO Air Defence 
Committee and Air Defence Analytical Cell, which made it easier for the Baltic 
states to make their case for NATO membership and later made integration with 
NATO structures easier. 
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In short, it appeared from the data that those working on BALTBAT and the 
other projects had at least one clear objective in mind: having these initiatives 
support the case for Baltic state membership in NATO.  That provided a focus 
for the Baltic initiatives and appeared to have been a factor in successfully 
achieving the political goal of NATO membership.  Addressing the point in a 
CIMO framework, particularly due to the difficult Context in which the Baltic 
nations found themselves, there were political and military Outcomes desired 
from the Baltic programmes, and NATO membership was a clearly sought 
political Outcome.  In this instance, the Mechanism of connecting the Baltic 
initiatives to the larger political goal of NATO membership helped to achieve 
that Outcome.       
 
5.8.1 Excessive Concern regarding NATO Membership? 
 
However, this focus on NATO membership arguably also generated difficulties 
for the Baltic initiatives and, returning again to the CIMO framework, the case 
could be made that the Intervention of broad political decisions between donor 
and recipient states could have been missing in this instance.  A US official 
(interview 2011) noted that it is important that there were clear political goals, 
but added that while the Baltic states and Denmark had a clear goal (NATO 
membership), the other donor nations did not necessarily have the identical 
goal.  For Denmark, it was critical to use BALTBAT and the other projects to 
make the case for NATO membership, but Sweden and Finland objected to the 
NATO emphasis.  The US official (interview 2011) noted that Finland said in 
1998 that it was curtailing support for all the Baltic efforts except the 
BALTDEFCOL due to the focus on NATO and the direction of the Baltic 
Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA).   
 
Echoing that point, Carlsen (interview 2010) noted that NATO membership was 
not an official goal of the Baltic initiatives, due to sensitivities of some Nordic 
countries.  However, the NATO PfP focus on PKO, particularly for UN missions, 
made the general push for military assistance to the Baltic capitals acceptable 
to all.  He stressed that the goal was to assist the Baltic governments so they 
were more able to defend their territory and could make a credible claim for 
NATO membership.   
 
Moreover, there were negative aspects to this constant push to promote the 
Baltic "label" in order to make the political case, particularly to NATO, regarding 
what the Baltic governments were trying to accomplish.  With the benefit of 
hindsight, a US official (interview 2011) stated that there was an underlying 
philosophy among those working in the area that constant growth was needed 
to generate more Baltic projects. In his view, there should have been a greater 
focus on improving the performance and efficiency of the existing programmes 
which were of genuine value. He added that when the idea of a Baltic Air 
initiative was floated, it was apparent that there was an unhealthy emphasis on 
continuing to generate items with a BALT-prefix. 
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With regard to the negative commentary and the statistical requirement that at 
least seven interviewees must support a particular issue in order to qualify as a 
Mechanism, 19 interviewees raised the topic of NATO membership.  Excluding 
the US official (interview 2011) and Carlsen (interview 2010) who expressed the 
view that this did not contribute to the success of BALTBAT, 17 interviewees 
still voiced support for the focus on NATO membership as a positive factor 
which contributed to what BALTBAT accomplished.  It therefore qualified as a 
Mechanism. 
 
5.8.2 NATO Membership - Documents 
 
The focus in BALTBAT on the connection to the larger goal of NATO 
membership for the Baltic nations was manifest in a number of documents.  The 
13 September 1994 agreement of the Baltic states on the establishment of 
BALTBAT noted in Article 1, paragraph 1 that they establish BALTBAT "also 
cooperating with NATO and WEU in the field of peacekeeping." 
 
In the Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the development of 
BALTBAT issued in April 1999, which supplements the 10 December 1997 
document, Section 1.2 indicated "The purposes for establishing the Baltic 
Battalion can be resumed as follows" and cited as the second of four purposes, 
"To promote the Baltic States integration process into NATO by developing 
NATO interoperability and compatibility." 
 
The document from the Baltic BALTBAT Military Co-ordination Group, provided 
in response to the Political Guidance from April 1999, also touched on this 
factor.  Section 3 described the purpose of the BALTBAT project and included 
the following: 
 
BALTBAT was established with the purpose of increasing the NATO 
interoperability of the defence forces of the Baltic states, as a catalyst for 
generally improving military standards and in order to demonstrate the 
will and ability of the Baltic states to co-operate, both among themselves 
and in a multinational environment. The first achievements in this respect 
were exemplified by participation by BALTBAT units in the IFOR/SFOR 
operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon 
during 1996/1997. Participation by subsequent units (the BALTCON 
deployments) in the SFOR operation during 1998-2000 further expresses 
the emphasis put by the Baltic states on the operational 
NATO/Partnership co-operation. 
 
Section 3 went on to note that: 
 
By adopting common standards (for example procedures, language and 
equipment) that - at the same time - are equivalent to the standards used 
in NATO and in the PfP framework, interoperability is enhanced among 
the Baltic states and between the Baltic states and NATO/PfP. As such, 
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BALTBAT is a tool for developing and facilitating closer Baltic co-
operation with Alliance structures and procedures. 
 
In addition, it was highlighted in Section 3 that: 
 
On the national level, the project has also become a key part of the Baltic 
states’ participation in NATO’s expanded Planning and Review Process 
(PARP) and in the Enhanced and more Operational PfP.  BALTBAT is 
the subject of Initial Partnership Goal (IPG) L0041. The requirements and 
standards to be met in accordance with the Initial Partnership Goals (and 
the coming Partnership Goals) are to be taken into account in all relevant 
areas (e.g. logistic, deployability and readiness), and will form the basis 
for the planning in the BALTBAT project.  
 
Finally, Section 5 of the document, which covers the Development plan of the 
Baltic Battalion, indicated that training of BALTBAT "will be based on NATO 
training principles and requirements (TEEP) and NATO operational procedures 
in order to ensure interoperability." 
 
To summarize, the attention to the Mechanism of an overarching political goal 
of making the case for Baltic state membership in NATO was manifest in 
numerous documents regarding BALTBAT. 
 
5.9 Fifth Mechanism - Second Example: National Defence 
 
While NATO membership was a clear, desired, long-term political Outcome, 
there was also a long-term military Outcome: the development of modern 
defence capabilities for the Baltic countries.  There is no reason to attempt to 
determine which of these Outcomes was of greater significance; indeed, the 
case can be made that the political and military goals complemented each 
other.  A total of 15 interviewees noted the importance of the Baltic initiatives in 
building national defence capabilities: Abols, Carlsen, Donnelly, Godal, 
Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Saar, Schvede, an 
Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official and a retired US military officer.   
 
Godal (interview 2011) asserted that the Baltic military assistance projects were 
good for development of national defences, and provided a starting point for 
building capabilities.  Haekkerup (interview 2008) concurred, noting that the 
value of BALTBAT also came as a unit that could serve as an example for the 
Baltic military establishments.  Practices and processes could filter down to 
other levels, especially as BALTBAT exercised with other Baltic units.  
 
Mackenzie (interview 2010) emphasized that BALTBAT actually was national 
defence for the Baltic governments.  It was the solution on how to take the initial 
steps to defend the Baltic countries, and was critical to the overall development 
of national defence forces.  Indeed, he argued, it was the only realistic model for 
the Baltic capitals.  Mackenzie (interview 2010) stated that the idea of three 
independent Baltic military forces was "fanciful."  BALTBAT, he added, could be 
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viewed as the top of the pyramid of the military forces of the Baltic nations. 
Below that, it was possible to build the base of the pyramid. For small states, 
that base was NATO.   
 
BALTBAT, continued Mackenzie (interview 2010), was essential to have a force 
to provide some type of resistance to invasion. Such a capability would allow 
Allies and neighbours to be drawn in to help the Baltic governments.  Such a 
process, he asserted, was the only way to really help the Baltic capitals as they 
faced a very steep learning curve. This process of assisting the Baltic 
governments, commented Mackenzie (interview 2010), was an effective way of 
addressing a number of tasks by posing a number of important questions: How 
would they develop a good corps of non-commissioned officers?  What kind of 
air defence made sense for the Baltic nations?  The development of Baltic 
assistance programmes made it possible to address these questions in a logical 
manner, and the concrete results showed that the process worked.   
 
Echoing those views, Johnson (interview 2011) stated that a focus on national 
defence for the Baltic states was not possible.  Indeed, Kolga (interview 2009) 
questioned where the Baltic capitals would have found resources for defence in 
the absence of BALTBAT.  Western transfers of weapons would have been 
difficult without the initiative, and the Baltic governments had few potential 
suppliers of weapons.  Kolga (interview 2009) added that the Baltic projects 
provided the political foundation for defence spending by Baltic capitals.  He 
commented that one advantage of BALTBAT was that it was small enough to 
provide Baltic personnel an overview on all aspects of a military programme.  
This was enhanced by the fact that the range of Baltic initiatives covered all the 
military services.  The Baltic projects, asserted Kolga (interview 2009), helped 
resolve differences and generate a common focus.  
 
Continuing on this point, Linkevicius (interview 2010) stated that Baltic 
governments did not ignore requirements for hard defence.  However, as 
Defence Minister, he had to decide how to allocate scarce resources.  The 
Baltic capitals focused on resources needed for interoperability and selected 
niche capabilities in NATO which they could realistically address, and which 
they still provide today.  Ultimately, he concluded, he would not do anything 
differently if he had to do it over again.  A Latvian official (interview 2010) 
emphasized that the idea was to have the skills generated through the 
BALTBAT experience spread to the rest of the Baltic military forces.  However, 
echoing Linkevicius, there was only so much that could be done on a "trickle-
down" basis as there was so little money available for the military.  Urgent 
requirements for weapons, housing, and other needs could not be addressed 
adequately.  Even with the benefit of hindsight, he stressed, what was achieved 
in the Baltic countries was as much as could have been accomplished in view of 
the situation and the available resources.    
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5.9.1 Dissent on Emphasis regarding National Defence 
 
While a preponderance of interviewees asserted that BALTBAT had a positive 
impact on development of national defence, there were differing views on the 
extent to which the emphasis on developing PKO capabilities should have been 
shifted toward generation of traditional national defence forces.  For example, 
Carlsen (interview 2010) acknowledged some validity to the argument that 
BALTBAT may have received too much priority and allocation of resources.  A 
US official (interview 2011) supported that view, noting that by 1997, there was 
recognition that a reassessment was needed on whether there should be 
greater attention to development of traditional national military forces by the 
Baltic countries.   
 
Abols (interview 2009) asserted that there were no problems with the resources 
devoted to BALTBAT, as they provided value and generated benefits which are 
still important.  The projects brought the Baltic capitals together and provided a 
foundation for essential common activities, such as development of doctrine, 
and the BALTBAT experience had an impact on the overarching work on 
developing national defence.  Moreover, commented Abols (interview 2009), it 
is important to remember that the Baltic countries did not have substantial 
resources at that time to develop national defences.  However, he concluded, it 
probably would have been better to have devoted more resources to national 
defence instead of PKO, as transferring PKO capabilities to national defence is 
challenging. 
 
With his perspective as the first BALTBAT commander, Laneman (interview 
2010) provided an unexpected position on this question, conceding there is 
some truth to the argument that BALTBAT may have received a 
disproportionately large amount of resources.  He stated that the goal of 
BALTBAT was indeed to develop national defence capabilities.  Due to the 
shortage of trained personnel, people were training and working at the same 
time, and personnel were constantly being rotated through BALTBAT.  
Laneman (interview 2010) noted that there was equipment which went to 
BALTBAT that national military forces tried to get under their control.  However, 
he asserted that the problem was that the Baltic governments did not take the 
opportunity to maximize the benefits that could have been derived from 
BALTBAT.  If they had done so, the allocation of resources to BALTBAT would 
have been appropriate.     
 
An Estonian official (interview 2010) supported Laneman and commented that 
the projects contributed to development of national defences, which was one of 
the goals of the participating states.  However, more could have been done so 
that BALTBAT and the other programmes could have made a greater 
contribution to building national defence capabilities.  He noted that there was a 
split within the Baltic governments over utilizing funds for the development of 
hard defence versus PKO capabilities.  That was the primary reason why 
BALTBAT expertise was not spread more intensively among the rest of the 
military forces.  As a result, there was inadequate support inside the military 
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establishments in the Baltic countries to utilize BALTBAT and the other Baltic 
projects to develop hard national defence capabilities.  The balance on PKO 
versus hard defence, he asserted, ultimately was right, but more spill-over from 
BALTBAT to the rest of the military could have been achieved.  In retrospect, he 
would have worked to get a consensus within Baltic military forces to use the 
assistance projects for national defence development, which would have 
generated more support for the Baltic initiatives.   
 
A Latvian official (interview 2010) supported that point, stating that BALTBAT 
was seen as “the pandered child” of the military establishment, while others did 
“real” defense.  He noted that if he also had the opportunity to make those 
decisions again, he might have had more coordination with Latvian officers to 
address lack of support for BALTBAT within the rest of the defence forces.   
 
This diversity of views with regard to this particular military goal indicated that 
some practical modification of this Mechanism may be needed to enhance its 
value.  While it is important to have clear, long-term objectives to guide 
assistance projects, it may be prudent to continuously reassess an objective in 
light of changing circumstances, such as the extent of progress and the 
competing demands for resources.  In addition, the important lesson to be 
drawn may involve process, particularly on communicating a message that the 
specific assistance project (BALTBAT in this case) was indeed intended to 
contribute to developing a specific Outcome (national defence capabilities in 
this case).  Additional perspectives on this issue are provided in the later 
discussions on BALTRON and BALTNET. 
 
5.9.2 National Defence - Documents 
 
In line with the first two Mechanisms (assessment of regional security concerns 
and focus on optimal areas of military assistance), there was no reason to 
anticipate that any documents would have specific language indicating that 
BALTBAT was intended to build national defence capabilities of the Baltic 
states.  In view of the need to be aware of the concerns of the dominant 
regional power (Russia), it would be surprising for any of the public documents, 
especially in the early part of the 1990s, to stress the development of hard 
defence capabilities.  Indeed, the various issues covered in the documents from 
1994 focus on PKO training. 
 
However, the Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the 
Development of BALTBAT issued in 1999 provided relevant text.  After citing 
the focus of BALTBAT on peace support operations, Section 1.2 noted that "In 
parallel, the development of the Baltic Battalion should ensure the development 
of the self-defence capabilities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania."  
 
Section 1.2 also indicated that BALTBAT "has supported and contributed to the 
development of the national defence forces and the development of the self-
defence capabilities of each of the Baltic States, and its value as an example in 
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training and development of the national defence forces is recognised as a 
distinct objective."   
 
In addition, Section 1.2 clearly noted as the first of four purposes of BALTBAT: 
"The purposes for establishing the Baltic Battalion can be resumed as follows: 
To enhance the development of the national forces of the Baltic States and 
raise their operational self-defence capabilities." 
 
In short, the desired Outcome from BALTBAT of developing national defence 
capabilities, which may well have existed at its initiation, but was unstated, had 
become an explicitly desired Outcome from BALTBAT by the end of the 1990s. 
 
5.10 Sixth Mechanism - Developing New Leaders 
 
Despite the criticisms regarding the way BALTBAT was utilised to develop 
national defence capabilities, there appeared to be little disagreement on this as 
a desired Outcome.  An important component of such national capabilities 
through military assistance programmes would be developing the right kind of 
personnel.  This involved both the right kind of people in the new Baltic military 
forces, and, of specific importance, a new generation of political-military 
leadership.  This was a topic noted by 10 of the interviewees: Abols, Carlsen, 
Clemmesen, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Schvede, Tori and a 
Latvian official.   
 
Placing this topic within the CIMO framework, in view of the difficult Context in 
which the Baltic states found themselves, the critical Intervention of broad 
political decisions agreed upon between donor and recipient states made it 
important to have a Mechanism of developing new leaders in order to achieve 
the desired Outcomes.  It should be noted that this Mechanism would not be 
placed here if the methodology was strictly based on the number of times a 
topic was cited.  However, it flowed naturally from the previous point about 
developing national defence capabilities.   
 
The Baltic and supporting states recognized the significance of developing 
personnel with the mentality needed for a modern military force.  Working on 
the Baltic projects provided an opportunity for the next generation of Baltic 
military and civilian policy-makers to develop skills.  The need for such 
initiatives to develop such skills became unnecessary with accession to NATO, 
and the eventual development of a much larger cadre of Baltic officials and 
officers.  However, up to the point of NATO accession, the Baltic programmes 
played an important role in developing those new personnel, which would 
appear to be a Mechanism for any military assistance initiative to generate the 
desired Outcomes. 
 
The interview data indicated the significance of this Mechanism.  Carlsen 
(interview 2010) stressed that it was important that those who worked in 
BALTBAT were the young personnel who generated the cooperation that was 
needed for the Baltic governments to open up to and work with each other, and 
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with the West.  Clemmesen (interview 2010) emphasized that perhaps the key 
accomplishment of BALTBAT was development of the first of the next 
generation of Baltic military officers.  It was significant that a network of Baltic 
officers and civil servants was nurtured by work on common programmes and 
attendance at meetings.  In his estimation, there were about 20 important 
individuals who had the opportunity to work together and learn to trust each 
other.  Clemmesen (interview 2010) provided additional comments which 
specifically address the BALTDEFCOL and are cited in the later discussion of 
that initiative. 
 
Echoing those views, Linkevicius (interview 2010) concurred that the results of 
the efforts in the 1990s still have an impact, as the young people working on 
these projects are now in positions of leadership in defence and security policy.  
A Latvian official (interview 2010) added that, in retrospect, he is very proud of 
the people who came out of the BALTBAT process.   
 
Kolga (interview 2009) noted that BALTBAT served as a "window to the West," 
stressing that the Baltic governments in 1991 could not recruit enough good 
people with the understanding of military matters to establish military forces.  
BALTBAT and the other programmes allowed Baltic military personnel to get 
experience in a number of key areas, such as the generation of defence 
systems, and allowed them to develop understanding of the broader political-
military arena.  The Baltic initiatives, added Kolga (interview 2009), forced the 
Baltic capitals to work together, as well as refine their thinking in the defence 
area.  This process may not have led to the immediate development of military 
capability, but it provided people with exposure to Western military structures 
and how to work in a multinational environment.  This also, commented Kolga 
(interview 2009), supported the development of basic skills, such as consensus 
building.   
 
By the late 1990s, continued Kolga (interview 2009), "Baltification," or the 
turning over of programme responsibilities to the Baltic governments, had 
become an issue.  However, up to that point, the knowledge base of Baltic 
officials was very thin.  The Baltic projects consumed time and energy, he 
conceded, but this was unavoidable as a focus was on developing the mentality 
of young officers of the nascent Baltic forces.  Erkki Tori, Head of the Outreach 
and Baltic cooperation section of the Estonian Ministry of Defence, added in a 
2009 interview that what was important was the practical cooperation among 
the Baltic military personnel which took place in those early years. 
 
At that stage in their development, agreed Mackenzie (interview 2010), it was 
important to instill in the new generation a mind-set centered on Baltic 
independence and away from a reliance on others.  Such a process, he noted, 
was the only way to really help the Baltic governments as they faced a steep 
learning curve.  Abols (interview 2009) stressed that the Baltic projects were 
crucial to developing the right kind of military officers, and over the long-term, 
leadership and professional development were important.  Moreover, in his 
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view, the process went as fast as possible with regard to development of 
personnel. 
 
To summarize, one of the Mechanisms for the successful achievement of 
Outcomes from BALTBAT, and arguably of any military assistance programme, 
was to have a focus on a process which ensures that personnel develop the 
right type of mind-set and skills.  Such a Mechanism was particularly important 
with regard to developing competent leadership, and the data indicated that 
BALTBAT in particular and the Baltic projects in general were successful in 
achieving that Outcome.   
 
5.10.1 Sixth Mechanism - Documents 
 
In the 27 February 1995 agreement between the Baltic Ministries of Defence on 
Defence Cooperation, the areas in which the parties would cooperate are listed 
in Article 1.  Item 4 was "recruiting and training of the armed forces," and item 5 
was "Professional training of servicemen in educational institutions and units, 
their training to serve in the forces as well as the improvement of skills of 
professional servicemen and civilian personnel serving in the Ministries of 
(National) Defence." 
 
As the BALTDEFCOL in particular had the task of developing the new 
generation of military leaders, additional text from documents on this 
Mechanism is listed in the later section covering the BALTDEFCOL. 
 
5.11 Seventh Mechanism - Appropriate Direction and Control by Donor 
States 
 
Another Mechanism apparent from the interview data was the importance of 
ensuring that donor states provided the necessary direction and control to 
ensure recipient nations acted in a way which optimized results.  Within the 
CIMO framework, this appeared to be important in ensuring that within the 
Context of the difficulties faced by the Baltic governments, the Intervention of 
broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states required a 
Mechanism of appropriate donor control, agreed to by recipient states, to 
ensure Outcomes were achieved. The fact that 20 interviewees cited the 
significance of Western direction and control, particularly to manage rivalries 
among the Baltic nations, indicated the importance of this Mechanism for the 
success of the Baltic projects.  Those interviewees were: Abols, Andrusyszyn, 
Carlsen, Clemmesen, Donnelly, Fischer, Godal, Herd, Kolga, Laneman, 
Lawrence, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Molis, Saar, Schvede, Sibul, Tori, an 
Estonian official and a retired US military officer.   
 
The concrete manifestation of this factor in the Baltic military assistance 
projects was appropriate direction by the donor states to ensure the three Baltic 
governments acted as a single entity, and not at cross-purposes to pursue 
separate national goals.  This was an important political consideration, as noted 
by some interviewees below, as three Baltic countries acting as one entity could 
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make a stronger case with NATO than three small, individual states.  At the 
working level, it meant efforts by donor states to ensure there was one Baltic 
position, rather than three separate national positions. 
 
The case could be made that the Baltic projects presented a unique situation, 
and donors to military assistance programmes in general would not face this 
kind of complication.  The first and most basic response to that point is that it is 
likely that all assistance projects have mechanisms in place to ensure that 
donations are used by recipients as intended by donors, as that is good 
programme management.   
 
The second response is that while it is true that Western direction for the Baltic 
initiatives had a more political aspect, once again, it is not unusual for donor 
states to be in a situation where they must direct political decisions by recipient 
countries.  One example would be on the extent to which programmes to 
develop military forces need to draw from more than one ethnic group within a 
country.  That may not be an easy decision for the recipient government to 
make on its own volition.  However, it is arguably a critical factor for the success 
of a military assistance project in an ethnically diverse recipient state.  In short, 
the Mechanism which arose from consideration of the Baltic projects appears to 
have general relevance to achieve desired Outcomes: donor states on an 
assistance project need to generate the necessary amount of direction and 
control to ensure recipient states make best use of the resources. 
 
5.11.1 Baltic Unity 
 
As indicated by the interview data, at a basic level, there was political support in 
Baltic capitals for BALTBAT and the other projects.  Godal (interview 2011) 
emphasized that Baltic assumption of responsibilities contributed to success, 
and there was substantial "nation-building energy."  The Baltic governments 
had strong political enthusiasm to work on such initiatives, and their own 
determination was crucial.  A Latvian official (interview 2010) noted a historical 
factor: the Baltic nations had not cooperated at the onset of World War II and 
they were determined not to repeat that mistake after regaining independence 
in 1991.  To be candid, added Kolga (interview 2009), the Baltic governments 
did not understand initially what was involved.  However, that understanding 
grew and the support spread from the top down until it became part of a 
foundation of political support.   
 
A retired US military officer (interview 2010) commented that the Baltic capitals 
were tied together in their own self-interest, and the West pressed them to do 
so.  Moreover, Baltic solidarity made it more difficult for Russia to harass three 
states viewed as a unit, rather than three individual states.  It was difficult, noted 
Linkevicius (interview 2010), to get agreement among the Baltic capitals.  There 
were disputes over which project would be located in which state.  However, he 
stressed, there ultimately was more in common which held the Baltic 
governments together than differences which separated them.   
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Taking a different perspective, Dr. Graham Herd, Head of the International 
Security Programme of the Geneva Center for Security Policy, stressed in a 
2011 interview that trilateral military cooperation was driven by the desire for 
NATO membership rather than internal collaborative impulses.  Working 
together in the military sphere, the Baltic nations could demonstrate a 
cooperative capacity which also signalled their readiness for NATO 
membership, and indicated that this would continue when they were in NATO.  
Herd (interview 2011) made the point that trilateral military cooperation was as 
much, if not more, a means to an end (NATO membership) than an end in and 
of itself.   
 
5.11.2 Baltic Disunity 
 
However, as many interviewees made clear, unity among the Baltic 
governments did not come naturally.  Certainly, stressed Mackenzie (interview 
2010), the Baltic capitals did not want to be lumped together.  Moreover, there 
are clear differences, such as language, which make cooperation difficult.  In a 
2011 interview, Professor Eric Sibul, assistant professor in Military Theory and 
Military History at the BALTDEFCOL, noted the basic fact that Lithuania is 
Catholic and Estonia is Lutheran.  
 
Tori (interview 2009) commented that there is not a strong instinctive desire 
among the Baltic states to work together.  The three independence movements 
were a basis for cooperation, but the momentum for Baltic cooperation flagged 
after they regained independence, and cooperation among the three nations 
was not at the top of the list of priorities.  Tori (interview 2009) stated that the 
West pushed the Baltic governments to act in a way that was not "natural" to 
them, but they recognized their common need to turn to the West, which 
generated a common interest. Ultimately, he asserted, the Baltic nations were 
"stuck in one boat."   
 
Continuing on that theme, Clemmesen (interview 2010) recounted that one 
foreign military officer serving in Estonia told him the military leadership of the 
Baltic capitals supported BALTBAT, but nowhere near enough to remove 
mutual suspicion.  Clemmesen (interview 2010) asserted that key people in the 
Baltic governments "deeply distrusted each other."  He noted that Lithuania 
pushed hard for creation of a Lithuanian-Polish battalion even after BALTBAT 
was established.  In addition, Lithuania was initially skeptical of the 
BALTDEFCOL, as it wanted to use educational options in Western countries.  
Clemmesen (interview 2010) added that Lithuania wanted to be viewed as 
distinct and separate from Estonia and Latvia, particularly as it did not have a 
Russian population. It wanted not only to be considered a Baltic state, but also 
a Central European state, which was more beneficial to its national foreign 
policy objectives.  In that regard, he asserted that Lithuania never really 
adopted BALTBAT. 
 
Each of the representatives of the Baltic governments, asserted Clemmesen 
(interview 2010), would go back to capitals and undermine agreed decisions 
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regarding Baltic projects.  This mutual suspicion, he believed, was a remnant of 
how people had to act under the Soviet regime, and such habits are difficult to 
break.  Interpersonal relationships were, he commented, clearly lacking in trust.  
With regard to BALTBAT and the other initiatives, Clemmesen (interview 2010) 
provided the assessment of the Baltic capitals that "their minds were in it, but 
not their hearts."  While they understood the policy rationale, this was not 
enough to guide their behaviour, and as the political structures were weak, it 
was hard for them to commit.   
 
Laneman (interview 2010) asserted that the Baltic capitals were not happy with 
national visibility within BALTBAT.  Moreover, a retired US military officer 
(interview 2010) noted that once the Baltic countries were in NATO, divisions 
arose among the three countries, even about deploying and operating together.  
He stated that distinctions showed up in the way they responded to specific 
military tasks.  He characterized the Lithuanians as "gung-ho" about becoming 
engaged.  The Estonians will "engineer" the problem.  The Latvians will look for 
assistance and guidance.  He added that there were clear divisions among the 
Baltic forces operating in Afghanistan.  The Estonians and Latvians rebelled 
against Lithuanian efforts to take the lead of a “Baltic” Provisional 
Reconstruction Team in central Afghanistan in early 2005, opting instead to 
integrate their troops in the commands of other forces (for example, Estonia 
with the UK in Helmand Province).  
 
In a 2011 interview, Anthony Lawrence, Directing Staff of the Higher Command 
Studies Course at the BALTDEFCOL, noted that intellectually, the Baltic 
governments understand the benefits of Baltic cooperation, as with obtaining 
membership in NATO.  However, as a practical matter, they find it difficult to do.  
For example, on defence acquisition, they generally cannot take a Baltic 
approach.  He noted that ministers are apparently ready to cooperate, but 
working-level personnel find it too easy to find excuses to not do so.  The 
leadership, added Lawrence (interview 2011), does not follow up on these joint 
efforts, and there is no overarching vision in favour of Baltic cooperation.   
 
Saar (interview 2010) echoed the points made by Lawrence, stating that there 
was recognition in the 1990s that common Baltic procurement would help 
address many issues that arise with major acquisition projects.  However, each 
country had its own legislation, and finding a legal basis for common Baltic 
military procurement was extremely difficult. 
 
5.11.3 The West - "Twisting Arms" 
 
Ultimately, emphasized Clemmesen (interview 2010), the donor states had to 
"twist arms" to get Baltic coordination and participation, as only outside 
pressure could get agreement among Baltic capitals.  He asserted that, in his 
view, the most important factor for the success of these initiatives was creating 
a framework to force the Baltic governments to work in their best interest.  To 
achieve this, added Clemmesen (interview 2010), the US commitment remained 
the decisive factor.   
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Godal (interview 2011) stated that the Baltic governments knew the donor 
states appreciated agreed Baltic action.  The message to the Baltic capitals 
focused on the positive aspects of collaboration, and the Nordic countries could 
not unduly pressure them.  However, stressed Godal (interview 2011), the Baltic 
nations "got the message."  Certainly, noted Mackenzie (interview 2010), the 
logic was that the Baltic capitals needed to work together, and cooperating in 
the military sphere may have been easier than other areas.  Johnson (interview 
2011) also commented that he impressed on Baltic capitals the need to 
approach NATO as one entity of three Baltic nations, rather than three small 
individual states. 
 
Supporting that point, Carlsen (interview 2010) emphasized that getting the 
Baltic capitals to work together was essential, and a challenge.  Sometimes, he 
conceded, Denmark had to apply pressure to get a common decision.  
Selecting a training base or a force commander became points of contention, 
and Denmark had to press for a unified decision.  Carlsen (interview 2010) 
noted that Denmark explained to the Baltic capitals that the Danes could not 
support a decision and take it to the other supporting states if the Baltic 
governments themselves were not in agreement.  He commented that steady 
pressure on the Baltic capitals to work together was important for success.   
 
Kolga (interview 2009) noted that there were debates within the Baltic capitals 
about defence, but BALTBAT and the other projects forced them to work 
together and refine their thinking.  Baltic cooperation was sometimes good, but 
at times there were difficulties.  A lot of work needed to be done on all the 
projects, he stated, and the Baltic governments understood they "had to 
deliver."  An Estonian official (interview 2010) concurred, adding there also were 
differences of opinion between older and younger officers within the Baltic 
military forces as well as between those with different areas of responsibility.   
 
There were clear divisions among the Baltic capitals, stressed Andrusyszyn 
(interview 2010), and it was important to find a way to get them to work together 
and avoid disunity, as differences occasionally came into public view.  He noted 
that one senior Estonian official told him frankly that there was a Baltic view and 
an Estonian view.  This indicated the extent to which maintenance of Baltic unity 
was an important rationale for the Baltic projects, added Andrusyszyn (interview 
2010).  In that regard, "Baltification" was irrelevant.  More important, he 
asserted, was ensuring the Baltic countries worked together, and that was a 
primary benefit of BALTBAT and the other projects.  Abols (interview 2009) 
agreed that in the period 1992-1994, coordination between the Baltic capitals 
was not well-developed, and they had different visions on how they wanted to 
develop their policies.  However, the West pushed the Baltic governments to act 
together, which ultimately was a sound policy.   
 
To summarize, the statements from the interviewees indicated one of the 
Mechanisms which led to the success of BALTBAT and the other initiatives was 
the determination of the Western supporting countries to ensure that there was 
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an agreed Baltic position and not a set of three distinct positions by Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania.  The comments indicated that there was no natural unity 
among the Baltic governments, and indeed, that there was a substantial amount 
of disunity among the three capitals.  As a result, it was particularly important 
that the Western donor countries used a proper amount of pressure to ensure 
the Baltic governments acted in a way that optimised the prospects of success 
for the assistance programmes and generated the desired Outcomes.  More 
generally, it appeared that the determination of donor states to ensure that 
recipient nations acted in such a manner was an important Mechanism 
necessary for the achievement of successful Outcomes in these military 
assistance projects. 
 
5.11.4 Seventh Mechanism - Documents 
 
Recognising the political importance of showing a unified front, there were 
numerous examples of the Baltic governments expressing their determination to 
pursue a common Baltic position.  For example, it was notable that Article 1 of 
the 1994 Agreement on Baltic Parliamentary and Governmental Cooperation 
Between the Baltic States indicated that "The Baltic States shall endeavour to 
develop cooperation in the spheres of foreign and security policy, defence, 
legislation ... and other fields of mutual interest and for this purpose negotiate 
bilateral and multilateral agreements which regulate cooperation in the 
respective spheres." 
 
Moreover, the 13 September 1994 resolution of the heads of Government of the 
Baltic states noted that:  
 
We deemed it important that common foreign and security policy 
together with cooperation in the economic sphere between Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia be continued and properly developed in the 
framework of strengthening regional cooperation as well as with the 
purpose of joining European structures of political and economic 
integration and both regional and transatlantic security systems. 
 
The Preamble to the 1995 Agreement Between the Ministries of Defence of the 
Baltic States on Cooperation in the fields of Defence and Military Relations cited 
"striving to ensure efficient trilateral co-ordination of actions in the field of 
defence and security as well as in cases of crises." 
 
Finally, the Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the development 
of BALTBAT issued in April 1999 included the notation in Section 1.2 that 
BALTBAT "has been aimed at increasing interoperability and displaying the will 
and ability of the Baltic States to co-operate both among themselves and in a 
multinational environment." 
 
With regard to these documents, the case can be made that the importance of 
the Mechanism of donor states imposing direction and control was most 
apparent in the fact that inter-Baltic rivalries were contained and public disputes 
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minimized.  Particularly as the extent of the disagreement among the Baltic 
nations was apparent after they joined NATO, it was noteworthy that the 
documents provided the appearance of unanimity among the Baltic states, 
which attested to the significance of this particular Mechanism.   
 
5.12 Eighth Mechanism - Turning Over Responsibility to Recipient States 
 
The preceding Mechanism of donor nations exerting control and providing 
direction to optimise results is important, particularly if there is disunity among 
recipient states.  However, the case can be made that if that Mechanism is 
over-emphasized, it can generate a dependency by recipients on donors that 
could be fatal for the assistance effort.  Thus, 18 interviewees addressed the 
need to consider how to turn over responsibility to recipient states at an 
appropriate pace.  The interviewees were: Abols, Andrusyszyn, Brett, Carlsen, 
Clemmesen, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, 
Mackenzie, Schvede, Sibul, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official, 
and a retired US military officer. 
 
The proposition is put forth that at some point in a military assistance 
programme, recipient states must be able to assume responsibility for the 
project and show that they have developed the requisite skills to do so.  From a 
practical perspective, it is hard to imagine donor states being willing to sign on 
to a programme that would proceed indefinitely.  One of the significant aspects 
of the Baltic initiatives which appeared to have particular value regarding future 
military assistance projects involved the need to determine how and when to 
wean recipients off the support provided by donors.   
 
It should be noted that there were a wide range of views among interviewees 
regarding the experience of the Baltic projects, and whether, in retrospect, the 
pace of what has been called "Baltification" was too fast, too slow or appropriate 
for the circumstances.  There appeared to be no support for rigid schedules and 
time-lines for transfer of responsibility.  Instead, there seems to have been a 
general view that decision-makers should keep the goal of transferring 
responsibility in mind, and act on it when appropriate.   
 
Returning to the CIMO framework, it appeared to be important that within the 
Context of the challenges facing the Baltic states and the organizational 
weaknesses they faced at that time, the Intervention of agreement on broad 
political decisions between the donor and recipient states on gradually turning 
over responsibility to recipient states was an important part of achieving desired 
Outcomes, and would therefore be an important element of a model for effective 
military assistance projects.     
 
5.12.1 The Right Pace 
 
The data from the interviews indicated the diversity of opinions on this question.  
Haekkerup (interview 2008) stressed that the Baltic states were not ready to 
assume more responsibility for the projects at the start, but he was surprised at 
 126 
how quickly they developed their abilities.  Godal (interview 2011) commented 
that it is hard to say if the Baltic capitals could have taken more responsibility for 
BALTBAT and the other projects at an earlier stage as they needed substantial 
guidance.  It is hard to imagine, he added, that if it could be done again, the 
donor states would change the way in which they directed and controlled the 
initiatives.  Linkevicius (interview 2010) agreed that he would not alter the pace 
at which responsibility was shifted to the Baltic countries, stressing that at that 
time, they needed assistance.  The process of moving responsibility to the 
Baltic capitals was not fixed, he stressed, but happened gradually as they 
developed their capabilities.   
 
Mackenzie (interview 2010) concurred that the Baltic states could not have 
done more or done it sooner.  They were at a very low stage of development 
and the leaders were used to taking orders, not giving them.  The BALTBAT 
model, he stressed, was good because it developed at a reasonable pace.  Too 
much change done too quickly would have generated a "disaster."  Drawing a 
comparison, Mackenzie (interview 2010) asserted that other former Warsaw 
Pact states went too far, for example, in getting new military equipment, but did 
not think through the changes they were making.  He noted that it is important 
to be clear on a roadmap for devolution of responsibility, and it has to be seen 
as a journey of assistance for the recipient nations.  Johnson (interview 2011) 
agreed that the pace of “Baltification” was about right.    
 
Addressing another aspect of this issue, it should be noted that elements of the 
Baltic forces were corrupt and inefficient in their early days.  Denmark had to 
send quartermasters to take care of the equipment, and there was an 
agreement with donor states that the equipment would not fall into the hands of 
third parties.  Moreover, in the early stages of the projects, the personnel in the 
Baltic countries had questionable English.  The Baltic governments, commented 
Abols (interview 2009), were not ready at early stages to own the programmes.   
 
An early transfer of more authority to the Baltic capitals simply was not possible, 
stated Clemmesen (interview 2010), and more "Baltification" was not an option.  
While some have argued that the Baltic countries could have been given more 
responsibility, he believed the problem was always to achieve "a full-hearted 
Baltic will to cooperate and coordinate."  An Estonian official (interview 2010) 
made the case regarding the BALTDEFCOL that “Baltification” was done too 
rapidly, and the comments of that official will be addressed in greater detail in 
the later discussion on the BALTDEFCOL.     
 
Fischer (interview 2010) added that, even with the benefit of hindsight, the 
division of labor between the supporting and Baltic states in the early stages 
was about right.  "Baltification" was pursued with greater intensity beginning in 
1997, and could not have been accomplished until then.  He noted that the 
capabilities of the Baltic nations in 1994 simply did not allow them to take more 
responsibility.  That was markedly different by 1997, but this was because they 
had time to learn at a steady pace with the aid of the supporting states.  In his 
view, the patient process by which the Baltic capitals developed abilities and 
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could handle more tasks was, even in retrospect, the most effective way to 
proceed.   
 
A Latvian official (interview 2010) asserted that "Baltification" was always the 
aim of BALTBAT, and around 1997 there was a desire to have the Baltic 
governments take more responsibility.  However, he agreed this could not have 
been done any earlier than that.  Indeed, the supporting states needed to push 
Baltic capitals to do more on "Baltification."  Kolga (interview 2009) noted that 
there was some “grumbling” about the donor states telling the Baltic nations 
what to do, but he added that this was a natural response.  In addition, he 
agreed that it might have been possible for donor countries to have "pushed" 
the Baltic governments more as they were initially quite passive.  However, the 
method was a patient dialogue to ensure the Baltic capitals understood how 
things had to be done.   
 
Around 1996, stated a US official (interview 2011), "Baltification" was under 
way, and this was the right time to have Baltic nations assume more 
responsibility.  The first security assistance conference with Eastern European 
democracies had been held, and it was apparent these states were not yet 
ready to handle more tasks.  In the early years of BALTBAT, the Baltic countries 
required a lot of "hand-holding" from the West, but by 1999, they were able to 
take more responsibility.  Certainly, by 1999, the Baltic capitals were prepared 
to effectively handle more tasks regarding these projects. Even at that time, he 
added, there were still problems which would arise, such as issues of sanitation 
and hygiene in barracks facilities, which would indicate the Baltic officials still 
had much to learn.   
 
A retired US military officer (interview 2010) agreed that he would not have 
changed anything significant regarding pace, as the Baltic forces were in a 
situation in which they could only absorb so much information, assistance and 
equipment.  Julian Brett, author of the referenced "Lessons Learned" 
assessment, and former UK exchange officer at the Danish Defence Ministry, 
stated in a 2008 interview that there was comparatively little input from the 
Baltic nations during Steering Group meetings in the early days.  However, this 
gradually improved as the officials concerned gained experience and 
confidence.  By the late 1990s, they were demonstrating more ownership.  As a 
general rule for such programmes, asserted Brett, there should be "Baltification" 
as early as possible 
 
5.12.2 Too Slow A Pace for "Baltification" 
 
On the other hand, some interviewees made the case that the pace of 
“Baltification” was too slow and should have been pressed more by the donor 
states.  Carlsen (interview 2010) commented that, in retrospect, perhaps more 
could have been done earlier to shift responsibilities to the Baltic governments, 
and they could have received more encouragement from the supporting 
countries to play a larger role.  Certainly, he noted, donor capitals kept watch on 
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how work was progressing.  He believed, however, that Denmark and the other 
supporting nations may have "guarded" the Baltic governments too much. 
 
Laneman (interview 2010) supported Carlsen’s view, stating that “Baltification” 
could have been done sooner and better. What was actually done was good, 
but more responsibilities should have been put on the shoulders of the Baltic 
countries. However, conceded Laneman (interview 2010), a credible argument 
could be made that the Baltic capitals were not ready to have a substantially 
larger role.  Captain Igor Schvede, Commander of the Estonian Navy and 
former BALTRON commander, asserted in a 2010 interview that the German 
leadership of BALTRON did a good job in pushing the Baltic naval forces to 
assume more responsibilities.  In his view, the pace of “Baltification” was good, 
although echoing Carlsen and Laneman, it perhaps could have been done 
faster.  The comments from Schvede (interview 2010) are addressed in greater 
detail in the later discussion on BALTRON.     
 
To summarize, there appeared to be little disagreement on the significance of a 
conscious effort by donor countries to have recipient states assume greater 
responsibility for the assistance programmes.  This would appear to be an 
important Mechanism for the successful achievement of Outcomes from any 
military assistance project.  In the case of the Baltic projects, the preponderance 
of views appeared to indicate that the pace of “Baltification” was appropriate, 
although there were individuals who believed that the pace, in retrospect, may 
have been too slow.  As a principle, it would appear that the Mechanism should 
be an element of a model for effective military assistance programmes, and the 
details of the pace of transferring greater responsibility to recipient states should 
be continuously reassessed to ensure that they are appropriate. 
 
5.12.3 Eighth Mechanism - Documents 
 
It was notable that Article 1, paragraph 1 of the BALTBAT MOU specifically 
noted that the programme was "designed to put in place mechanisms by which 
the Baltic States can themselves in the future maintain a peacekeeping 
capability."  
 
The Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of 
BALTBAT issued in April 1998 addressed "Baltification" in the fourth bullet of 
Section 3: "It is the understanding of the Baltic States, that the Baltic authorities 
should gradually assume greater responsibility for the development of the 
project, including the financial share and the logistic support."  In addition, 
paragraph 1 of Section 5 noted that: 
 
Recognising the ongoing gradual "Baltification" process, continuous 
support by the Supporting States is considered important for the further 
development of the Baltic Battalion project.  Support to the development 
and anchoring of the training launched in the project (train the trainers) is 
strongly encouraged.   
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The Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the Development of 
BALTBAT issued in April 1999 also provided relevant text.  After citing the focus 
of BALTBAT on peace support operations, Section 1.2 indicated that BALTBAT 
"has been aimed at increasing interoperability and displaying the will and ability 
of the Baltic States to co-operate both among themselves and in a multinational 
environment." 
 
In short, there was a repeated emphasis in the BALTBAT documentation which 
indicated that the Mechanism of turning over responsibility to recipient states 
was always a critical consideration for donor and recipient states and an 
important part of achieving the desired Outcomes.  
 
5.13 Ninth Mechanism - Flexibility in Planning 
 
In general, the case can be made that a key component of any successful 
project is good planning.  This can encompass a wide variety of issues: setting 
of goals; organisational structures; reporting requirements; and accountability.  
Numerous other issues can be added to that list.  However, for the purposes of 
this research, a broad, all-encompassing definition was sufficient, and there was 
no reason to narrowly define or address the specific components.  The rationale 
for such a decision was that the particular focus on planning drawn from the 
interviewees was the significance of the flexibility in the general planning 
process which was evident in the Baltic military assistance initiatives.       
 
Good planning was cited by 14 interviewees as a factor in the success of the 
Baltic projects, particularly the planning which went into establishing the 
framework of BALTBAT, as it became the template for the subsequent 
programmes.  Those interviewees were: Abols, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Fischer, 
Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Mackenzie, Molis, an Estonian official, a 
Latvian official, a US official and a retired US military officer.   
 
With regard to a general overview of the importance of this Mechanism, Abols 
(interview 2009) made the point that the Baltic projects were well and 
thoroughly planned, which contributed to the chances for success.  Carlsen 
(interview 2010) concurred, noting that from the start, the focus was on 
addressing practical issues to make these initiatives work. The first topic which 
had to be addressed, he cited as an example, was what language would be 
used for BALTBAT, and the Nordic states made the pragmatic decision to use 
English.  As a result, Denmark asked the UK to join in the assistance effort and 
provide language instructors. When the UK agreed, Denmark took that decision 
to the Baltic countries.  Moreover, Laneman (interview 2010) stated that, as a 
general principle, there has to be unity between the project details and the 
policy, and the BALTBAT experience showed that it is essential to have people 
support the plan and the decisions. 
 
However, what was particularly noteworthy was the commentary on the 
significance of the flexibility demonstrated by policy-makers.  On one count, this 
appeared to have been important in initiating BALTBAT in particular, as there 
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was no set framework or structure which the supporting states could utilise.  In 
addition, flexibility was critical in the policy area, where there was avoidance of 
doctrinaire or dogmatic responses and consideration of utilising opportunities.  
As a result, the significance of flexibility in planning was frequently and strongly 
noted by the interviewees as a component of the success of the Baltic 
initiatives.  Returning again to the CIMO framework, within the specific, 
challenging Context in which the Baltic initiatives were established, the 
Intervention of broad political decisions among donor and recipient states 
needed the specific Mechanism of flexibility in planning to generate specific 
Outcomes.   
 
Godal (interview 2011) provided commentary on the various aspects of flexibility 
in planning.  On policy, he stated that clear political goals were significant, and 
there was Western donor agreement on policies.  However, using opportunities 
that arose was also important.  On the initiation of the projects, he noted that 
there was flexibility in the way in which the Nordic countries provided 
assistance.  He noted that there was no set Nordic organizational framework to 
utilize, and processes and procedures for the Baltic initiatives had to be 
developed by the participants.  Haekkerup (interview 2008) concurred, stating 
that Denmark had the lead on BALTBAT decision-making, but “all the crucial 
decisions were made in common.”   However, there was no blue-print to follow, 
adding that the will to take action was decisive, and that is how leaders have to 
respond "when sailing in uncharted waters."   
 
A Latvian official (interview 2010) concurred with Haekkerup’s comment by 
noting that establishing BALTBAT was “to an extent, made up as the BALTBAT 
process went along.”  Fischer (interview 2010) also echoed Haekkerup’s point 
that when work on BALTBAT was initiated, the Danish MOD had to develop 
processes and procedures, even though the MOD did not have a solid blueprint 
or a significant amount of experience in handling this type of task.  He also 
reiterated Godal’s point that the perspective of those working on the projects 
was to take advantage of available opportunities to build BALTBAT and Baltic 
military capabilities.     
 
Mackenzie (interview 2010) concurred that it is important for military assistance 
programmes to have both a good base framework and the flexibility to head in 
the strategic direction which has been set out.  Too much doctrinaire thinking 
generates problems and increases the chances of failure.  As forces develop, 
advantages may arise, and it is important to be able to take opportunities.  It is 
also critical, emphasized Mackenzie (interview 2010), to first develop policy and 
then establish military mechanisms.  It is not a case of being doctrinaire and 
using a specific model.  It is important to look at functions, he added, rather than 
structures, which is why the Danish model worked for BALTBAT.  This can 
include a realization of the existence of regional problems.  Moreover, 
commented Mackenzie (interview 2010), it stresses the importance of not 
beginning the process by creating the solution.  It is important to be able to 
analyse and take opportunities. They usually arise, he noted, and the key is to 
have them develop the way you wish. 
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Echoing Mackenzie’s points, Carlsen (interview 2010) stated that the Danes 
were focused on how to adapt projects to succeed.  It was not the case of 
beginning with a plan and just sticking with it.  In fact, Carlsen (interview 2010) 
believed that the flexibility of approach was a critical reason that BALTBAT was 
a success.  Clemmesen (interview 2010) reiterated that there was no road-map 
to follow, and Denmark had to make up the process as it went along.  It was a 
process by which lessons were assessed as work proceeded.  Taking a 
different perspective on flexibility, Kolga (interview 2009) noted the Baltic 
projects went through an interesting evolution.  They began as top-down 
initiatives, but over time, they generated more bottom-up processes as ideas 
and suggestions arose. 
 
It is worthwhile reiterating that flexibility in planning was particularly important 
with regard to BALTBAT, as it was the first attempt at a Baltic military 
assistance project.  As such, it was a valuable indication of the cases in which 
the approach was productive, or may not have been optimal.  Laneman 
(interview 2010) noted instances in which the flexibility was beneficial.  For 
instance, the initial plans were optimistic, with a proposal for one BALTBAT 
support organization.  When that clearly was not sufficient, two more were 
developed.  Moreover, his first attempt at an organizational table was not a 
success, but he constantly worked to improve it, which was in line with the ad 
hoc approach to addressing challenges.  In short, the structure was improved 
as the project went along, which was a mark of the practical way in which 
BALTBAT addressed problems. 
 
However, there were also difficulties in the area of flexibility and striking the 
right balance.  On the one hand, Laneman (interview 2010) indicated that he 
would have appreciated some guidance from policy-makers, as he stated that 
he simply got an order to form a PKO centre.  Moreover, he had to generate a 
statement of intent and a budget “from scratch.”  On the other hand, Laneman 
(interview 2010) commented that his flexibility to act was reduced over time.   
 
To summarize, it appeared to be the case that one of the items which 
interviewees judged as important to the success of the Baltic projects was the 
fact that there was a flexible approach to planning.  That was manifest in the 
development of the structures for BALTBAT in particular, and also in the 
inclination of the decision-makers to be open to using opportunities which 
became available.  Such flexibility in planning would appear to be a Mechanism 
which would be important for achieving Outcomes and a necessary element for 
a model for effective military assistance programmes.    
 
5.13.1 Ninth Factor - Documents  
 
It was difficult to find examples of documents which included text that 
specifically cited flexibility in planning.  That would be most manifest in the 
decisions reached by the policy-makers and project managers, for instance, in 
having Baltic forces participate in particular PKOs.  Instead, it was possible to 
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look at the extent to which there was an avoidance of micro-management and 
large amounts of detail.  On that count, one document excerpt stood out.  
 
It was notable that the Project Plan for BALTBAT was outlined in Annex A to the 
BALTBAT MOU.  It specifically noted that the training of BALTBAT would be 
conducted in three phases, but in the following very general terms: 
 
Phase 1: Baltic officers and NCOs attend Nordic UN courses. 
Phase 2: Training of three Baltic infantry companies by Nordic and UK 
instructors. 
Phase 3: Formation and training of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion. 
 
5.14 Tenth Mechanism - Good Organizational Structures 
 
The organizational structure for BALTBAT and the other projects was noted by 
15 of the interviewees, and appeared to be a Mechanism which would be critical 
in achieving the desired Outcomes from a military assistance programme.  
Those interviewees were: Brett, Carlsen, Clemmesen, Fischer, Godal, 
Haekkerup, Kolga, Laneman, Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Molis, Saar, Schvede, a 
Latvian official and a US official.   
 
A short comment is in order with regard to the significance of this factor.  It 
would appear self-evident that a good organizational structure is a prerequisite 
for any successful project, military or non-military.  The reply to such a 
statement is a comment on the number of assistance efforts which are 
undertaken with a weak organizational structure.  Therefore, returning again to 
the CIMO framework, within the challenging Context in which participating 
states were trying to work, the Intervention of a broad political agreement 
between donor and recipient states required the critical Mechanism of a good 
organizational arrangement in order to achieve the desired Outcomes from the 
military assistance initiative.   
 
In the case of the Baltic projects, the policy-makers effectively addressed that 
Mechanism.  At the top of the organizational structure for BALTBAT were the 
Baltic Ministers for Defence and Chiefs of Defence, who formally were 
responsible for the project.  This indicated the political significance attached to 
BALTBAT.  As a practical matter, the policy-making responsibilities were given 
to a Steering Group (SG) which was below the Ministerial level and made the 
overarching decisions with regard to the direction of the project.  A Military 
Working Group (MWG) was set up below the SG, which addressed the details 
of the assistance programme and managed implementation.  Finally, specific 
training tasks were handled by the Training Teams (TTs) under the authority of 
the MWG.   
 
One organization also cited by interviewees was the Baltic Security Assistance 
Group (BALTSEA).  It was established in 1997 with a focus on coordinating the 
multitude of bilateral assistance arrangements between the Baltic and donor 
states.  BALTSEA was not an integral part of the organizational structures of 
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BALTBAT and the other military initiatives.  However, the various references to 
BALTSEA reinforced the point that good organizational arrangements enhanced 
the prospects of success for the overall effort to assist the Baltic capitals.  
 
The interview data provided positive commentary on the organizational 
structures that were set up.  Haekkerup (interview 2008) asserted that the SG 
and MWG structure worked well, and Godal (interview 2011) emphasized that 
political and military frameworks set up for the Baltic initiatives were important to 
their success.  Linkevicius (interview 2010) noted that the SG at the political 
level and MWG at the practical level were important bodies that worked on 
concrete issues.  He also commented that BALTSEA was a forum where Baltic 
projects were discussed, adding that it was so useful that it served as a model 
for implementation of non-military Baltic cooperative efforts.  Continuing on that 
theme, Kolga (interview 2009) believed that establishment of BALTSEA was 
necessary due to the growth of numerous bilateral agreements.  More 
generally, Kolga (interview 2009) concurred that from the SG down to the TTs, 
the BALTBAT organizational entities performed well, with the TTs, for example, 
having the autonomy to do what was needed.   
 
In addition, Mackenzie (interview 2010) stressed that Denmark did an effective 
job running the coordination on BALTBAT, and also noted that the coordination 
of military aid to the Baltic capitals under BALTSEA was good.  The 
establishment of BALTSEA, concurred Brett (interview 2008), was important for 
alignment and harmonisation of efforts. The supporting countries had a list of 
what they wanted to give, while the Baltic capitals had a separate list of what 
they needed, and it was sometimes unclear whether the cooperation was 
demand driven (led by the Baltic governments) or supply driven (led by donors 
who had surplus equipment). 
 
Fischer (interview 2010) stated that compared to other military assistance 
programmes, BALTBAT and the other projects were cleanly organized and run.  
He added that a large part of that was due to the fact that the Baltic capitals 
knew that reports of corruption would damage political support in donor 
countries, and the Baltic capitals recognized that it was in their interest to avoid 
allegations of graft.  More generally, Fischer (interview 2010) commented that 
there were difficult negotiations on funding, especially as the Baltic 
governments had few resources. However, all of the participating states 
managed to construct a solid framework to provide aid.     
 
Clemmesen (interview 2010) agreed that the establishment of the BALTBAT SG 
was important, particularly for the Danish Defence Ministry.  The demands on 
the supporting nations and the work that was required became more intense 
when BALTBAT became more than a symbol.  It was much more challenging to 
address issues such as vehicles, weapons, military materiel, and the equipment 
required for a full PKO battalion.  Moreover, as BALTBAT organizational 
structures were replicated in the other projects, it was notable that Schvede 
(interview 2010) stated that Germany used the MWG structure to provide good 
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leadership and drive the BALTRON project.  With regard to BALTNET, Saar 
(interview 2010), commented that there were well-connected layers. 
 
Taking a different perspective on the value of the organizational arrangements, 
Carlsen (interview 2010) noted that the ideas for the various Baltic programmes 
arose from different sources, and development of these initiatives was 
facilitated by the opportunity to work in the SG, which he believed was “fairly 
effective,” a characterization he also applied to the MWG.  He noted that 
building on a Nordic framework sometimes generated problems with the UK, 
Germany and US.  In the early stages, continued Carlsen (interview 2010), use 
of Nordic processes was fine, but when difficult issues, such as weapons, had 
to be addressed later, it generated complications.  
 
5.14.1 Organizational Weaknesses 
 
There were, however, caveats and comments about organizational weaknesses 
in BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects.  Some of this data blended into the 
area of problems with a variety of issues, such as national allegiances, but as 
they could not neatly be disaggregated from organizational issues, it was best 
to simply note the points raised by interviewees.  For example, a Latvian official 
(interview 2010) agreed that the SG, MWG and TTs were “good mechanisms to 
make BALTBAT a reality.”  However, he emphasized that they all depended on 
personalities, with Per Carlsen having taken a critical role in driving decisions, 
and good TT commanders essential for achieving training results.  The Latvian 
official (interview 2010) noted that there were no problems on general 
principles, but coordination was difficult.     
 
Laneman (interview 2010), charged with establishing BALTBAT and serving as 
its first Commander, had a good vantage point from which to comment on this 
issue.  He highlighted good organization as one of the elements for success.  
He continued by noting that it is important to get the right decisions within a 
good framework, stressing that he got good support from the SG, MWG and 
TTs.  He added that they were always positive, patient and focused on what 
had to be done.  Laneman (interview 2010) asserted that the SG “provided top 
cover and support,” and that the SG and MWG were neutral and kept things on 
track.  He stressed that it was never an unpleasant experience working with 
these bodies, and that they were quite helpful. 
   
However, Laneman (interview 2010) noted that there were weaknesses.  For 
example, national contingents were “misused” and personnel decisions were 
not optimal.  He also emphasized a weakness in the structure -- the authority 
given to the BALTBAT commander did not match his responsibility.  This 
occasionally generated difficulties in addressing disciplinary issues involving 
personnel from three different national military forces.  He cited an incident 
where he had to put a Latvian soldier in detention and Latvia initially objected 
rigorously, although it eventually accepted the decision.  Ultimately, stressed 
Laneman (interview 2010), he and his two deputies agreed on how they would 
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resolve these matters: as senior national officers, they handled soldiers from 
their respective Baltic countries.  
 
A US official (interview 2011) noted that the entities which were put into place, 
such as the SG, did a good job minimizing duplication of effort among the 
various supporting states.  Stressing that the SG performed well, the official 
noted that a concern was that it only focused on taking action as SG meetings 
approached.  In retrospect, added Molis (interview 2009), there could have 
been better coordination of materiel, goals and forces in the Baltic projects. 
There were different doctrines and supplies, which made integration for the 
Baltic forces more difficult. 
 
To summarize, there appeared to be general agreement on the importance of 
good organization as an important factor in what was accomplished in 
BALTBAT and the other programmes.  Organizational structure was cited 
frequently, and the commentary was largely positive, although weaknesses 
were noted.  However, in general, the experience of the Baltic initiatives and the 
comments provided by interviewees appeared to indicate that a solid 
organizational structure should be included as a Mechanism and therefore an 
element in a model for effective military assistance projects. 
 
5.14.2 Tenth Factor - Documents 
 
If solid organizational structures were an important Mechanism in obtaining 
successful Outcomes from the Baltic initiatives, this should have been apparent 
in the documents establishing BALTBAT and the other projects.  Moreover, as 
organizational structures were modified or clarified, they would have drawn the 
attention of policy-making officials. 
 
It was therefore notable that Article 3, paragraph 1 of the BALTBAT MOU noted 
that the Steering Group, under Danish chairmanship, was established "to 
facilitate effective coordination and to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort 
and resources."  Moreover, the Steering Group goal was to "exercise overall 
control and direction of the multinational assistance." 
 
In the same paragraph, "a multinational group of military experts (the Ad Hoc 
Working Group)" was also established under Danish chairmanship and was 
"responsible for developing the detailed aspects of the cooperative programme 
of assistance, for reviewing at regular intervals the terms of the Project Plan and 
for overseeing its implementation."   
 
Subsequently, the 10 December 1997 agreement among the Baltic states 
concerning BALTBAT, which was done due to "the need to define the conditions 
on which the Baltic Battalion is established and maintained," noted in Article 3, 
paragraph 1 that the Baltic states agreed "to establish a combined control 
mechanism in order to direct, supervise and audit the operations of the Baltic 
Battalion."  They agreed that the mechanism would be: 
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a) Ministerial Committee, consisting of Ministers of Defence of the Baltic 
States. 
b) Baltic Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Defence of the 
Baltic States. 
 
According to Article 3, paragraph 2: 
 
The MC embodies the highest political authority over the Baltic Battalion 
and among other things shall: 
a) give policy guidance on development of the Baltic Battalion for the 
BMC; 
b) make major decisions on development of the Baltic Battalion; 
c) approve the budget of the Baltic Battalion; 
d) review annually the progress of the Baltic Battalion; 
e) resolve disputes that occur in the BMC; 
f) audit accounts and expenditures against the budget by auditors 
appointed by the MC; 
g) approve the Terms of Reference for the Commander, Deputy 
Commander and Chief of Staff of the Baltic Battalion; 
h) approve a development plan and annual plan of activities of the Baltic 
Battalion; 
i) make decisions on financing, account and auditing, procurement of 
equipment and weaponry of the Baltic Battalion; 
j) approve the form of the identification card and seal of the Baltic 
Battalion. 
 
According to Article 4, paragraph 3: 
 
The BMC embodies the highest military command authority over the 
Baltic Battalion as the Chiefs of Defence will retain Full Command over 
all their national personnel assigned to the Baltic Battalion.  The BMC 
among the other things shall: 
a) make recommendations to the MC on policy, the development of the 
Baltic Battalion, organization, structure, training and material including 
operating procedures; 
b) approve the form and use of the flag and the emblem of the Baltic 
Battalion; 
c) review structural and organizational matters of the Baltic Battalion; 
d) present a development plan and an annual plan of activities to the MC 
for approval, take responsibility for execution of approved policy; 
e) present the annual budget of the Baltic Battalion to the MC for 
approval; 
f) issue operational orders and Standing Operational Procedures to the 
Baltic Battalion; 
g) present the Terms of Reference for the Commander, Deputy 
Commander and Chief of Staff of the Baltic Battalion to the MC for 
approval; 
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h) review implementation of the development plan and an annual plan of 
activities and submit an annual report on the development to the MC; 
i) present suggestions on financing, account and auditing, procurement 
of equipment and weaponry of the Baltic Battalion to the MC for decision; 
j) approve the training standards of the Baltic Battalion; 
k) present controversial issues to the MC. 
 
With regard to the problems involving discipline noted above by Laneman 
(interview 2010), Article 5, paragraph 3 of this 1997 document attempted to 
address that problem.  The document noted that "appropriate Command and 
Control authority shall be granted to Commander of the Baltic Battalion by the 
BMC as needed to carry out assigned missions or training."  However, Article 5, 
paragraph 4 indicated that:  
 
The senior officer of each national contingent shall be designated as the 
national contingent Commander and shall be given the power by his 
national authorities to exercise disciplinary power over all members of 
national contingent.  The Commander of the Baltic Battalion and his 
subordinate Commanders may require that disciplinary procedures 
envisaged under the appropriate national legislation are exercised on 
their subordinates by the Commander of the national contingent where 
this is needed to uphold good order and military discipline.  The national 
contingent Commanders shall apply their national disciplinary rules, to 
include the delegation of authority within the national contingent and take 
appropriate actions to maintain order and discipline within the Baltic 
Battalion.   
 
That was amplified by Article 5, paragraph 5:  
 
The Commander of the Baltic Battalion may recommend disciplinary 
punishment for his immediate subordinates of another national 
contingent to the Baltic Military Committee.  The BMC shall direct the 
recommendation to the appropriate national authority who exercises 
disciplinary power over the individual. 
 
Finally, with regard to an over-arching view of the organizational structures 
established for BALTBAT, and the constant effort to improve those structures, 
the document from the Baltic BALTBAT Military Co-ordination Group, provided 
in response to the Political Guidance from April 1999, included under Chapter 
1.4(a) for "Management and legal framework," the notation that:   
 
Management of the BALTBAT project is provided by Ministers through 
the Ministerial Committee (MC) and by Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) 
through the Baltic Military Committee (BMC). In addition the project has 
utilised the multinational Steering Group and Military Working Group 
(MWG) established in 1995 by the Baltic states and supporting countries 
in order to co-ordinate international support to the project.   
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The two initial international support MOUs from June and September 
1994, and the further Support MOU from February 1999 have also 
provided a degree of overall direction to the project – principally through 
their outline project plans.  The subsequent development of a Baltic 
Management Group (BMG) and BALTBAT Military Co-ordination Group 
(BALTBAT MCG) in March through June 1999 is intended to improve 
overall management and control of the project in the three countries.  
 
In short, there was ample indication in numerous documents on attention to 
detail in establishing a good organizational structure for BALTBAT. 
 
5.15 Eleventh Mechanism - A Strong Lead Nation 
 
A Mechanism apparent from the data was the extent to which success was due 
to the determination of the lead nation for the particular Baltic military 
assistance project.  Two points need to be made at the outset regarding this 
particular Mechanism.  First, this was the one Mechanism which addressed a 
multinational assistance effort.  There is a difference between a simple military 
assistance programme in which Country A is providing aid to Country X and a 
complex initiative in which Countries A, B and C are providing aid to Countries 
X, Y and Z.  The other Mechanisms outlined in this thesis can be applied with 
equal ease to both types of projects as they involve issues which need to be 
raised and considered by one or a number of donor or recipient governments, 
such as: What is the optimal area of military assistance?   
 
With regard to this particular Mechanism, the focus was on a particular donor 
nation which coordinated a complex assistance initiative.  However, a number 
of points should be made.  First, the proposition is put forward that the issue of 
a strong lead nation is as relevant in a simple programme as in a complex 
effort; it is simply the case that the sole donor country does not have to worry 
about other donor governments.  In many ways, this is another manifestation of 
Mechanisms 3 (A Constant Source of Support) and 4 (A Long-Term Political 
Commitment), put into the context of a complex effort.  Second, inclusion of 
such a Mechanism allows for the elements of a model discussed in detail in 
Chapter Six to be applicable to complex as well as simple efforts.  Finally, in 
light of the number of instances in which donor states seek to spread the 
burden of military assistance programmes, this particular Mechanism appears 
to have particular practical significance.       
 
The second point which needs to be made is that this Mechanism is closely 
related to the twelfth Mechanism which follows, which addresses the 
importance of key individuals in generating Outcomes from the programmes.  In 
some instances, the line admittedly blurs.  For example, Saar (interview 2010) 
noted in his interview the significance of energetic leadership for the success of 
BALTNET, but rather than giving the credit to Norway as the lead nation, he 
specifically cited the work of the Norwegian project officer.  However, for 
purposes of the identified elements of a model, the case can be made that it is 
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important to delineate the operational requirement that a military assistance 
project has a strong lead nation.     
 
The data indicated the significance or the role played by a lead state which 
drove the generation of Outcomes desired from a Baltic project.  A total of 20 
interviewees raised the issue of the key role played by Denmark as the lead 
nation for BALTBAT: Abols, Andrusyszyn, Brett, Carlsen, Clemmesen, 
Donnelly, Ellemann-Jensen, Fischer, Haekkerup, Johnson, Kolga, Laneman, 
Linkevicius, Mackenzie, Saar, Schvede, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a 
US official and a retired US military officer.  The commentary on the German 
role in driving BALTRON and the Norwegian role with regard to BALTNET is 
addressed later in the sections devoted to those projects. 
 
On the significance of the Danish leadership of BALTBAT, Linkevicius (interview 
2010) stressed that the Danes were the key, and it is not possible to overstate 
the important role that Denmark played.  It did an excellent job of coordinating 
military assistance.  The Danes, noted Andrusyszyn (interview 2010), put a lot 
of effort into making BALTBAT a success, and it was important that the Danes 
did all the detailed work to move BALTBAT forward.  Without those efforts, he 
asserted, there would have been divisions and difficulties among the Baltic 
governments.  Keeping them together was the important outcome, and the 
Danes were critical to achieving that objective.  Without Danish efforts, 
commented Andrusyszyn (interview 2010), corrosive influences would have 
crept in.  A retired US military officer (interview 2010) concurred that the Danes 
were crucial to BALTBAT success, noting that they were committed to the 
project and gave substantial amounts of support.   
 
Kolga (interview 2009) emphasized that the Danish leadership on BALTBAT 
was critical to the success of that project, which was recognized by the Baltic 
countries.  Resources from the lead countries were important, and the Danes 
provided numerous experienced personnel for BALTBAT.  When the Baltic 
governments did not always understand what was happening and why 
something needed to be done, noted Kolga (interview 2009), the Danes 
provided the necessary pressure to move the process along.  Making a more 
general point, Kolga (interview 2009) asserted that it is important for projects to 
have strong lead donor countries.   
 
Providing additional commentary, Brett (interview 2008) added that in the early 
days of establishing BALTBAT, Danish support was significant.  Dedicated civil 
and military support enabled the Danes to play a strong leadership role.  
Donnelly (interview 2011) concurred that the Danes were very proactive.  
Laneman (interview 2010) asserted that the Danes were "great" and a Latvian 
official (interview 2010) added that the Danes did a very good job of leading the 
project.   
 
Mackenzie (interview 2010) concurred that Denmark did a very good job leading 
BALTBAT. At this point in time, recipient states generally were irritated by too 
much control by others.  Nations had to prove that they knew what they were 
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doing, and the Danes, asserted Mackenzie (interview 2010), showed they did 
indeed have that knowledge.  Johnson (interview 2011) added that often it is 
better to let smaller nations take a leadership role, as recipient countries will find 
that easier to accept.  Thus, Denmark was perfect for that role.  An Estonian 
official (interview 2010) agreed that Denmark was the natural lead for 
BALTBAT, particularly due to its NATO membership.   
 
Abols (interview 2009) made the point that in all of these military assistance 
projects, there was a central donor nation driving the work and providing 
support.  A US official (interview 2011) agreed that the role of Denmark in 
providing leadership was important for BALTBAT success, adding however that 
Norway and Sweden would certainly say that they made as much of a 
contribution as Denmark.   
 
At this juncture, it is important to note that all the preceding comments regarding 
this factor were from non-Danish interviewees.  With regard to comments from 
Danish participants, Haekkerup (interview 2008) stressed that it was critical to 
have a lead nation for such a challenging project, and Denmark was ready to 
assume that role.  He emphasized that Denmark had options and room to act 
which the US or Germany did not have.   Clemmesen (interview 2010) 
commented that Denmark, led by Haekkerup, volunteered to take the lead, both 
on policy issues and on driving the concrete actions that needed to be taken on 
BALTBAT.   Danish leadership, he stressed, was essential for turning the policy 
concept into reality 
 
To summarize, it was notable that the non-Danish interviewees in particular 
emphasized the significance of the role played by Denmark as the lead nation 
for BALTBAT as a Mechanism in ensuring the success of that project.  There 
was also data from BALTRON and BALTNET on the necessity of having a 
strong lead nation, which is noted in the later discussion of those programmes.  
It therefore appeared that the Intervention of broad political decisions between 
the donor and recipient states required a Mechanism of a strong lead nation 
which took an energetic role in guiding, shaping and implementing all aspects of 
the military assistance project in order to generate the desired Outcomes.  Such 
a Mechanism would appear to be an essential element of a model for effective 
military assistance projects.   
 
5.16 Twelfth Mechanism - Leadership From Key Individuals 
 
The final Mechanism which arose from the data was the importance of 
energetic leadership from key individuals to make a military assistance initiative 
successful.  This would appear to naturally flow from the previous Mechanism, 
since, as a practical matter, “states” do not energetically work to ensure the 
success of a programme, but individuals representing those states.  This 
Mechanism was noted by nine interviewees:  Clemmesen, Donnelly, 
Haekkerup, Johnson, Laneman, Linkevicius, Saar, Schvede, and a Latvian 
official. 
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Linkevicius (interview 2010) emphasized that personalities were important in 
driving the Baltic initiatives forward.  It was strong leadership which kept things 
moving in the right direction and worked out solutions to problems.  If 
Haekkerup had not been there, he asserted, none of the Baltic assistance 
programmes would have worked.  In 1994, noted Linkevicius (interview 2010), 
he and Haekkerup were flying to Vilnius in a helicopter when they discussed the 
prospects of sending a Lithuanian platoon to Croatia to serve under Danish 
military supervision. Agreement was reached, and upon landing, the two notified 
a very surprised Per Carlsen that this was going to happen. Linkevicius 
(interview 2010) highlighted the fact that at point there was no Lithuanian legal 
basis for the action and certainly no experience in handling such a military task. 
As a result, the Lithuanians had to develop the legal basis, which included a 
major effort to get approval from the Lithuanian Parliament.  He stressed that 
there were dangers involved in these decisions. The Lithuanian troops sent to 
the Balkans could have suffered casualties, and if that happened, it could have 
had a negative impact on all the Baltic regional activities.  However, concluded 
Linkevicius (interview 2010), this again returns to the importance of 
personalities and leaders that would drive projects to completion. 
 
Clemmesen (interview 2010) added his view that the most important factor for 
the success of the Western assistance to the Baltic governments involved the 
personalities and commitment of key individuals.  Ellemann-Jensen was a 
driving force on Danish support for Baltic independence.  Haekkerup and former 
Danish Chief of Defence Jorgen Lyng were instrumental in formulating Danish 
policy and pushing for action.  Delving into the reasons for the determination 
apparent in those two leaders, Clemmesen (interview 2010) noted that 
Haekkerup was "emotionally attached" to Eastern Europe, and particularly to 
the Baltic governments, due to his time as leader of the NATO 
Parliamentarians.  Lyng was strongly influenced by the fact that the Baltic 
countries did not enjoy the liberation which Western Europe experienced in 
1945, and instead suffered under Russian domination within the USSR.  
 
There was substantial data from interviewees which indicated that Per Carlsen 
was critical in driving the BALTBAT project forward.  Johnson (interview 2011) 
noted energetic Danish leadership, and cited Carlsen as "the driving force" on 
BALTBAT.  Clemmesen (interview 2010) concurred that the key individual was 
Carlsen.  A Latvian official (interview 2010) added that Carlsen was particularly 
important in making BALTBAT work, a point on which Laneman (interview 
2010) concurred.   
 
Other individuals who played an important role in BALTBAT and the other 
projects were also noted by interviewees.  Clemmesen (interview 2010) stated 
that the UK Defence Attache in Riga, Janis Kazocins, the son of Latvian 
refugees, led the effort for the UK to be much more supportive of the Baltic 
capitals, a position he also pushed with other nations.  He also praised US 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ron Asmus for playing a central role in 
pushing the development of US policy towards the Baltic capitals.  Supporting 
Clemmesen’s point, Donnelly (interview 2011) reiterated that the West initially 
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did not exhibit a strong commitment to the Baltic governments. That changed 
due to the work of the people who took charge and pushed hard to get Western 
aid to the Baltic countries.   
 
Clemmesen (interview 2010) and Laneman (interview 2010) praised the Danish 
head of the BALTBAT Military Working Group who addressed the details and 
pushed BALTBAT forward.  Schvede (interview 2010) emphasized that 
personalities were key in the BALTRON process. National positions depended 
on who represented a supporting state at a meeting.  Finally, Saar (interview 
2010) provided the strongest commentary on this factor, stressing it was the 
work of the Norwegian project officer for BALTNET who put the initiative on a 
successful course.  A more detailed analysis of his comments is provided in the 
later discussion of BALTNET.   
 
To summarize, it was apparent from the data that the experience of BALTBAT 
and the other Baltic programmes indicated that in order for the Intervention of 
political decisions between the donor and recipient states to generate the 
desired Outcomes, one of the important Mechanisms was the commitment of 
individuals to make the military assistance project work.  As an operational 
matter, that would appear to translate into ensuring that military assistance 
programme team leaders or those providing overall political guidance should be 
energetic and determined to make decisions and keep initiatives on a forward 
trajectory.  The response could be provided that this is self-apparent and an 
important ingredient for any project, military or non-military.  However, this 
would generate the reply that although it may be self-apparent, it is noteworthy 
that many initiatives seem to lack the individual ready to drive the programme to 
success.  Fortunately for the Baltic governments, with regard to their military 
assistance projects, those individuals were present.  
 
5.17 Significance of Mechanisms – Application in Other Baltic Projects 
 
As indicated in Section 5.1.4, one way of assessing the significance of the 
Mechanisms was to analyse how they were implemented not only in BALTBAT, 
but in the subsequent projects (BALTRON, BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL).  
If they were indeed Mechanisms important for any military assistance 
programme which generated the desired Outcomes, they should have shown 
up in most, if not all, of the Baltic initiatives.  Thus, the consistency of the 
appearance of Mechanisms among later projects provided a degree of 
additional reliability through triangulation.   
 
The analysis which follows reviews the extent to which the 12 Mechanisms 
were taken into consideration and utilised in the development of BALTRON, 
BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL.  Once again, the Mechanisms were: 
 
(1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns 
(2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance 
(3) - A Constant Source of Support 
(4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment 
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(5) - Connection to Larger Goals 
(5A) - NATO membership 
(5B) - Development of National Defence Capabilities 
(6) - Development of New Leadership 
(7) - Direction and Control by Donor States 
(8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States 
(9) - Flexibility in Planning 
(10) - Good Organizational Structures 
(11) - A Strong Lead Nation 
(12)  Leadership From Key Individuals 
 
It is worthwhile to begin this analysis with general background on the initiation 
and development of the subsequent Baltic military assistance initiatives before 
analyzing the extent to which the various Mechanisms were present in these 
projects.  Such information also provides a valuable historical perspective in 
which to place the individual programmes, and is also of use in assessing the 
Outcomes that were achieved by these initiatives.   
 
5.17.1 Background on BALTRON  
 
Germany served as the lead nation for BALTRON, which was inaugurated on 
28 August 1998.  It is valuable to repeat the assessment in Section 2.11.13 of 
the Literature Review from Walter (2001, p. 115) that BALTRON provided a 
good start for combined naval force development, noting the importance for the 
Baltic governments of participating in Western training and exercises.  
 
Schvede (interview 2010) commented that, as a general point, all the Baltic 
naval forces wanted to cooperate and were inspired by the work on BALTBAT, 
adding that he actually started working on the initial preparation for BALTRON 
as early as 1994.  With regard to military Outcomes, it appeared that BALTRON 
achieved the goal of establishing a naval capability for the Baltic states.  The 
fact that BALTRON continues to operate after the Baltic countries joined NATO 
indicated that it still has military value and reinforced the case that it generated 
the desired military Outcomes.  Schvede (interview 2010) provided an 
interesting perspective on the continued operational relevance of BALTRON, 
noting that even though the Baltic nations are now in NATO and receive advice 
from the NATO Working Group, it has been “comfortable for the Baltic states to 
continue to use the BALTRON framework.”   
 
On political Outcomes, and specifically NATO membership, Schvede (interview 
2010) asserted that BALTRON did make a contribution, due to the close 
cooperation with NATO member states and the preparation of Baltic naval 
forces for NATO membership.  He noted that BALTRON established the 
readiness of Baltic naval forces to work within a NATO structure, thereby 
contributing to achieving the political goal of NATO membership for the Baltic 
nations.   
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5.17.2 Background on BALTNET 
 
Norway served as the lead nation for BALTNET, which began operations on 6 
June 2000.  It is worthwhile to reiterate the point from Section 2.11.14 in the 
Literature Review made by Winner (2002) which highlighted “sensible and 
politically savvy joint efforts,” citing the “creation of a joint radar station that … 
can also be linked to NATO’s air–defence network” as having “augmented each 
country’s armed forces construction” (p. 209).   
 
Saar (interview 2010) highlighted what he asserts are relevant aspects of the 
background to the establishment of BALTNET.  He noted that after regaining 
independence, the Estonian Air Force consisted of a dozen Estonian officers 
who had served in the Soviet air force during the occupation.  The first meeting 
in Riga of the three Baltic Air Force Commanders, commented Saar (interview 
2010), was held to discuss and coordinate development of their respective 
forces, which led to talks about specific cooperative projects among the Air 
Forces.  Coordination was developed, and there were regular Air Force 
Commanders meetings.  The meetings had protocols with a list of action items, 
commented Saar (interview 2010), but they were still largely theoretical 
discussions.   
 
This changed, asserted Saar (interview 2010), when the US, accompanied by 
representatives from Lockheed Martin, broached the idea of the Regional 
Airspace Initiative (RAI).  That was the point at which the three Baltic Air Forces 
realized they could work together.  The RAI was the first opportunity to make 
genuine progress.  When the three Baltic Defence Ministers signed the 
BALTNET agreement in 1998, stated Saar (interview 2010), the “real work 
started.” 
 
Once again, it is important to begin by assessing whether BALTNET generated 
the desired military Outcomes.  Saar (interview 2010) provided his view that 
“BALTNET is a success,” and noted that BALTNET has been maintained even 
after the Baltic nations joined NATO.  As with BALTRON, BALTNET had 
established its military utility by its continued existence within the NATO 
framework, providing an air defence system judged to be of sufficient value to 
be retained by the Alliance.  Turning to the issue of whether BALTNET played a 
role in achieving desired political Outcomes, specifically NATO membership for 
the Baltic nations, Saar (interview 2010) asserted that BALTNET did make a 
contribution to that political Outcome due to the conscious effort undertaken to 
integrate with NATO air defence systems. In that regard, it contributed to the 
case made by the Baltic governments that they were ready to join the Alliance.   
 
As an overarching commentary relevant to discussion of the 12 Mechanisms 
and their application in the subsequent Baltic military assistance initiatives, Saar 
(interview 2010) noted that, with the benefit of hindsight, the key to success was 
achieving the right political decisions, political support, and a solid framework.  
That is the situation in which the military works best.  Fundamentally, he 
emphasized, the BALTNET framework was indeed ideal.  It was started by the 
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US and then supported by others.  Saar (interview 2010) commented that 
BALTBAT had good and bad times, and there were questions about the 
mission.  In contrast, BALTNET was "a 24/7 operation and had a focus on a real 
concern."  The BALTNET system, added Saar (interview 2010), was always 
improving itself and never went through bad times.  
 
5.17.3 Background on The BALTDEFCOL 
 
Sweden served as the lead nation for the BALTDEFCOL, which held its first 
senior staff course on 16 August 1999.  It is valuable to reiterate the point from 
Section 2.10.9 of the Literature Review provided by Foot (2001) who judged the 
Baltic Defence College as “a remarkable experiment in combined military 
education” and asserted that “there is a prima facie case for considering the 
BALTDEFCOL as a model that could be applied elsewhere within the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership community of nations” (p. 119).   
    
The BALTDEFCOL, like BALTRON and BALTNET, continues to operate after 
the accession of the Baltic countries into NATO, providing educational 
opportunities and training for Baltic military personnel and students from other 
military forces, as well as conducting academic research.  With regard to 
achieving the desired military Outcomes, the BALTDEFCOL contributed to 
achievement of an important military goal by training a new generation of Baltic 
military leaders, essential for developing modern military forces.   
 
It also contributed to achieving the political Outcome, specifically NATO 
membership for the Baltic nations, by training the new military personnel 
needed to show the West they had the requisite leadership to work within 
NATO.  An Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that the BALTDEFCOL 
was one of the most successful Baltic projects, and Molis (interview 2009) 
commented that the BALTDEFCOL provided quality inputs into Baltic military 
requirements.  In short, it would appear that the BALTDEFCOL successfully 
achieved the desired military Outcomes and contributed to achieving the 
desired political Outcomes.   
  
5.17.4 Mechanism 1 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On “Assessment of Regional Security Concerns” and its application in the 
development of the subsequent Baltic initiatives, it is worthwhile to reiterate 
some of the comments from Section 2.12.1 of the Literature Review regarding 
the relationship between Russia and the Baltic governments.  Dalsjo (1998) 
asserted that “Given the history and geography of the Baltic three, it is 
understandable that the possibility of a major and deliberate Russian attack on 
them cannot be discounted” (p. 41).  Kramer (2002) noted that “the Russian 
government took numerous steps during the decade after 1991 that caused a 
good deal of unease and acrimony in relations with the Baltic states” (p. 734).   
 
With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) emphasized that Russian 
reactions were always on the minds of people, but added that they were not a 
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major concern.  Russia was always invited to attend various events, he noted, 
as the work was done openly and defence attaches were briefed on 
developments.  However, citing a specific example of the impact of the focus on 
Russian reactions, Schvede (interview 2010) stated that perhaps more could 
have been done on sea surveillance.  He conceded, though, that this might 
have been too sensitive an area for the Russians.   
 
With regard to BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) asserted that Russia cast a 
shadow over all the Baltic military projects.  He added that while there was no 
official Russian complaint about BALTNET, there were lots of Russian articles 
complaining about the programme.  The press items focused on surveillance 
efforts by the Baltic capitals to gather data and intelligence on Russia, which 
was particularly unacceptable as the Baltic governments were using US radars.  
Drawing a comparison, Saar (interview 2010) asserted there was no similar bad 
press regarding BALTBAT and BALTRON.   
 
With regard to the presence of this Mechanism in the Baltic official documents 
from Section 4.7, and with particular reference to air defence, the Ministries of 
Defence of the Baltic States, in their 2 June 1992 Communique, indicated they 
would prepare a joint conceptual draft “in the field of Military technology” and 
that “this draft would contain the aspects of technical maintenance, airspace 
and border protection and air defence."  In addition, Article 1, point 9 of the 27 
February 1995 Agreement Between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic 
States cited "Creation of air-space control system."  What was notable was the 
absence of any reference in either document to the need to address a threat 
from any particular country (such as Russia) and efforts in the 1992 
Communique to minimize attention to the work by putting it under the heading of 
“military technology.” 
 
5.17.5 Mechanism 2 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On a “Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance” and its application in the 
subsequent Baltic initiatives, it is valuable to reiterate the comment in Section 
2.11.12 of the Literature Review from Asmus and Nurick (1996) which 
emphasized the importance for the Baltic states of participating in larger 
Western security efforts, such as peacekeeping, to establish that they were not 
just "consumers" of security, and, indeed, recommending expansion of 
BALTBAT and the other Baltic assistance programmes (p. 131).  Moreover, in 
Section 2.11.10, Sapronas (1999, pp. 59-60) asserted that BALTBAT was 
critical to providing Baltic defence forces with a chance to become familiar with 
Western military forces, and galvanized Baltic defence cooperation, adding that 
BALTBAT allowed Western capitals to provide aid to a joint programme, rather 
than three national projects, while not generating Russian ire.   
 
With regard to the development of BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) 
emphasized that what was important for the Baltic capitals was the goal of 
getting Western support and practical results.  In that regard, the BALTRON 
focus on anti-mine warfare was cheaper, and resources were a key 
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consideration.  Moreover, as anti-mine warfare is defensive, he stated, it was 
easier for Sweden and Finland to support politically.  Such a consideration 
therefore also was important in ensuring that BALRTON received financial 
support. 
 
The documents regarding BALTRON explicitly set forth a mission which arose 
from the application of this particular Mechanism.  It was notable that there was 
reference to the potential use of BALTRON with regard to peace support 
operations, a critical focus of the Nordic states and an area in which Russia 
could not credibly raise objections to Baltic efforts.  The 16 April 1998 
agreement between the Baltic states on the establishment of BALTRON 
included the notation in Article 1, paragraph 2 that: 
 
BALTRON shall provide the Baltic states with a permanent short notice 
capability to undertake naval operations in peacetime and crisis.  The 
functions of the BALTRON shall be mine-countermeasure operations and 
the enhancement of the security of the Baltic States territorial waters and 
economic zones.  BALTRON may be directed to participate in 
international peace support operations and operations contributing to 
regional stability, mandated by international organisations and conducted 
in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 
 
This focus for BALTRON was reiterated in the April 1999 Political Guidance of 
the Ministerial Committee on the Development of BALTRON.  There were six 
purposes noted under Section 1.2, three of which addressed Mechanism 2 and 
three of which drew attention to concerns under Mechanism 5 (“Connection to 
Larger Goals”).  The three purposes relevant to Mechanism 2 were: 1) to 
counter mine threats, enhance security of peaceful seagoing and contribute to 
the reduction of environmental damage in the territorial waters and economic 
zones of the Baltic States; 2) to develop a multinational naval force with the 
capability to participate in international peace support operations; and 3) to 
optimise the use of resources. 
 
With regard to BALTNET and the appearance of Mechanism 2, it is worthwhile 
highlighting the fact that 1) Kaliningrad is part of Russia, 2) the three Baltic 
nations are located between Kaliningrad and the main part of Russia, and that 
3) Russia has an air corridor to Kaliningrad.  In short, the location of 
Kaliningrad, as shown by the map at page xiii, indicated why air defence was an 
optimal, indeed necessary, area on which to focus military assistance to the 
Baltic governments.  Stressing the importance of this consideration to the Baltic 
governments, Saar (interview 2010) commented that Russian planes flew close 
to the Estonian border soon after the Baltic countries joined NATO, and 
continue to do so.   
 
5.17.6 Mechanism 3 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On “A Constant Source of Support” and its application in the subsequent Baltic 
programmes, it is worthwhile to reiterate the point in Section 2.10.1 of the 
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Literature Review from Glantz (1999, p. 3) which stresses that “to succeed, the 
military assistance program requires real national commitment to it, particularly 
in terms of the focus, attention, and human and financial resources 
commensurate with its ultimate importance.”   
 
With regard to the development of BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) stated 
that German leadership also led to work by a larger number of assisting 
countries, such as the US and France.  In addition, Baltic naval personnel had 
the opportunity to use naval facilities in Germany as well as the NATO mine 
warfare centre.  In short, asserted Schvede (interview 2010), Germany did a 
good job providing solid support in developing BALTRON.   
 
With regard to BALTNET and consideration of this Mechanism, Saar (interview 
2010) asserted that Norway, Denmark and the US made a real effort to make 
the project a success.  Whether it was in the US International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) programme or in other vehicles, assistance from the 
supporting nations was substantial and the Baltic capitals felt they could rely on 
those commitments.  Saar (interview 2010) noted that this support continues to 
this day, with extensive training in Norway and cooperation with Denmark.  
 
On the extent to which work on the BALTDEFCOL indicated application of this 
Mechanism, Sibul (interview 2011) noted that Western support was important 
for the BALTDEFCOL, as political will was needed to make the projects work, 
adding that a lack of such will is the reason projects fail.  In addition, Lawrence 
(interview 2011) agreed that there was strong Western guidance on the 
BALTDEFCOL.   
 
Turning to BALTDEFCOL documents which indicated the presence of this 
Mechanism, paragraph 2.1 of Annex B of the BALTDEFCOL MOU noted that 
the Chairman of the BALTDEFCOL Board will be provided by the Ministry of 
Defence of Sweden.   
 
5.17.7 Mechanism 4 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On "Long-Term Political Commitments" and its application in the development 
of the subsequent Baltic programmes, it is worthwhile to reiterate some of the 
commentary from the Literature Review.  In Section 2.8.2, Cottey and Forster 
(2004) wrote that the relationship between donor and recipient states “should be 
viewed as a long-term - decades-long - process, rather than an approach likely 
to produce quick results” (p. 28).  In Section 2.8.4, Gates (2010) in his on-line 
article commented that “security assistance efforts must be conducted steadily 
and over the long term so as to provide some measure of predictability and 
planning for the U.S. government and, what is more significant, for its partners 
abroad,” 
 
With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) commented that there was 
a clear, long-term commitment to the project by many supporting states, and not 
just Germany.  With regard to implementation of this Mechanism in BALTNET, 
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Saar (interview 2010) asserted that it was important that the donor states made 
a long-term commitment to the programme.   
 
Turning to BALTNET documents indicating the appearance of this Mechanism, 
Section 4 of the April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on 
the Development of BALTNET specifically noted that:  
 
The BALTNET project provides vast possibilities for international defence 
cooperation.  Continuous support by the Supporting States is an 
essential factor for the development and build up of the BALTNET 
system.  The Continuation of close contacts between the armed forces of 
the Participants and their Partners in the fields of air surveillance, control 
and defence is strongly encouraged. 
  
With regard to the BALTDEFCOL and consideration of this Mechanism, 
Lawrence (interview 2011) stated that there is a long-term Western commitment 
to the BALTDEFCOL, with continued support for guest lecturers as merely one 
example.  Turning to BALTDEFCOL documents and the presence of this 
Mechanism, paragraph 1.2 of the MOU establishing the BALTDEFCOL 
indicated that support was "intended to assist in the development of the Baltic 
Defence College towards the said objective over a period of five years." 
 
5.17.8 Mechanism 5a in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On “Connection to Larger Goals” and its application in the subsequent Baltic 
initiatives, the first specific issue to assess is Mechanism 5a, the goal of “NATO 
membership.”  With regard to valuable points from the Literature Review, it is 
worthwhile repeating the comment in Section 2.10.4 from Urbelis and Urbonas 
(2002) that the strategic goal of joining NATO led to “a qualitatively new stage in 
the development of Lithuanian defence policy” (p. 114).  Moreover, in Section 
2.10.4, Trapans (2006) noted that a focus on NATO membership “gave the 
Latvian defence reform process a defined - though not always consistent – set 
of targets to aim for” (p. 67).   
 
With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) asserted that work on the 
initiative was done with an eye to preparing for accession to NATO, and various 
NATO examples and frameworks were utilised.  The Baltic navies, he stated, 
recognized they had to be familiar with what NATO membership would entail.  
Thus, Baltic naval forces had no problem moving to NATO communications, for 
example, due to Danish guidance.  As a result, the Baltic navies achieved wider 
integration among themselves and higher readiness for NATO interoperability.   
 
Turning to BALTRON documents which indicated the presence of this 
Mechanism, the preamble to the 16 April 1998 agreement noted as one of the 
reasons for BALTRON that the Baltic states were "striving to enhance 
interoperability of the naval forces of the Baltic States with NATO."  In addition, 
within the MOU between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic states regarding 
the organisation of BALTRON, Section 2.2 on Preconditions for planning and 
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implementation included the notation "BALTRON will train and act in 
accordance with NATO/PfP naval and staff procedures both in the fleet and 
staff work." 
 
Moreover, in the previously cited April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial 
Committee on the Development of BALTRON and the six noted purposes for 
BALTRON under Section 1.2, one purpose addressed the goal of NATO 
membership, specifically citing the need “to promote the Baltic States 
integration process into NATO by developing NATO interoperability and 
compatibility.”  In addition, Section 2.4 on COMBALTRON and BALTRON Staff 
indicated that "BALTRON staff will be a multinational naval staff providing the 
Baltic States with the possibility to have a NATO interoperable staff." 
 
On the larger goal of "NATO Membership" and its consideration in the initiation 
and formation of BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) provided extensive 
commentary.  He noted that while the US and Lockheed Martin had the RAI, the 
Norwegian project leader used NATO guidelines to show the Baltic capitals the 
optimal way forward.  As was proven when the Baltic countries joined NATO, 
commented Saar (interview 2010), this cooperation was the best way of 
transitioning from a formerly Soviet-occupied state to a NATO member nation.   
All of this made it easier for the Baltic capitals to make their case for NATO 
membership, and also made the subsequent integration with the Alliance’s air 
defence structures much easier.   
 
The best proof of this success, stressed Saar (interview 2010), was that once 
the Baltic nations joined NATO, it took only hours to connect BALTNET to the 
NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS), as the BALTNET system 
was almost equal to NATO requirements.  As the Norwegian project officer 
reported to NATO, Brussels made extra efforts to assist on BALTNET. This 
proved to be crucial in making accession to NATO as easy as possible.  
Additional proof of the success of BALTNET, once again, was the fact that it 
has been maintained even after the Baltic governments joined NATO.   
 
International arrangements were made to allow NATO air policing aircraft to be 
seamlessly transferred from one country’s airspace to another, stated Saar 
(interview 2010).  He noted that the critical decision was cooperation among the 
Baltic capitals in airspace related matters.  This helped in organizing ideas, 
concepts, requirements and training, and generated easier integration into 
NATO.  For the Air Force, this specifically involved integrating BALTNET into 
NATINADS.  
 
With regard to BALTNET documents and the presence of Mechanism 5 and 
specifically 5a, "NATO Membership," the Agreement between the Baltic states 
on the Establishment of BALTNET included in its preamble a notation 
"committing to establish their national airspace surveillance systems compatible 
with the NATO system ..."   
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In addition, Section 1.2 of the April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial 
Committee on the Development of BALTNET noted the purposes of 
establishing BALTNET, which included “to promote the Baltic States integration 
into NATO by developing NATO interoperability and compatibility.”  Moreover, 
Section 2 of the 1999 Political Guidance specifically indicated that "NATO 
standards and procedures will be applied in the BALTNET system to the extent 
possible with the aim of achieving interoperability and compatibility with, and 
integration into, NATO air surveillance and defence systems." 
 
Finally, with regard to official documents on the BALTDEFCOL and 
consideration of Mechanism 5 and specifically 5a "NATO Membership," Article 
1, paragraph 5d of the BALTDEFCOL MOU noted that activities would "to the 
extent possible integrate NATO principles and procedures in order to prepare 
the Parties for NATO membership."   
 
5.17.9 Mechanism 5b in Other Baltic Projects 
 
With regard to the second specific issue under this Mechanism, the goal of 
"Development of National Defence Capabilities" and its application in the 
development of the subsequent Baltic programmes, it is worthwhile to reiterate 
the point made by Reveron (2010) in Section 2.8.3 of the Literature Review that 
“security assistance programmes attempt to strengthen the partner to provide 
for its own security” (p. xi).   
 
With regard to the development of BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) 
provided a useful insight into the question of BALTBAT resourcing and 
development of national defence with a BALTRON perspective that was 
different from that put forward by other interviewees.  He commented that the 
stated goal was that people should transfer in and out of BALTBAT, but that did 
not prove to be as widespread in practice as hoped.  As a result, only a small 
group from the Estonian Army benefitted from BALTBAT.  Addressing the issue 
from another perspective, he noted that BALTBAT was viewed as a high level, 
stand-alone initiative with limited direct links to the rest of the Baltic armies, 
rather than as a project for the Baltic armies.  In comparison, stressed Schvede 
(interview 2010), BALTRON was viewed as a Navy programme, as a large 
majority of the Navy's activities were related to BALTRON.   
 
On the appearance of this particular Mechanism in the BALTRON documents, 
the MOU between the Ministries of Defence of the Baltic states regarding the 
organisation of BALTRON, Section 4, paragraph 1 addressed the issue of 
rotation of forces, noting that "national units will normally be assigned to 
BALTRON for a period of at least six months." 
 
Moreover, in the previously cited April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial 
Committee on the Development of BALTRON and the six noted purposes for 
BALTRON under Section 1.2, two of the purposes addressed the development 
of national defence.  They were: 1) to enhance the development of the national 
naval forces of the Baltic States and raise their operational self-defence 
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capabilities and 2) to enhance the presence of the naval forces of the Baltic 
States into the Baltic sea. 
 
With regard to "Development of National Defence Capabilities" and its 
implementation in the development of BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) 
highlighted the fact that the Baltic capitals had scarce resources to acquire air 
defence capabilities.  However, in organizing their systems, the Baltic countries 
spent their money optimally.  The policy decision to cooperate also helped to 
organize and optimise procurement, as indicated by the fact that Estonia and 
Latvia acquired similar radars.  It was still national defence acquisition, but 
BALTNET provided the coordination mechanism.   
 
As a result, commented Saar (interview 2010), BALTNET avoided the internal 
debates that occurred with BALTBAT.  In his view, the two programmes were 
different.  The goal for BALTBAT was keeping units combat ready.  BALTNET, 
stressed Saar (interview 2010), was focused on constantly handling a national 
military task.  There was integration of national data into BALTNET, so it was 
the sum of three national air defence networks, which is the way NATO 
addresses air defence.  Saar (interview 2010) added that the area of the three 
Baltic countries is too small for separate national approaches in airspace 
matters.  As a result, the centres in Estonia and Latvia are now arranged so 
they can take over for each other if the need arises, so redundancy is built into 
the system.   
 
With regard to BALTNET documents which indicated the presence of this 
Mechanism, Section 1.2 of the April 1999 Political Guidance of the Ministerial 
Committee on the Development of BALTNET noted the purposes for 
establishing BALTNET, which included the following three points:  1) to 
enhance the development of the national air surveillance capabilities of the 
Baltic States in their respective airspace, 2) to create a regional airspace 
surveillance network based on the principles of international cooperation and 3) 
to optimise the use of resources. 
 
5.17.10 Mechanism 6 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On "Developing New Leaders" and the extent to which this was a consideration 
in the subsequent Baltic projects, it is worthwhile to reiterate the comment in 
Section 2.8.4 of the Literature Review from Gates (2010), who stressed that 
“there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity 
(such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including leadership skills 
and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term.”  Moreover, in 
Section 2.9.2, Szayna and Larrabee (1995) agreed that “personnel training is 
perhaps the most important area in which the United States can make a long-
term impact” (p. xi).   
 
With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) reiterated that BALTRON 
personnel and units were continuously rotated, and as a result, a wide majority 
of naval personnel received training and experience.  With regard to the 
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presence of this Mechanism in BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) commented 
that work in BALTNET also involved training and education of personnel as well 
as infrastructure projects.  
 
As would be anticipated, there was extensive commentary on the application of 
this Mechanism with regard to the BALTDEFCOL, where development of new 
leaders was the foundation of the work, along with academic and educational 
outputs.  Having served as the first Commandant and “effectively built the 
college,” Clemmesen (interview 2010) emphasized that the goal at the 
inauguration of the BALTDEFCOL was development of a new generation of 
Baltic officers and leaders.  He noted that the focus at the BALTDEFCOL was 
not doctrine, as "doctrine becomes dogma."  In providing his assessment of the 
success of his efforts and the Outcomes that were achieved, Clemmesen 
(interview 2010) candidly stated that he spent millions of Danish kroner that 
could "just as well have been burned." The funds were not being used 
efficiently, he asserted, since the mind-set of the Baltic officials involved was 
simply inappropriate.  
 
The essential task, Clemmesen (interview 2010) stressed, was to encourage 
the development of common leadership ideas in the minds of the Baltic officers 
and have them think independently and take risks.  He stated that he hoped to 
be successful in generating that mentality in a minimum of one-third of the 
students that went through the BALTDEFCOL.  Clemmesen (interview 2010) 
cited the challenges he faced, noting that the Estonian army leadership initially 
resisted sending its best officers to the BALTDEFCOL, making it hard to 
achieve the desired goals.  It was also hampered by the Soviet legacy, with 
students stating that independent and thus potentially "revolutionary" thinking 
was basically unwelcome. 
 
Turning to BALTDEFCOL documents which indicated the appearance of this 
Mechanism, the 12 June 1998 agreement between the Baltic states concerning 
the BALTDEFCOL noted in the preamble that "a joint educational institution for 
senior staff officers training will increase and strengthen the co-operation and 
understanding between the armed forces of the Parties."  Moreover, paragraph 
1.1(c) of the MOU establishing the BALTDEFCOL cited the need to "support the 
high priority that must be given to the development of active and independently 
thinking staff officers." 
 
5.17.11 Mechanism 7 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On "Direction and Control by Donor States" and its presence in the subsequent 
Baltic initiatives, it is valuable to reiterate the comment in Section 2.10.2 of the 
Literature Review from Mott (1999) that “a critical feature of the donor-recipient 
relationship involves the ‘commitment’ of the donor to the relationship” (p. 19) 
and that there is a need for “focused management, priority for resource 
allocation, and full donor attention within an integrated holistic policy …” (p. 
269). 
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With regard to the development of BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) 
praised Germany as the lead nation for pushing the pace of work on BALTRON 
at the right tempo.  He noted that there were initial tensions among the Baltic 
capitals, as Lithuania wanted to have the lead on BALTRON.  However, the 
preference was to have Germany lead on a naval project, as the Baltic navies 
received a substantial amount of equipment from Germany, including old naval 
equipment belonging to the former East Germany.  Moreover, there were 
German advisors in Estonia, Lithuania and later in Latvia.  
 
Continuing on the topic, with a focus on the specific question of the difficulties of 
generating a common Baltic position, Schvede (interview 2010) stressed that a 
critical issue was getting all Baltic capitals to agree on important decisions.  The 
first three Baltic Navy chiefs understood the need to coordinate despite differing 
national interests.  Comparing that to the current situation, he noted that all the 
Baltic navies now have bought different vessels, so there is no commonality, as 
there was under BALTRON.  Schvede (interview 2010) stated that a challenge 
for BALTRON in the 1990s was getting all three Baltic countries to agree, and 
that is still the case.  With regard to acquisition of naval materiel, such as diving 
equipment and communications, the three Baltic governments currently are 
drifting apart and there is a loss of commonality. 
 
With regard to this Mechanism and its application in the development of 
BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) cited examples of the disunity among the 
Baltic governments, noting the decisions on where certain facilities would be 
located.  Each of the Baltic countries had national facilities at that time.  Since 
each of the three wanted to host cooperative military projects, political decisions 
had to be made.  Estonia became the host nation for the BALTDEFCOL, Latvia 
got BALTBAT and Lithuania got BALTNET.   
 
The comments from Saar (interview 2010) on the topic of equipment acquisition 
regarding air defence provided another perspective on the lack of Baltic 
cooperation and the challenges facing the donor states.  His general point was 
that from initial discussions in 1992, there was recognition that common Baltic 
procurement would address many issues that arise with major projects.  On air 
defence, Estonia began the procurement of radars and invited Latvia and 
Lithuania to attend as observers. When Estonia selected a system from 
Lockheed Martin, it informed the other Baltic capitals, and provided details on 
price and number of radars purchased.   
 
Estonia also ensured, added Saar (interview 2010), that there was language in 
the contract that the "procurement could involve other Baltic states," with more 
purchases by other governments translating into lower overall costs.  Six 
months later, Latvia joined the Lockheed Martin purchase.  Estonia and Latvia 
then initiated work on logistical support and training, with all training taking 
place in Estonia.  In short, Latvia and Estonia found a way to cooperate, but 
Lithuania had no interest.  Perhaps more important, commented Saar (interview 
2010), the procurement of common systems and materiel, such as radars, is 
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still done nationally.  The systems can be integrated later, but it would be easier 
to operate and maintain common items.     
 
Turning to the presence of this Mechanism in development of the 
BALTDEFCOL, Clemmesen (interview 2010) noted the disunity among the 
Baltic governments.  He stated that he wanted the BALTDEFCOL established in 
Estonia, but had to go through a complex procedure to get it there, due to 
rivalries among the Baltic capitals. He achieved what he wanted by stressing 
that the college needed to be placed in a university city that was not a capital. 
The only options were Tartu, Estonia and Kaunas, Lithuania.  Clemmesen 
(interview 2010) stated that as Lithuania was the host for BALTNET, he 
suggested to Lithuania's Defence Ministry that they "owed the Estonians one."  
As a result, beginning in 1997, Clemmesen (interview 2010) began preparations 
with the Estonians to set up the BALTDEFCOL in Tartu.  All of which indicated 
the extent to which the donor states needed to provide sufficient direction and 
control to overcome a natural disunity among the Baltic governments. 
 
5.17.12 Mechanism 8 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On "Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States" in the subsequent Baltic 
initiatives, it is worthwhile to reiterate the point noted in Section 2.9.4 of the 
Literature Review from Fischer (2003) concerning the significance of having the 
Baltic countries develop sufficient capabilities to gradually take over the 
BALTBAT project (p. 13). 
 
With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) believed Germany as lead 
nation pushed the Baltic navies to take over responsibilities as soon as 
possible.  He added that, on reflection, the Baltic capitals might possibly have 
done more and done it sooner.  However, language was a problem for the Baltic 
navies at the beginning of the project.  It was important, he emphasized, that 
Germany never pushed for a key command role, and that the Baltic navies were 
left in charge.  In short, Schvede (interview 2010) asserted that the pace of 
"Baltification" was good, and in retrospect, perhaps could have even been 
accelerated. 
 
With regard to appearance of the Mechanism in developing the BALTDEFCOL, 
there was substantial, albeit mixed, commentary from interviewees.  An 
Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that the present trend is to bring in 
indigenous instructors under the heading of "Baltification."  However, he 
believed the pace of BALTDEFCOL "Baltification" had been too fast.  The goal, 
he asserted, is to get Western ideas to new Baltic military personnel.  In his 
view, that had not been enhanced by moving too quickly to get Baltic personnel 
into teaching positions at the college.   
 
Sibul (interview 2011) began by asserting that "Baltification" on BALTNET and 
BALTRON is working fine.  At the BALTDEFCOL, he continued, the idea is to 
ultimately turn it over to the Baltic countries, which should have been done by 
2008, but turned out to not be possible.  The problem, stated Sibul (interview 
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2011), lies with the perceptions of the defence forces.  Moreover, the start of the 
BALTDEFCOL was “rough.”  Senior officers went through the courses and had 
gotten a bad impression.  The BALTDEFCOL now has people that have been 
through the personnel systems of the Baltic military forces. Some are less 
qualified and they are admittedly “a mixed bag.”  However, asserted Sibul 
(interview 2011), the quality is better than before. 
 
Lawrence (interview 2011) concurred that "Baltification" was done prematurely 
in the BALTDEFCOL.  The three Baltic Chiefs of Defence still do not send their 
best people.  Moreover, the “Baltification” process was not done in a 
transparent and coordinated way.  Indeed, "Baltification," asserted Lawrence 
(interview 2011), has to be “made up as you go along.”  There was no need for 
a timetable, but there is a need for good governance and an ability to track 
progress.  In general, in his view, it would be a shame to lose the Western staff 
at the BALTDEFCOL.  The other Baltic programmes, he commented, can be 
handed over to the Baltic governments, but not the BALTDEFCOL. 
 
With regard to the presence of this Mechanism in the documents concerning the 
BALTDEFCOL, paragraph 1.2 of the BALTDEFCOL MOU noted that: 
 
...steps will be taken towards achieving a phased taking over of 
responsibility for the management, funding and staffing of the college by 
the Baltic Participants.  Both Supporting and Baltic Participants recognise 
that progress towards this taking over of responsibility will depend upon a 
number of factors, including the availability of suitable Baltic staff, and 
that this is unlikely to be completed within the lifetime of this MOU. 
 
5.17.13 Mechanism 9 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On "Flexibility in Planning" and its application in other Baltic initiatives, it is 
worthwhile to reiterate the point in Section 2.11.10 of the Literature Review from 
Kazocins (1999, p. 51) that the political leadership of BALTBAT was not fixated 
on original goals, but showed flexibility in addressing new challenges.   
 
With regard to the development of the BALTDEFCOL, it was notable that the 
BALTDEFCOL MOU contained the following Annexes which have a length 
which indicated a clear definition of the goal, but did not provide a substantial 
amount of detail.  In short, flexibility was provided so that those details were left 
to be addressed by those implementing the project: 
 
Annex A: Project Plan (two pages) 
Annex B: Terms of Reference of the Baltic Defence College Board (three 
pages) 
Annex C: Financial, Accounting and Auditing Procedures (four pages) 
Annex D: Responsibilities of the Baltic Participants, including Host Nation 
Support (12 pages) 
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5.17.14 Mechanism 10 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On “Good Organizational Structures” and its application in the subsequent 
Baltic programmes, it is valuable to reiterate the comment in Section 2.10.3 of 
the Literature Review from Brett (2001) that there was effective coordination in 
channelling military assistance under BALTBAT (p. 59) and the BALTBAT 
experience “provided a useful model for other initiatives” (p. 56).   
 
With regard to the development of BALTRON, it was beneficial, noted Schvede 
(interview 2010), to be able to discuss assistance issues at a high level.  Such 
meetings provided the opportunity for informal discussions to reach agreement 
among Baltic capitals.  The result of these coordination mechanisms benefitted 
BALTRON participants as, for example, when Norway tailored its aid to meet 
NATO requirements.  
 
Schvede (interview 2010) noted that a Naval Working Group (NWG) was 
established, and there were meetings of the NWG, Chiefs of Navy, Chiefs of 
Defence and even at the Defence Minister level.  In short, there was good 
coordination at various levels which was critical.  Schvede (interview 2010) 
commented that Germany used the NWG to provide leadership and naval 
expertise for the Baltic navies.  It also served to obtain needed expertise in 
other important areas, such as logistics, while good support from Denmark was 
obtained on legal issues.  Moreover, advisors from the Netherlands and other 
naval forces also provided valuable advice to the Baltic navies.  Baltic personnel 
had the opportunity to use naval facilities in Germany as well as the NATO mine 
warfare centre.  
 
There was agreement on roles and responsibilities, noted Schvede (interview 
2010), which avoided duplication of effort and confusion.  There was a focus on 
developing specific areas of expertise which was divided among the Baltic 
nations.  The supporting projects included a diving school and mine counter-
measures (MCM) simulator in Latvia, a communications school in Estonia and 
gunnery training in Lithuania.  All of this was connected to overall development 
of BALTRON.  Schvede (interview 2010) stressed that scarce resources had to 
be used efficiently, and aid from 8-10 nations was coordinated to avoid 
duplication.  Provision of ships and materiel, as well as training, were well 
managed, and advisors assisted on organizational and operational issues.   
 
Schvede (interview 2010) asserted that the progress made by the Baltic navies 
was so good that the point was reached that the NWG could be dissolved.  It is 
possible, he added, that the command arrangements could have been set up 
differently and more could have been done to support interoperability.  He also 
stated that the BALTSEA mechanism worked well in supplementing established 
diplomatic arrangements with regard to provision of assistance.  Although 
parallel bodies, they worked effectively, especially if the Baltic governments 
could not reach agreement.   
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Turning to the presence of this Mechanism in the documents regarding 
BALTRON, it is worth noting that with regard to organisations to "direct, 
supervise and audit the activities of BALTRON," Section 5 of the BALTRON 
MOU indicated that there would be a:  
 
- Ministerial Committee consisting of Ministers of Defence or 
representatives, and a 
- Military Committee consisting of Chiefs of Defence or their 
representatives. 
 
In addition, the 12 June 1998 MOU between the supporting states and the 
Baltic states concerning cooperation on development of BALTRON included the 
following points under Section 4 (Organisation): 
 
- There would be, under (1) of Section 4 "a multinational Steering Group 
under German chairmanship.  The Steering Group is responsible for 
overall control and direction of the BALTRON Assistance Programme." 
 
- There is also, under (2) of Section 4, "a multinational Naval Working 
Group under German chairmanship for developing the detailed aspects 
of the BALTRON Assistance Programme, for reviewing the Terms of the 
Project Plan at regular intervals and for overseeing its implementation." 
 
- It is also notable that under (5.1), the Supporting states pledge to 
"endeavour to provide assistance to the Baltic States in such a way as to 
maximise, where appropriate, the opportunities for interoperability."  They 
would also "assist with the organisation and training of BALTRON as well 
as with the planning of arrangements for its logistic support." 
 
With regard to the consideration of this Mechanism in development of 
BALTNET, Saar (interview 2010) provided an overarching perspective and 
stressed his view that the success of BALTNET came down to practical military 
considerations.  There was a common approach, common concept of operation, 
similar equipment and coordinated training and education.  He added the 
comment that, in retrospect, it might have been possible to have organized it 
more effectively, although he did not provide specific suggestions. 
 
5.17.15 Mechanism 11 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
On “A Strong Lead Nation” and its significance in the subsequent Baltic 
initiatives, it is worthwhile to reiterate the assertion in Section 2.8.1 of the 
Literature Review from Mott (1999) that “For military assistance to be effective, 
a donor must fathom the recipient’s polity, economy, and culture and cause the 
recipient to adopt desired policies, military strategies, or other behaviors” (p. 
17).   
 
With regard to BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) asserted that German 
leadership on BALTRON was critical to the success of the project, particularly in 
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establishing a framework for cooperation.  In particular, Germany used the 
Military Working Group to provide good direction and a substantial amount of 
naval expertise for Baltic naval forces.   
 
With regard to application of this Mechanism in BALTNET, Saar (interview 
2010) stressed the fact that each Baltic assistance project had a partner as a 
mentoring nation.  He commented that it initially proved to be more difficult to 
find a mentor for BALTNET, but Norway eventually became the lead nation for 
the programme and got the credit for making BALTNET a success through its 
solid support.    
 
5.17.16 Mechanism 12 in Other Baltic Projects 
 
Finally, on “Leadership From Key Individuals” and its application in other Baltic 
initiatives, it is valuable to reiterate the comment in Section 2.10.9 of the 
Literature Review from Glantz (1998b) that “it is the personnel who man the 
assistance system who make it work as well as it does” (p. 51).   
 
With regard to the development of BALTRON, Schvede (interview 2010) 
stressed that personalities were important to what was achieved in BALTRON.  
In general, the UK and Norway were always solidly supportive and on specific 
areas such as communications (with a Danish lead) and diving (with a 
Norwegian lead), work progressed well and results were achieved.  However, 
Schvede (interview 2010) emphasized that in the case of some countries, 
national positions depended on who represented a supporting state at a 
meeting.       
 
Turning to the application of this Mechanism to BALTNET, Saar (interview 
2010) stressed the point that an energetic Norwegian Brigadier General was 
designated the project leader for BALTNET, and "he made things happen."  
From concept to details, the Norwegian drove the process and generated good 
coordination and results on BALTNET.  Having made the point noted above 
under Mechanism 11 that Norway as lead nation made BALTNET a success, 
Saar (interview 2010) stressed that this was the result of the determination of a 
single individual. 
 
Finally, with regard to the appearance of this Mechanism in the development of 
the BALTDEFCOL, Lawrence (interview 2011) stated that Clemmesen, as the 
first Commandant, had provided “a strong hand.”  Such commentary supported 
the comment in Section 2.10.9 of the Literature Review from Foot (2001), who 
praised the “committed, energetic and effective leadership of the founding 
Commandant - Danish Brigadier General Michael Clemmesen” (p. 120). 
 
5.18 Invalidation? - BALTBAT did not deploy as a whole 
 
One question was whether the validity of the Mechanisms was in doubt due to 
the fact that BALTBAT as a whole did not deploy on a peacekeeping operation.  
If this was indeed a mark of failure, it weakens the case that Outcomes were 
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achieved as well as the case for the Mechanisms as elements of a model for 
effective military assistance initiatives.   Thus, it was important to assess the 
views of the interviewees on whether this absence of a deployment as a whole 
invalidated the claim of success for BALTBAT.  As noted in Section 2.11.12 of 
the Literature Review, there had been a robust rebuttal to the allegation that the 
absence of such a deployment indicated BALTBAT was not a success.  This 
was buttressed by the data from the 15 interviewees who addressed that issue: 
Abols, Andrusyszyn, Brett, Carlsen, Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Kolga, 
Laneman, Linkevicius, Molis, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official, 
and a retired US military officer. 
 
Providing some background, Haekkerup (interview 2008) noted that he thought 
BALTBAT as a whole could deploy, but his Nordic colleagues disagreed.  The 
result was a decision to proceed with what was politically feasible, with 
BALTBAT component companies participating in missions alongside forces of 
donor states.  Godal (interview 2011) asserted that the fact that BALTBAT did 
not deploy as a whole for an operation was not an indication of a failure, as the 
Nordic states were pragmatic on this issue.  The Baltic companies were able to 
deploy, and that was acceptable.   
 
Linkevicius (interview 2010) concurred that this was not a blot on the record, as 
the objective of BALTBAT was training and development of personnel, which 
was achieved.  The Baltic governments needed more logistical support and 
other capabilities in order to have BALTBAT as a whole deploy.  Moreover, 
there was no good opportunity for BALTBAT as a whole to handle a PKO, 
especially for just a six-month deployment.  However, emphasized Linkevicius 
(interview 2010), this was not a failure, as it was not the task to deploy 
BALTBAT as a whole.  
 
All three Baltic companies, noted a Latvian official (interview 2010), deployed to 
handle PKOs. It was not a “real goal” for BALTBAT to deploy as a whole, so the 
fact that it did not do so was not a major blow to the record of the project.  He 
added that it would have been financially difficult to deploy all of BALTBAT at 
one time, and that would have been challenging for the supporting states.  
Kolga (interview 2009) conceded that there was some disappointment in Baltic 
and donor countries that BALTBAT as a whole could not deploy.  However, the 
donor nations did not believe BALTBAT was ready to undertake such a mission, 
and while the Baltic capitals did want deployment as a whole, they agreed that 
BALTBAT was not ready to do so.  Kolga (interview 2009) added the point that, 
in view of the fact that Baltic platoons had been sent out previously, deployment 
of companies was a step up for the Baltic forces.  Abols (interview 2009) agreed 
that the absence of deployment of BALTBAT as a whole did not diminish the 
success of the project. There were logistical challenges that simply could not be 
overcome. 
 
Providing additional commentary, an Estonian official (interview 2010) stressed 
that this “should not be considered a major black mark” against BALTBAT.  He 
noted that BALTBAT was concerned with training, developing military 
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capabilities, and assisting the Baltic military forces to become familiar with 
Western military processes and procedures.  It is important to remember, he 
commented, that the companies from the Baltic capitals did deploy for PKOs 
under the wing of larger nations. There were good reasons why BALTBAT as a 
whole could not deploy, and too much should not be made of that fact.   
 
Andrusyszyn (interview 2010) stated that the fact that BALTBAT did not deploy 
as a whole was not a key issue for the US.  A retired US military officer 
(interview 2010) concurred that this was not a failure.  He asserted that the fact 
that Baltic forces have participated in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
showed what they have learned, adding that they were “making real 
contributions” which exceeded those of more developed military forces.  
 
Brett (interview 2008) added that certain partners, notably the UK, were 
sceptical about BALTBAT deployment because the unit was so small and low 
level multi-nationality at the company level was unusual.  They asked the 
question whether such a force would actually be helpful in PKOs.  Ultimately, 
individual Baltic companies deployed to the Balkans with "host" units provided 
by the Nordic countries. This set a pattern for future deployments, particularly 
by Denmark in IFOR and SFOR.  Molis (interview 2009) noted that deploying 
BALTBAT as a whole was never a formal task or requirement.  The overall goal 
was to receive military experience and material, avoid Russian threats, and 
make a contribution to Western PKO efforts. There was nothing which specified 
the need to deploy BALTBAT as a whole.  Molis (interview 2009) therefore 
argued that the BALTBAT goals were achieved.  
 
5.18.1 Acknowledging A Valid Criticism 
 
However, some of the interviewees acknowledged that the criticism of 
BALTBAT since it failed to deploy as a whole had a measure of validity.  
Carlsen (interview 2010) believed that the deployment decisions indicated the 
extent to which the supporting states were flexible about what could be 
accomplished and focused on getting the Baltic forces missions they could 
handle, and from which they could learn.  However, he conceded that there was 
some validity to the criticism that BALTBAT as a whole did not deploy for a 
PKO. He added that it was also true that as the Baltic component companies 
served in missions alongside Western forces, they achieved genuine military 
capabilities.   
 
Laneman (interview 2010) concurred that not deploying as a whole was indeed 
a failure of BALTBAT, emphasizing it is important to be critical, but not negative, 
about that failure.  Cost was a major factor in that decision.  Moreover, the initial 
plan was to have many force elements ready for BALTBAT and draw from them 
to build BALTBAT when it was ready to deploy. However, noted Laneman 
(interview 2010), substantial amounts of time were lost because personnel were 
constantly being rotated in and out of BALTBAT units for other activities. The 
constant need to train new people was part of the reason why BALTBAT never 
deployed as a whole.   
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Fischer (interview 2010) also agreed that critics of BALTBAT were justified in 
noting that BALTBAT as a whole did not deploy for PKOs. However, he also 
stressed that the component companies served in UN missions in the Balkans 
alongside Western forces, which indicated that they did achieve genuine military 
capabilities, and also learned lessons with regard to peace support operations 
and international operations with NATO forces.  A US official (interview 2011) 
noted that the inability to deploy BALTBAT as a whole did not appear in 
retrospect to have been a significant issue.  However at the time, it was a 
serious political question and there was indeed a perception, especially among 
the Nordic countries, that this was a sign of failure.   
 
To summarize, the general commentary from interviewees and the 
assessments noted in Section 2.11.12 of the Literature Review indicated that 
the fact that BALTBAT as a whole did not deploy for a PKO did not invalidate 
the proposition that BALTBAT was a success and generated the desired 
Outcomes.  BALTBAT achieved its essential military Outcome of improved 
Baltic military capabilities.  It provided training opportunities for Baltic personnel 
and served as a vehicle for Western military assistance to the Baltic capitals.  
Moreover, BALTBAT component companies were able to participate in PKOs.  
In short, BALTBAT generated the planned military Outcomes, irrespective of 
whether it deployed as a whole.   
 
BALTBAT also contributed to the achievement of the political Outcome of NATO 
membership for the Baltic nations by serving as tangible proof that the Baltic 
governments were worthy candidates for membership, once again, irrespective 
of whether it deployed as a whole.  Moreover, the point should be reiterated that 
BALTBAT served as the template for the other Baltic projects (BALTRON, 
BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL) which continued to function and also 
provided the planned military and political Outcomes.  In short, it would appear 
that the fact that BALTBAT did not deploy as a whole did not invalidate the 
assessment that it was a success and produced the desired Outcomes.     
 
5.18.2 Invalidation? - Documents 
 
It was notable that Article 2, paragraph 3 of the BALTBAT MOU, under the 
heading "Purpose," indicated that "It is the intention to focus the assistance 
primarily on providing basic military infantry training and peacekeeping training 
to one national infantry company from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as 
to the Battalion's joint Logistics and Headquarters Company." 
 
Subsequently, the Political Guidance of the Ministerial Committee on the 
development of BALTBAT issued in April 1999 addressed deployment of 
BALTBAT.  Section 2.1 noted the actual capabilities of BALTBAT as follows: 
 
During the exercises in late 1997, the capabilities of the Baltic Battalion 
were assessed.  The Baltic Battalion proved to be able to adequately 
perform peacekeeping tasks in a non-confrontational environment.  The 
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ability to sustain the battalion in terms of manpower and logistics have 
given rise to special attention, and the current status in this area is the 
main reason why the Baltic Battalion recently has been seen capable of 
only a one-time deployment of 6-12 months after which it would return to 
the Baltic States for reconstitution. 
 
A series of critical issues that could jeopardise a successful long-term 
deployment have been identified: recruitment (in particular of officers, 
staff officers and experts), logistic sustainability (especially due to old 
and worn out equipment), legal and budgetary agreements (to regulate 
command and control as well as administrative affairs related to a 
deployment) and resources required to fulfill the mission. 
 
In Section 3, the further development of BALTBAT was outlined, including as 
the second bullet, "A deployment to an international peace support operation 
will remain one of the objectives of the Battalion.  Priority will be given to NATO 
led operations.  This objective should not be pursued at the detriment of other 
expectations attached to the project." 
 
In the BALTBAT Annual Report 2000, provided by the Commanding Officer, 
with regard to the participation of the Baltic contingents (BALTCON) in Balkan 
peacekeeping, Section 1a under Execution of Tasks concerning BALTCON 
mission noted the following: 
 
BALTCON performed well in the NATO lead mission in Bosnia.  The 
contingent has solved all given tasks (patrolling, site inspection and 
monitoring) in a very good manner and personnel were highly motivated.  
All Baltic staff officers and sub-units were fully integrated in the Danish 
battalion and participated in the mission duty within their respective 
areas.  Three national contingents have acted as good representatives 
for BALTBAT, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  Despite the cultural and 
linguistic differences, it has worked well due to the good military skills 
and the mutual respect, commitment and consideration shown by those 
involved.  The main problem was lack of adequate English language 
skills, especially below company level, when it comes to co-operation 
with other units. 
 
The document from the Baltic BALTBAT Military Co-ordination Group indicated 
in Section 5, the development plan of the Baltic Battalion: 
 
Deployments remain a priority but without compromising other project 
goals. In the mid-term perspective, BALTBAT will be able to deploy and 
sustain a company group size to a mission area. At the same period 
there will be also possibility to deploy the whole battalion for one-time 
mission for a maximum period of one year.  Such deployments would 
continue to require outside support.  In the long-term perspective 
BALTBAT will be deployable and sustainable at a variety of levels in 
 164 
international operations exceeding one year. The military readiness for 
BALTBAT units is 30 days. 
 
In Chapter 1, Section 1.4(f) addressing "Operational capability and 
deployments," the authors provided an extensive analysis, noting (italics in the 
original text):  
 
Capacity: The initial phase of establishing BALTBAT as a peacekeeping 
battalion was concluded in December 1997 with the FTX "BALTIC TRIAL 
II" where the capabilities for BALTBAT were evaluated. It was concluded 
that BALTBAT was capable of undertaking deployment to conventional 
peacekeeping missions in a non-confrontational environment - after 
further pre-mission training designed for an actual mission.  
 
The development of operational capabilities since 1994 is shown in 
Annex B. It has proved difficult to establish the infantry companies before 
the Headquarters, specialist platoons and the required logistic capacity is 
in place.  
 
The development of BALTBAT from a peacekeeping structure to that of 
an infantry battalion capable of Peace Support Operations is being 
conducted successively as the various sub-units and elements return 
from deployment to SFOR. The transition should be completed by the 
end of 2000.  
 
Deployability: BALTBAT sub-units have proved capable of deployment to 
Peace Support Operations with assistance from host units in the mission 
area and after appropriate pre-mission training.  Between 1996-1997, all 
three national infantry companies underwent a 6-month long international 
mission practice.  The Estonian Company was deployed to the UNIFIL in 
South-Lebanon as part of the Norwegian Battalion. Latvian and 
Lithuanian companies participated in IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia, with the 
support from Sweden and Denmark, respectively. All companies 
performed well.  
 
During 1998, while investigating deployment alternatives for the battalion, 
the Steering Group and the Military Working Group recommended 
rotational deployment of BALTBAT company-plus size contingents as a 
part of the Danish battalion to SFOR. The contingents deployed to 
Bosnia (BALTCON) have been rotated every six months in order to 
ensure that all BALTBAT personnel receive practical experience in the 
mission area. BALTCON 1, which was deployed to Bosnia in October 
1998, consisted of the Estonian Company, a multinational staff and 
support elements. In April 1999, it was replaced by BALTCON 2, based 
on the Lithuanian Company, the latter being replaced in October 1999 by 
BALTCON 3 based on the Latvian Company. BALTBAT contingents in 
Bosnia are integral parts of the Danish Battalion, operating with a 
separate area of responsibility in the Doboj area.  
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A lessons learned report on the deployment of BALTCON 1 and 2 was 
issued in August 1999. This showed that BALTCON 1 and 2 performed 
well and that the contingents gave a valuable contribution to the mission. 
It was noted that operational effectiveness generally increases in 
accordance with national homogeneity. Within the permissive 
environment of SFOR, it was seen that organic units of company size or 
above with their own national commander were the most effective.  The 
report also highlighted the importance of effective pre-mission planning 
and co-ordination amongst all involved, good starting standards, self-
reliability and adequate English language skills at all levels.    
 
The documents noted above indicated that supporting and Baltic states 
regularly assessed the capabilities of BALTBAT to deploy as a whole for a PKO 
as well as the option of having operational deployments of component 
companies.  While the former could not be achieved, the participating states 
judged that the latter was not only possible, but would provide critical 
operational experience that would be of value to development of Baltic military 
capabilities.   
 
5.19 Area for Possible Future Research - Recipient State Readiness to 
Challenge Donor States 
 
In addition to the 12 Mechanisms noted above, there was an intriguing topic 
cited by multiple interviewees that appeared to warrant consideration for further 
research with regard to military assistance projects.  The topic involved the 
readiness of recipient states to challenge the decisions of donor states, which 
was cited by six interviewees: Abols, Brett, Kolga, Mackenzie, Molis and a 
retired US military officer.  Once again, an issue had to be cited by at least 
seven individuals (at least one-quarter of all interviewees) to be considered a 
possible Mechanism, so this topic did not qualify.   However, particularly as it 
came close to qualifying as a Mechanism, it is worth highlighting. 
 
Data from the interviews indicated that while the Western military assistance 
effort was good, problems were generated due to the lack of clarity regarding 
advice to the Baltic capitals.  Providing general commentary, Mackenzie 
(interview 2010) asserted that each NATO member came in with advice for 
former Warsaw Pact states, and usually tied these recommendations to military 
sales.  Such an effort almost upset the Western assistance effort, he noted.  
The Eastern European countries suffered from corruption and rapid changes of 
Ministers, particularly soon after regaining their freedom.  The Baltic 
governments did not have the finances for such purchases, Mackenzie 
(interview 2010) commented, and were fortunate to be too small and too poor to 
draw such attention, so there was no attempt to sell it military equipment. 
 
Kolga (interview 2009) added that Western donations for BALTBAT did at times 
appear to be channeling a lot of varied material to the Baltic capitals.  Indeed, 
they occasionally refused offers of equipment.  However, he emphasized, the 
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process continued to improve over time and there was increasingly critical 
assessment among donor nations of what materiel would be useful for the Baltic 
governments.  In retrospect, noted Molis (interview 2009), there could have 
been better coordination of materiel, goals and forces in the Baltic projects.  
Echoing Kolga’s comments, he noted that there were various types of supplies 
which were provided which made integration more difficult for Baltic forces.  The 
Baltic capitals should have been more determined about what they needed and 
more forceful in raising objections to some of the directions from donor states. 
However, commented Molis (interview 2009), there were times when it was 
easier for Baltic military forces to work with donor countries than each other.   
 
A retired US military officer (interview 2010) stated that he had warned the 
Baltic governments about taking some old equipment no longer used by 
Western forces, as this could become a "money pit" into which resources would 
be thrown.  However, he added, the West did a good job overall providing 
equipment and targeted support as well as advice.  Abols (interview 2009) 
asserted that the donor states could have done a better job coordinating 
assistance for the Baltic initiatives with other bilateral aid.  Continuing on the 
theme of coordination, and citing a related defence example, he noted that it 
was difficult for the Baltic military forces to develop an integrated military 
doctrine as there were many different possibilities put forward by varied donor 
countries. 
 
In short, the data regarding this issue warranted mention as a finding which 
could be an area worthy of additional research.  The question of the attitude of 
recipient states in challenging the decisions of donor states would appear to be 
a logical consequence of the CIMO analysis used in this research.  Once again, 
the Context question was: What is the nature of the relationship between donor 
states and recipient states?  The Intervention question was: What is the impact 
of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient state on the 
efficacy of the military assistance programme?  It would appear that the case 
could be made that an important Mechanism could involve the willingness of 
recipient states to challenge donor states.   
 
However, the response could be provided that, rather than serving as a 
separate Mechanism, such an attitude held by the recipient states would be an 
aspect of the overall Context and the specific Intervention.   While not qualifying 
as a Mechanism based on the parameters set up for this research, the 
experience of the Baltic projects indicated that, in line with the CIMO framework, 
it may be worthwhile to consider how exactly to address the significance of the 
willingness of recipient states to take a more energetic position in defending its 
interests when dealing with donor states.  Such an assessment could also lead 
to a consideration of the value of ensuring that specific processes are in place, 
or opportunities made available, to prompt recipient states to provide input into 
the type of military assistance which is being provided. 
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5.20 Transferability of the Baltic Experience 
 
A fundamental question regarding this research which has been raised 
previously is as follows: Can the experience of the Baltic projects serve to 
identify the elements of a model for effective military assistance programmes 
that can be applied to initiatives in other countries and regions?  Phrasing the 
question another way: Is the Baltic experience transferable?  It was a topic 
addressed by 17 of the interviewees: Andursyszyn, Brett, Carlsen, Donnelly, 
Fischer, Godal, Haekkerup, Hannibalson, Johnson, Laneman, Linkevicius, 
Mackenzie, Saar, an Estonian official, a Latvian official, a US official and a 
retired US military officer.  On this issue, the views ranged from strongly 
supportive of transferability to quite negative, with the preponderance of the 
commentary having leaned toward the former.  However, it is important to note 
that even when comments supported the view of transferability to other 
countries, it was often laden with caveats.   
 
5.20.1 Transferrable - Yes 
 
Mackenzie (interview 2010) asserted that the Baltic model was well-received in 
NATO, and copied to an extent in Bulgaria.  It addressed a number of 
challenges, and for the Baltic capitals it was "perfect."  The BALTBAT template 
could be transferred to other states, he believed, and was a good first step.  
However, he stressed that it was important for the political aspects to be 
synchronized with military goals, and that this included links to other nations.  It 
also involved acquisition of the right military equipment and consideration of 
logistical support.  It was also important, stressed Mackenzie (interview 2010), 
to use opportunities, which highlighted the importance of “not beginning the 
process by creating the solution.”   
 
Hannibalsson (interview 2011) agreed that the model that evolved for the Baltic 
initiatives could set a good example for countries in other regions.  Haekkerup 
(interview 2008) believed that "BALTBAT is a good model," and tried to get the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) to copy it.  However, the 
effort failed due to the war in the Congo and developments in Zimbabwe.  He 
also pushed to see if the Central Asian countries could copy BALTBAT, but was 
unsuccessful.  Godal (interview 2011) noted that there were unique conditions 
for the Baltic governments, but there were aspects of the Baltic projects that 
could be applicable elsewhere.  He added that when he was Foreign Minister, 
he held the view that South Africa should take the lead role on regional African 
peacekeeping, and tried to inspire other key states to pursue PKO capabilities. 
 
Linkevicius (interview 2010) commented that the BALTBAT model could not be 
used in areas like the Caucasus, but might be possible in other places.  The 
BALTBAT Steering Group at the political level and the Military Working Group at 
the practical level were important bodies that worked on concrete issues.  That 
could be applied, he stated, to other countries, and might be useful to donor and 
recipient countries.  Brett (interview 2008) asserted that, in theory, BALTBAT 
could serve as a useful model for future projects.  Fischer (interview 2010) 
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added that states in Africa and Central Asia had cited BALTBAT as a possible 
template they could utilize to develop national or regional military capabilities.  
He believed the Baltic programmes provided good inspiration for how to utilize 
assistance. 
   
The BALTBAT model, stated Donnelly (interview 2011), could be applied 
elsewhere, and it was noteworthy that BALTBAT sought to draw on NATO 
practice.  Using a comparison with Africa, he commented that intense Baltic 
rivalries were a problem, a point that would apply in Africa. There was also a 
need to move to a humane model of defence forces in the Baltic nations, which 
also is relevant to Africa.  Moreover, it was important to get Baltic military forces 
properly trained on the basics of a modern military force, which also applies to 
Africa. Thus, asserted Donnelly (interview 2011), the BALTBAT model could be 
applicable in Africa, possibly even more than it was applicable in the Baltic 
nations.  
 
Laneman (interview 2010) believed that the BALTBAT model could be 
transferred to other countries.  He made the point that BALTBAT was the basis 
for larger Baltic military cooperation.  It served as the centre of a network where 
MOD and other personnel could work together, coordinate their efforts, and get 
needed experience.  All of this was particularly valuable, noted Laneman.  
Moreover, Baltic cooperation saved money and generated efficiencies in areas 
such as joint logistics, joint acquisition programmes, and joint deployments.   
 
5.20.2 Transferable - With Key Caveats 
 
Some of the commentary from interviewees indicated support for the 
proposition that the experience of the Baltic projects was transferable, but 
added conditions or caveats regarding the preconditions for successful 
transferability of the model.  An Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that 
the model used for the Baltic projects could be used elsewhere, but stressed 
that there must be political unity among recipient and donor states.  Success 
depends on political will.  Moreover, the Baltic governments shared the same 
values.  While African states have expressed interest in the Baltic experience, 
he noted, the question must be asked if African nations are ready to cooperate 
at the level that was apparent in the Baltic projects. 
 
A retired US military officer (interview 2010) added that in Africa, there is no 
outside threat that drives cohesion.  The Baltic capitals perceived a common 
threat from Russia, and none of the Baltic nations was a threat to the others.  All 
of these factors provided a strong impetus for successful, cooperative military 
programmes.  A US official (interview 2011) echoed these points, noting that the 
situation with the Baltic countries in the 1990s involved three small nations with 
a common threat, a shared goal of NATO membership, and a clear group of 
friends and supporters.   
 
A Latvian official (interview 2010) also emphasized the importance of the fact 
that the Baltic capitals were still afraid of Russia when BALTBAT began.  The 
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desire for NATO membership and fear of Moscow drove the Baltic governments 
together, so political interests were critical to the success of BALTBAT.  Self-
defence, stated the Latvian official (interview 2010), was a major motivating 
factor for the Baltic nations to make BALTBAT work.  He believed that the 
BALTBAT model could be used elsewhere, but would require a strong policy 
motivation to succeed.   
 
The Latvian official (interview 2010) continued by noting that there had been 
discussion, pushed by the US, of establishing a similar PKO capabilities 
programme in Central Asia, but that never became a reality. Certainly, he 
commented, African states may need assistance in developing PKO capabilities 
so that they can help themselves in crisis situations.  However, he added that 
even though the situation in regions of instability like the Sahel or the Horn of 
Africa could be motivating factors for African cooperation, it is an open question 
if the focus on development of PKO forces would be a good route to follow.  
BALTBAT, echoed Andrusyszyn (interview 2010), was indeed a good model 
and framework, but while African states have expressed an interest in the 
template, the situation in Africa is different.   
 
The need for caveats with regard to the issue of transferability was also 
indicated in the later Baltic initiatives.  Schvede (interview 2010) believed 
BALTRON could be used as a model in other regions, but stressed that there 
are preconditions for success. Navies must have a willingness to cooperate, 
and the donor nations must have the same goals.  Schvede (interview 2010) 
also emphasized that if a nation already has a Navy, it is difficult to change it 
and start something new.  In that regard, it is important to remember that all the 
Baltic countries started from zero and the Baltic navies were simply looking to 
acquire some kind of capability.  However, he stated, even for countries with 
existing naval forces, the BALTRON experience could be beneficial, but it is 
important to consider the state of the systems already in place.  
 
5.20.3 Transferrable - No 
 
Two of the interviewees expressed the view that the Baltic programmes would 
not be a model that could be transferable to other regions.  Without further 
elaboration, Carlsen (interview 2010) stated that it is hard to see if it is realistic 
to have BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects serve as a model for other 
developing military forces.  Johnson (interview 2011) concurred, stating equally 
briefly that one should not expect too much from use of that model elsewhere.  
Particularly in view of the roles played by these two interviewees with regard to 
the Baltic initiatives, their abrupt dismissal of the idea that the model could be 
transferable was significant.   
 
However, as they did not provide any detail with regard to why they held that 
particular view, it would be speculative to try to determine why they have come 
to that conclusion.  In addition, as they did not address the specific issue, it 
would be speculative to try to judge whether they rejected the idea of the 
transferability of any and all aspects of the model used in the Baltic projects, or 
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whether they believed that elements of the Baltic programmes could be 
transferrable to other countries.    
 
5.20.4 Transferability and Utility 
 
As noted above, while much of the data indicated a belief among interviewees 
that the lessons from the Baltic initiatives could be of use in other countries, 
there was skepticism among some individuals that the model used in the Baltic 
projects could be directly transferred elsewhere.  There were also caveats that 
local or regional conditions will have an impact on the chances for success of 
utilizing a model drawn from the Baltic experience on any future military 
assistance programmes.   
 
It is therefore important to reiterate the points made previously and ensure 
clarity about the intended utility of the identified elements of a model for 
effective military assistance projects, its transferability and the significance of 
the 12 Mechanisms.  The intention was not to distill from the Baltic projects a 
blueprint that will guarantee success wherever it is utilised.  The intention was 
to identify the elements of a model by highlighting the Mechanisms which were 
apparent in the Baltic military assistance initiatives.  These Mechanisms 
appeared to be of utility in the future development of a model for effective 
military assistance programmes.       
 
Taking one of the Mechanisms as an example, the specific process by which 
transfer of responsibility to recipient states (Mechanism 8) is accomplished will 
be different in recipient countries in various stages of military, political and 
economic development.  However, the specific decisions on timing, 
expenditures and overall effort to achieve transfer of responsibility are not 
critical.  What is important is the fact that consideration of transfer of 
responsibility is undertaken by policy-makers planning the assistance 
programme.  Viewed from this perspective, skepticism regarding the ability to 
replicate the Baltic experience in other countries or regions was justified, but not 
the issue.  What was significant was that the lessons from the Baltic projects 
highlighted Mechanisms which should be considered and evaluated, 
irrespective of the recipient country involved. 
 
5.21 Conclusions 
 
Returning to the CIMO framework, the specific question for this thesis regarding 
Context was: What is the nature of the relationship between donor states and 
recipient states?  The specific Intervention question was: What is the impact of 
broad political decisions between the donor and recipient state on the efficacy 
of the military assistance programme?  The specific question regarding 
Mechanisms therefore was: What are the particular Mechanisms that can cause 
broad political decisions between the donor and recipient state to have an 
impact on the efficacy of military assistance?  Finally, the question regarding 
Outcomes was: Are the military and political goals associated with the military 
assistance programme achieved? 
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The analysis in this chapter outlined the Mechanisms which were apparent from 
the data from the interviews, augmented by extracts from relevant documents 
from the Baltic programmes.  These were items noted by at least seven of the 
27 interviewees.  Those twelve Mechanisms were: 
 
(1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns 
(2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance 
(3) - A Constant Source of Support 
(4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment 
(5) - Connection to Larger Goals 
 (5A) - NATO membership 
 (5B) - Development of National Defence Capabilities 
(6) - Development of New Leadership 
(7) - Direction and Control by Donor States 
(8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States 
(9) - Flexibility in Planning 
(10) - Good Organizational Structures 
(11) - A Strong Lead Nation 
(12) - Leadership From Key Individuals 
 
Chapter Six provides an analysis of these 12 Mechanisms as the elements of a 
model for effective military assistance initiatives identified from the experience 
of the Baltic military assistance projects.  There has been no such analysis of 
BALTBAT and the other Baltic initiatives, and the proposition is put forward that 
the data provided by the interviewees, the Mechanisms which were generated, 
and the identification of elements to be used as the basis for development 
through further research of a model for effective military assistance 
programmes are of value for academics and practitioners working in the area. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION OF THE ELEMENTS OF A MODEL 
 
6.1 Overview 
 
The analysis of the data conducted in Chapter Five indicated that the following 
12 Mechanisms emerged as the main reasons for the success of BALTBAT and 
the other Baltic assistance projects.  The data from the 27 interviews were 
coded, and any issue had to be noted by at least seven interviewees (at least 
one-quarter of the group) to be included as a Mechanism, indicating that there 
was an apparent consensus regarding its significance.  The resulting 12 
Mechanisms were: 
 
(1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns 
(2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance 
(3) - A Constant Source of Support 
(4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment 
(5) - Connection to Larger Goals 
 (5A) - NATO membership 
 (5B) - Development of National Defence Capabilities 
(6) - Development of New Leadership 
(7) - Direction and Control by Donor States 
(8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States 
(9) - Flexibility in Planning 
(10) - Good Organizational Structures 
(11) - A Strong Lead Nation 
(12) - Leadership From Key Individuals 
 
Once again, the goal of this research was to identify the elements to be used as 
the basis for development through further research of a model for effective 
military assistance programmes.  While the goal of this thesis was not to 
develop such a model, work regarding these elements (the Mechanisms) could 
be of value for future work in developing such a model. 
 
In particular, clustering of these elements (the Mechanisms) would appear to be 
of value for future work of academics and practitioners.  A basic clustering of 
those Mechanisms which appeared to be closely related would also provide 
clarity with regard to how they could interact in any model.  To cite an example, 
the presence of a constant source of support from donor states (Mechanism 3) 
might often be associated with a strong lead nation (Mechanism 11) driving 
support from a number of countries, which would also entail a long-term political 
commitment (Mechanism 4).  All of these Mechanisms are indications of 
commitment by supporting states, which would logically appear to be critical for 
a model for effective military assistance programmes which generates desired 
Outcomes.  
 
With regard to the conduct of the research, as there was no attempt in 
conducting the interviews to try to generate linkages between various 
Mechanisms, there was no attempt to assume such linkages exist.  It may be 
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possible that chronological linkages (which Mechanisms should be considered 
in a particular sequence) are essential in the construct of a model.  Other 
possible linkages with regard to the impact of one Mechanism on another may 
also be apparent and have to be considered in the establishment of a model.  
However, such linkages were beyond the scope of this thesis, although they will 
probably be essential areas of consideration for future research into developing 
a model. 
 
A second point should be noted regarding the conduct of the research, and the 
benefit of the clustering of Mechanisms.  There was no hierarchical listing of the 
Mechanisms based on the number of times it was cited.  At a fundamental level, 
such an attempt would provide a false sense of certainty using a purely 
quantitative measure.  It also highlighted one of the admitted weaknesses in the 
conduct of the research.  While the transcripts were accurate reflections of the 
views of the interviewees, there was no attempt to measure the intensity of the 
views held by the interviewee regarding any particular Mechanism.  To take an 
example, an individual who fervently believed that a strong lead nation 
(Mechanism 11) was essential to the success of BALTBAT was coded as equal 
to an individual who noted in passing that a strong lead nation was valuable.  
This was admittedly a weakness which should be addressed in future research 
in this area.   
 
Finally, with regard to the goals of the research and the advantage of a 
clustering approach, it should be emphasized again that the focus was on 
causality and not on predictability.  From an academic perspective, the goal was 
to conduct an analysis of the significance of the political decisions which 
provided the foundation for the Baltic military initiatives, and which had not been 
the subject of academic research.  From the perspective of practitioners in the 
area of military assistance, the goal was to generate the elements of a model 
which could have utility with regard to enhancing the prospects of success for 
an assistance project.  The research did so by noting that there were various 
Mechanisms which appeared to have generated the Outcomes from the Baltic 
programmes, and therefore are worth considering in a future project.  Thus, 
clustering of the mechanisms into logical groups assists in identifying the areas 
in which attention needs to be directed. 
 
The elements identified for future use in development of a model were not 
intended to predict the precise probability of a particular Outcome.  For 
example, the research indicated that a good organizational structure 
(Mechanism 10) was shown to have been important for the success of the Baltic 
programmes.  It did not predict that successful implementation of good 
organizational structures would generate a 21.7% increase in efficiency, or that 
the probability of success for the programme achieving the desired Outcome 
would be enhanced from 16.4% to 27.2% because of a solid organizational 
structure.  Once again, further research into this area which attempts to 
generate predictability with regard to these Mechanisms would be of value to 
both academics and practitioners.  However, it was beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
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Clustering of the Mechanisms into logical groups, however, could assist in 
identifying the extent to which Mechanisms may reinforce one another.  
Moreover, as Mechanisms appeared to fall within a variety of clusters, 
generation of logical groups could be of value in determining which Mechanisms 
may have greater significance within a model, particularly if there is interaction 
with other Mechanisms.  Such analysis could assist future research which 
attempts to generate a model which can have predictive capabilities.   
 
Once again, from an academic perspective, the goal was to conduct an analysis 
of the significance of the political decisions which provided the foundation for 
the Baltic military initiatives, and which had not been the subject of academic 
research.  Such analysis has identified the elements (the Mechanisms) that can 
be used as a basis for development of a model for effective military assistance 
programmes.  From the perspective of practitioners working in this area, the 
identification of such elements could provide a contribution toward the 
generation of a model which could enhance the prospects of success for future 
assistance projects.   
  
6.2 Cluster 1: Political-Military Planning 
 
The first cluster of Mechanisms addressed issues which could be categorized 
as political-military planning.  That is the focus on assessing regional security 
concerns (Mechanism 1) and deciding on the optimal areas of military 
assistance (Mechanism 2).  It also involves consideration of the connection 
between the programme and larger goals (Mechanism 5).  These are 
overarching political considerations which civilian and military leaders will need 
to assess before deciding whether, and how, they wish to proceed.  In order to 
highlight the value of these elements for a model, a number of questions are 
listed under each Mechanism to illustrate the type of issues that should be 
addressed by policy-makers. 
 
While these Mechanisms were quite apparent with regard to the Baltic capitals 
and their concern regarding Russia, the case can be made that they are equally 
relevant for contemporary or future assistance programmes.  One current 
example is consideration of military assistance for the new state of South 
Sudan.  In the recent past, it could have applied to the countries in the Balkans 
that emerged from the former Yugoslavia.  Such projects are not solely 
reserved for new states, as there are continuing assistance efforts by developed 
states to aid lesser developed states in generating military capabilities.  One 
example would be US military and other assistance to Colombia.  However, for 
purposes of examining the Mechanisms, a purely hypothetical country is used. 
 
With regard to Mechanism 1 and regional security concerns, it would be prudent 
for political and military leaders in donor states to ask a number of critical 
questions: Is there a dominant regional power?  If so, which country is it?  If not, 
are there multiple regional powers?  Does a major country from outside the 
region have a particular interest?  How tense are relations with the dominant 
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regional power?  What is the state of relations with neighbouring states?  Is 
there a clear and present threat from any particular state?  Is there a coalition of 
regional states which constitutes the primary threat to the recipient state?   
 
This leads to a set of questions derived from Mechanism 2 and optimal areas of 
military assistance:  What would be the appropriate type of military assistance 
that should be provided?  Would it be prudent to assist the recipient state in 
generating largely defensive military capabilities?  Should the focus be on 
traditional “hard” defence?  Would it be preferable to assist them in developing 
PKO capabilities?  Would a combination of aid including traditional “hard” 
defence and PKO be optimal?  Should the process focus on direct military 
assistance with personnel from donor states on the ground of the recipient 
state?  Would such an arrangement generate strong opposition from other 
countries in the region?  Would it be preferable to have a small number of 
trainers in place for a number of years to develop recipient state capabilities?  
Should the training be conducted through programmes in which personnel from 
the recipient state receive training in the donor states?  How much military 
equipment will be provided by the donor states?  Will such equipment be 
qualitatively superior to that owned by countries in the region? 
 
All of this would have to be considered within the context of Mechanism 5 
questions regarding what larger goals are involved for the donor and recipient 
states:  Is the intention to simply defend the sovereignty of the recipient state 
against clear aggression?  Is the goal to provide adequate defensive 
capabilities without posing a threat to other nations in the region?  Is the goal to 
develop capabilities to participate in a regional or some other type of military 
alliance?  Has the policy decision been taken to rely on the protection of the 
donor state?  If so, is the goal of the recipient government to be in a position to 
provide a holding action against any type of attack until the supporting state is 
able to provide assistance?  Is the intention to defend a claim on territory or 
territorial waters which is being contested?  Taking a broader perspective, if the 
larger goal involves economic development, and specifically to ensure that 
natural resources of the recipient state can be efficiently extracted, is the goal to 
ensure the ability to protect those resources while not generating tensions with 
neighbours that would impede development of those resources?   
 
The hypothetical example indicates that there is a relationship between these 
three Mechanisms and the ultimate success of a military assistance project.  
Consideration of the questions listed above enhances the prospects of a solid 
assessment of the security situation, a decision on the optimal type of military 
aid and a focus on ensuring that the project contributes to the effort to achieve 
the overarching goals agreed upon by the donor and recipient state.  Analysing 
the experience of the Baltic initiatives, these would appear to be elements for a 
model for effective military assistance initiatives which should be considered not 
in isolation, but in conjunction with one another in order to set a good foundation 
for any military assistance programme.   
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6.3 Cluster 2: Steadfast Donor Support 
 
The second cluster of Mechanisms involved the need to have supporting 
nations which are committed to the military assistance programme.  Drawing on 
the experience of the Baltic states, and the strong support of Denmark in 
particular and the other Nordic countries in general, it would appear to be 
important to ensure that the project has donor nations that provide a constant 
source of support (Mechanism 3) and are also committed to providing 
assistance over the long-term (Mechanism 4).  That may well mean that the 
donor states will have to provide a significant amount of direction and control 
(Mechanism 7), particularly from the strong lead nation directing the initiative 
(Mechanism 11) which may have that energetic position due to leadership from 
key individuals (Mechanism 12). 
 
As noted previously, there was no intention of proposing any strict sequencing 
with regard to these Mechanisms as elements for the development of a model.  
However, it would appear logical that once the overarching political-military 
analysis outlined in Cluster One has been conducted, those countries that are 
interested in contributing to the military assistance initiative must ask the 
practical question of whether there is sufficient support for the programme to 
have a realistic prospect of success.  This would mean that any donor states 
would need to ask questions which would involve the Mechanisms noted above. 
 
With regard to Mechanism 11 and a strong lead nation, it would appear logical 
to ask one key question early in the deliberations: Which country is willing to 
take the lead on the project?  The issue of causality between the Mechanism 
and achieving the Outcomes seems to be quite apparent, as the absence of an 
enthusiastic response from at least one supporting nation would generate 
doubts about the prospects of successfully achieving Outcomes.  To be clear, 
this does not mean that there must be a strong, positive response in the first 
discussion about the initiative.  It does, however, mean that at some point, one 
government has to make a clear commitment to doing the work so that the 
project can achieve the desired Outcomes.   
 
This may well then turn to the question of Mechanism 12 and leadership from 
key individuals, where it may be the case that one person in a decision-making 
position in one state is determined to make the programme work, and that 
individual will drive the national position.  That may be sufficient to ensure that 
there is a strong lead nation directing the effort and working to see if other 
countries are ready to contribute to the initiative.  To return to the example cited 
by Saar (interview 2010), it was the Norwegian project officer who drove the 
process and made BALTNET a success.   
 
That could lead to consideration of Mechanism 3 and the issue of a constant 
source of support for the project.  Once again, it is worthwhile to utilize specific 
questions to provide examples of what is involved with the Mechanisms in this 
cluster.  As a practical matter, the questions which recipient states should place 
to donor governments (and which donor governments should ask themselves) 
 177 
should address concrete political and military issues which are logically 
essential to the achievement of the desired Outcomes:  Are you committed to 
this military assistance project?  What resources are you prepared to commit?  
Can you provide trainers?  Can you contribute military equipment?  Are spaces 
available at your staff colleges?  Is your focus on only providing political 
support?  Can you provide financial assistance?  Are you willing to provide this 
assistance even in the face of objections from other countries in the region?  
Are you willing to provide such aid if other donor countries drop out of the 
initiative?  If other donor states reduce or eliminate their contribution, are you 
willing to carry that extra effort?     
 
With regard to Mechanism 4 and a long-term political commitment, the 
discussion would seek to ensure that there is no misunderstanding about the 
time-frame for the programme and the commitment to persevere until the 
desired Outcomes are achieved.  As noted by some of the interviewees, the 
generation of military capabilities is a lengthy process and the supporting states 
need to make a commitment for an extended period of time, and not just 
provide an isolated gesture of support.  The questions that should be asked 
focus on ascertaining whether potential donor states are ready to participate for 
the long-term:  Are you prepared to make a multi-year commitment to this 
project?  If so, how many years?  Will that require annual renewal of legislative 
approval for your participation and contributions?   Should unexpected demands 
arise on your military forces or defence budget, will you still be able to make 
your promised contribution?  If those demands generate a reduction in your 
contribution for one or two years, will you make larger contributions in 
subsequent years to make up the shortfall?  At what stage should we 
collectively reassess the duration and depth of our obligations to the project?     
 
Finally, with regard to Mechanism 7 and the need for donor states to provide a 
significant amount of direction and control, it may be best to view this from two 
different perspectives.  From the optic of the recipient state, the questions are 
straightforward: Is the recipient state willing to accept a substantial amount of 
direction and control from supporting states at the start of the initiative?  Are 
there certain areas in which the recipient state cannot or will not relinquish its 
sovereignty or authority?     
 
From the optic of the donor state, a different set of questions should be asked:  
In view of the need to direct and control this assistance effort, can we devote 
the resources to do so effectively?  Are we ready to insist on decisions to which 
the recipient state objects?  Are we willing to do so even if it puts the 
continuation of the project at risk?  These questions are somewhat modified, but 
become particularly important in a multinational effort, particularly after a lead 
nation is identified:  Does any state object to a mandate for the lead nation that 
it must constantly monitor and supervise implementation?  Do we agree that we 
will not attempt to individually address requests by the recipient state for a 
relaxation of those controls?  Do we agree that we will cooperate to reinforce 
the authority of the lead nation?  What are the mechanisms or processes by 
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which we will obtain the views of the recipient state regarding the programme 
and collectively make decisions?  
 
Returning to the issue of the causality between the Mechanisms and the 
generation of Outcomes, and remaining with the example of a multinational 
effort, if the lead nation or key individual is not able to generate enthusiasm 
among a larger group of donor states, the prospects of success should be 
carefully reconsidered.  Should the lead country be able to handle all the 
responsibilities on its own, that would remove the apparent obstacle.  However, 
it should then initiate careful analysis by the lead government about whether it 
can handle that burden for an extended period of time.  It could also generate a 
decision by the lead nation that it will support the initiative on the hope that 
others would later join, which might not be an illogical policy decision for the 
lead country, depending on the circumstances.  All of the questions noted 
above indicate the significance of considering the Mechanisms in this cluster as 
elements in the development of a model which have an impact on one another 
and may well be best addressed as interconnected, rather than isolated, 
elements. 
 
6.4 Cluster 3: Establishing Permanent Strengths 
 
There was another set of Mechanisms which appeared relevant to the ability of 
the military assistance project to achieve the desired Outcomes.  It is important 
to consider at the appropriate time how the recipient state will eventually 
become self-sufficient and no longer dependent on the supporting nations.  For 
that reason, it is valuable to assess how to develop new leadership (Mechanism 
6) and how a transfer of responsibility to the recipient state will be accomplished 
(Mechanism 8).   
 
The intention is not to compel donor countries to develop an artificial timetable 
by which recipient states will assume more responsibility, or agree on metrics 
(how many senior officers from the recipient nation need to graduate from 
training academies in the donor nations) which may have little to do with 
whether the recipient states have generated the capability to assume more 
responsibility.  The critical aspect of this cluster is to emphasize that the political 
and military leadership in the supporting countries should discuss with the 
recipient nations how they can realistically plan to address the development of 
permanent strengths and capabilities in the recipient states. 
 
With regard to Mechanism 8 and transfer of responsibility to recipient states, it 
would be beneficial to raise numerous practical questions:  At what point in the 
future do all the participating nations wish to be able to declare that the 
Outcomes of the assistance project have been achieved?  Does the recipient 
state believe it will be able to gradually assume greater responsibilities in the 
near future?  Is it more realistic to expect that it can only begin to assume more 
duties after an intense initial training period lasting a number of years?  Should 
the pace of transfer of responsibility be reassessed annually?  Should it be 
reviewed more frequently?  Will the supporting countries continue to have 
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advisors on the ground even after responsibility has been transferred to the 
recipient state? 
 
Some of the discussion and the resulting questions will relate to consideration 
of Mechanism 6 and development of new leadership.  In this instance, the 
following questions indicate the type of issues which need to be addressed:  
Does the recipient state have the requisite minimum number of senior and/or 
mid-level officers to be able to implement the assistance programme?  If not, 
would that critical mass be achieved only after a number of years?  Should the 
pace be accelerated by having significantly more of the younger officers attend 
courses in the donor states?  What constitutes the short-term and long-term 
plan for developing the new generation of leaders?  Should officers from the 
recipient state attend courses in different staff colleges and defence academies 
in a number of countries to get a broad perspective?  Should there be a focus 
on continuity and sending these officers to only one institution?  Should a staff 
college or defence academy be established in the recipient state?  How long will 
it take until it is running smoothly?  What assistance is required from donor 
countries?  Will donor countries continue to provide staff even after the college 
or academy is managed by the recipient state? 
 
Consideration of these two Mechanisms at an appropriate time will enhance the 
likelihood of permanent results for the recipient state, which, in all probability, 
will be an important part of achieving the desired Outcomes.  In addition, it will 
allow for better planning regarding the overall length of the project and realistic 
expectations for both donor and recipient nations.  For the supporting 
governments, it will help avoid a situation in which it feels that it is carrying a 
greater burden for a longer period of time than anticipated.  For the recipient 
nation, it will minimize the extent to which it feels it is in an enforced state of 
dependency, or that it is being held back from doing more to develop its own 
military capabilities.  Achieving any of these results would be beneficial for the 
assistance programme, and indicate the significance of considering the two 
Mechanisms in this cluster as elements in the development of a model which 
have an impact on one another and may well be best assessed as 
interconnected, rather than isolated, elements. 
 
6.5 Cluster 4: Clear Structures and Lines of Authority 
 
As indicated in Section 1.3, the focus of this research was on military assistance 
and not project management.  The experience of the Baltic initiatives, however, 
indicated the importance of ensuring that the fundamentals of any well-run 
project would also be necessary in a military assistance initiative.  This should 
not be interpreted to mean that good application of generic project management 
principles to military assistance projects will ensure success.  It seems unlikely 
that an initiative with a flawed analysis of the regional security situation and 
selection of an inappropriate type of military assistance without a strong lead 
nation and with weak commitment by supporting states would be salvaged by 
good project management. 
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However, the experience of the Baltic initiatives indicated the extent to which 
there are specific aspects of clear structures and lines of authority which are 
particularly important for military assistance programmes.  There are a cluster of 
Mechanisms which emphasize the need to have good organizational structures 
(Mechanism 10) as well as strong leadership by a lead nation (Mechanism 11) 
which includes overall direction and control by donor states (Mechanism 7).  
Consideration of this particular cluster requires political and military leaders to 
address fundamental issues which may need to be considered early in the 
initiation of any military assistance project.   
 
A discussion of Mechanism 10 and good organizational structures leads to a 
number of practical questions that should be addressed by donor and recipient 
states, although primarily by the former:  Is there an existing organizational 
framework which the donors wish to copy for this assistance programme?  If 
not, is there an existing model which would appear most suitable with 
appropriate modifications?  If so, which modifications?  Does a new structure 
need to be developed?  Does the final organizational structure ensure clear 
lines of authority?  Does it ensure decision-making at appropriate levels?  Is it 
too centralized?  Is it necessary to establish a new administrative body devoted 
solely to administering this programme?  Does the structure provide for good 
flows of information to the leadership and from the leadership back down to the 
operators?  How will it be determined if there are excessive layers that should 
be eliminated?   
 
In addition, the importance of Mechanism 11 and a strong lead nation requires 
asking questions about organizational issues relating to the work of the lead 
country:  Will officials of the lead nation control all aspects of decision-making 
within the organizational structure?  If not, which specific areas will be reserved 
for the lead country?  Will the lead nation staff senior positions at all levels?  
What will be the coordination mechanism for those parts of the organization not 
staffed by personnel from the lead nation?  What is the arrangement regarding 
transmission of information between the lead country and the other supporting 
states?  What is the mechanism by which all the participating states will assess 
whether the lead country should devote less time to briefing other supporting 
governments, and direct that time to aiding the recipient state? 
 
The answers to these questions have an impact with regard to Mechanism 7 
and direction and control by donor states.  In the case of a simple assistance 
project noted earlier (Country A provides aid to Country X), direction and control 
by the supporting state continues to be an essential requirement for achieving 
Outcomes.  It is just that only Country A is concerned.  In a complex assistance 
project (Countries A, B and C provide aid to Countries X, Y and Z), direction 
and control becomes more complicated, and indicates why in these initiatives 
Mechanism 7 is connected to Mechanism 11. 
 
While this particular Mechanism is not exclusively the province of the lead 
nation, and involves the coordinated, united position of all the supporting 
countries vis-à-vis the recipient state, as a practical matter, it is the role of the 
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lead nation to manage the daily requirements of implementing the project and 
addressing any problems which may arise.  Thus, there are some basic 
questions which should be asked so that there is clarity of responsibility among 
the supporting states and acceptance and understanding by recipient states:  
What type of supervision and monitoring is expected of the lead nation by the 
supporting states?  In what instances will it be necessary for the lead nation to 
call on all the donor countries to take a decision?  When is it acceptable for 
individual donor states to work directly with recipient states?  When is it 
imperative for the lead nation to send a united message to the recipient state?       
 
Returning again to the issue of causality and the impact of this set of 
Mechanisms, it is apparent that a military assistance project, like any other 
project, has certain prerequisites for successfully achieving Outcomes.  A good 
organizational structure and clear lines of authority, including monitoring and 
supervision, are apparent in the private and public sectors.  What is different 
regarding a military assistance initiative was apparent in the experience of the 
Baltic programmes.  Particularly if there is a group of donor states, and 
especially if there are multiple recipient states, the lessons from the Baltic 
initiatives indicated that this cluster of three Mechanisms generates specific 
types of questions which should be considered to assist in enhancing the 
prospects of the project achieving the desired Outcomes.  The answers to these 
questions, although arising from different Mechanisms, appear to have an 
impact on one another.  Thus, it appears to be worthwhile to consider the 
Mechanisms in this cluster as elements in development of a model which may 
well be addressed as interconnected, rather than isolated, elements. 
 
6.6 Cluster 5: Sufficient Flexibility 
 
While a clear organizational structure is necessary for an effective military 
assistance programme, an excessive attention to organization and process 
could be counterproductive.  One example is a structure which is so rigid that it 
does not respond to unanticipated developments and results in continuation of 
the original plan even though it is not suited to the new developments.  Another 
example is a structure which does not allow the participants to utilize 
opportunities which may arise. 
 
As noted by interviewees reflecting on the Baltic initiatives, it is important that 
there be flexibility in planning (Mechanism 9) which can allow decision-makers 
to change course and take opportunities.  There are other Mechanisms which 
would also appear to fall within this cluster.  For example, careful consideration 
of the optimal areas of military assistance (Mechanism 2) involves an initial 
evaluation of what focus the project should have.  However, it does not preclude 
subsequent reassessments to consider changes which have occurred.  Indeed, 
the case can be made that such a re-evaluation would be of substantial value 
and an indication of good management.  It would also be valuable to reassess 
whether initial plans for the transfer of responsibility to the recipient state 
(Mechanism 8) should be modified as the recipient nations indicate they are 
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progressing at a faster (or slower) rate than anticipated.  This may well mandate 
a change in the planning for handover from the supporting countries. 
 
With regard to Mechanism 9 and flexibility in planning, there is no defined set of 
areas in which there should be a focus on flexibility.  It is not apparent that 
flexibility should be grounded in processes, and may more appropriately be 
emphasized as part of the behaviour and mentality of the military and political 
leadership.  The processes certainly should include an opportunity for senior 
level reassessment of where the project stands and whether a change of course 
is needed.  However, quarterly meetings of a group of leaders who do not have 
the mind-set to institute change or take opportunities would appear to be of little 
value.   
 
As a result, one potential way forward would be to ensure that periodic 
meetings of senior officials include a list of questions to be discussed:  Do the 
original Outcomes of the project need to be adjusted?  If so, what should be the 
new Outcomes?  If not, is the initiative moving in the proper direction?  Are 
short-term changes needed to exploit a particular opportunity?  Is the best 
option to simply stay the course?   
 
As part of this process, one of the steps that could be taken would involve 
Mechanism 2 and a re-evaluation of the optimal areas of military assistance.  A 
periodic re-evaluation would appear to be important not only with regard to 
strengths and weaknesses which subsequently arise regarding the original 
Outcomes sought from the programme, but also with regard to how success 
could be further promoted.  The experience of the Baltic initiatives involved 
replication of the initial success of BALTBAT in naval, air defence and military 
education assistance initiatives.         
 
Returning to the periodic meetings of senior political and military leaders of the 
assistance programme, there would appear to be numerous questions worth 
asking:  Are our Outcomes being achieved?  If not, should the focus be turned 
to other types of assistance?  If Outcomes are being achieved, should progress 
be accelerated by moving into closely related areas?  Should expansion be 
pursued immediately?  Are there sufficient resources?  Is there another lead 
nation able to drive efforts in this new area? 
 
The final Mechanism in this cluster, for which flexibility would appear to be a key 
consideration, is Mechanism 8 on transfer of responsibility to recipient states.  
Once again, the periodic meetings should ask basic questions about whether 
changes are needed:  Is the recipient state progressing as fast as anticipated?  
If not, does the plan for devolving responsibilities need to be amended?  Does 
training need to be intensified?  If so, are there sufficient places available?  Are 
there other areas in which we have not focused our attention and require 
resources?  Was our assessment of the ability of the recipient state to develop 
capabilities simply wrong?  If progress is better than anticipated, should the 
transfer plan be moved forward? 
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The three Mechanisms in this cluster address the fundamental issue of how to 
ensure the political and military leadership considers possible amendment of 
plans due to changing conditions.  To be clear, the focus is not simply on 
pursuing change.  It may be that changes generate disruptions which reduce 
project efficiency.  The point, as indicated from the Baltic initiatives, is that it is 
important for the leadership to have the chance to decide on whether to alter 
course as events require, or display innovative thinking with regard to 
challenges and possible opportunities.  Moreover, the decisions they take with 
regard to possible changes, although possibly arising from different 
Mechanisms, may well have an impact on one another.  Thus, it appears to be 
worthwhile to consider the Mechanisms in this cluster as elements in 
development of a model which may well be best assessed as interconnected, 
rather than isolated, elements. 
 
6.7 Pentagon of Clusters of Mechanisms 
 
The five clusters of the 12 Mechanisms outlined above were: 
 
1) Political-Military Planning 
2) Steadfast Donor Support 
3) Establishing Permanent Strengths 
4) Clear Structures and Lines of Authority 
5) Sufficient Flexibility 
 
These clusters were an attempt to group the identified elements to be used as a 
basis for a model for effective military assistance projects in a manner which 
could be of use to future work on development of such a model.  In particular, 
the clusters noted the significance of the elements as interconnected, rather 
than isolated.  Those five clusters can be diagramed as the points of a 
pentagon with the relevant Mechanisms noted, as indicated on the next page 
(also included as Appendix E in the Appendices).  Such a graphic reinforces the 
point that these five clusters are considered to be at the same level of 
importance in grouping the elements for development of the model.  There is no 
intention of asserting primacy of one particular cluster, or that there is a 
particular sequence in which these clusters of elements need to be considered 
in the development of a model.  
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Figure 1 Clusters of Mechanisms  
 
 
 
It is worthwhile at this juncture to reiterate the specific function and value of 
Mechanisms within the CIMO framework utilised in this research and outlined in 
Section 2.5.  With regard to the particular issue of military assistance 
programmes, the specific Context question was: What is the nature of the 
relationship between donor states and recipient states?  This led to the question 
of the specific Intervention of interest, and the question was: What is the impact 
of broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states on the 
efficacy of the military assistance programme? 
 
This led to the question of what particular Mechanisms are of interest for this 
research.  Once again, the role of a Mechanism (Denyer and Tranfield, 2009, p. 
683) was to address the general question: What is it about Interventions acting 
in a Context that leads to the Outcomes?  For this research, the question 
regarding Mechanisms was: What are the particular Mechanisms that can 
cause broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states to have 
an impact on the efficacy of military assistance?  This led to the final issue of 
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achieving Outcomes, and the specific question was: Are the military and 
political goals associated with the military assistance programme achieved?       
 
In short, within the CIMO framework, it was the Mechanisms which were critical 
in generating Outcomes.  It was the Mechanisms which were the elements that 
have been identified that can be used as the basis for development of a model 
for effective military assistance programmes.  The diagram presented above 
groups the Mechanisms derived from BALTBAT and the Baltic initiatives into 
what appear to be logical clusters.  Such clusters could be of assistance to 
those academics doing future work on the development of a model.   
 
The case also can be made that such clusters could be of use to practitioners 
working in the area as they can assist in understanding the overarching 
Outcomes sought from the military assistance programmes.  The questions 
noted previously under each Mechanism within the clusters provided an 
indication of the type of specific issues which should, at a minimum, be 
considered by policy-makers.  While such detail is arguably crucial for such 
initiatives, the use of clusters provides an overarching way of viewing the 
Mechanisms and reinforcing the Outcomes that are desired.   
 
For example, it is important to consider in detail how to address transfer of 
responsibility to recipient states (Mechanism 8), but it is critical to recognize that 
this is significant because it falls within the larger context of establishing 
permanent strengths in the recipient state (Cluster 3).  The value of the various 
identified elements for a model is in ensuring that these points are at least 
addressed as the project is planned and established and that attention is 
maintained on the ultimate Outcomes sought by the participating states.  The 
value of the clusters is to assist in highlighting the interconnected nature of the 
various elements.  The clusters would therefore be of particular utility to 
practitioners, and also of value to academics. 
 
It is important to reiterate that the amount of attention devoted to any particular 
cluster of Mechanisms does not guarantee achievement of the desired 
Outcomes.  Instead, the purpose of the clusters is to note that there is a 
relationship between these Mechanisms and successfully achieving Outcomes, 
and consideration of an individual Mechanism can have an impact on the ability 
to achieve desired Outcomes. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
The proposition is therefore put forth that the specific Mechanisms and the 
resulting clusters have value for academics and practitioners working in the 
area of military assistance.  The thesis analysed a set of Baltic initiatives which 
were set in a particularly challenging Context, utilised a particular Intervention 
and achieved the desired Outcomes.  The views and opinions of a wide variety 
of individuals from the policy-making, operational and academic arenas 
provided a broad spectrum of commentary from which Mechanisms were 
derived and the elements of a model for effective military assistance 
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programmes were identified.  While the policies, structures and processes used 
for the Baltic initiatives may not be directly transferable to other countries, the 
lessons derived from the Baltic projects do appear to provide elements for a 
model which could be generalizable and could be of value to academics and 
practitioners in the area of military assistance.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Studying Success 
 
The specific research question put forth at the start of this thesis was as follows: 
Can the elements to be used as the basis for development through further 
research of a model for effective military assistance projects be identified from 
the experience of the Baltic military cooperative programmes, particularly 
BALTBAT?  The proposed answer to that question, addressed in detail below, 
is in the affirmative.  However, before turning to those conclusions, it is 
worthwhile to review the larger issue of why the Baltic initiatives were worth 
extensive study. 
 
In view of the challenges faced by the Baltic and supporting states, the 
achievement of political and military goals (the Outcomes) provided reasons for 
these nations to view their accomplishments with a substantial amount of pride.  
That was apparent in the comments of the interviewees.  Mackenzie (interview 
2010) stated that, "the result was a good one."  Hannibalsson (interview 2011) 
asserted that the Baltic initiatives culminated “with considerable success.”  
Andrusyszyn (interview 2010) noted that the political and security environments 
were quite challenging, and Western policy regarding the Baltic countries was a 
success, both with regard to overarching policy goals and performing the 
detailed work that was needed.  A potentially unstable, tense relationship 
between Russia and the Baltic nations, he added, was avoided due to sound 
policy decisions and patient, concrete Western aid to the Baltic countries.   
 
Johnson (interview 2011) concurred that the West handled the challenge of 
assisting the Baltic capitals very well, both with regard to policy in general and 
the Baltic military projects in particular.  Clemmesen (interview 2010) asserted 
that the Baltic governments were better prepared for NATO upon accession and 
understood NATO better than the other new members, and that was because of 
the Baltic programmes.  Developing trust and real interoperability with the West 
were critical.  In his view, the Baltic capitals understood the importance of those 
factors from the start, and the Baltic initiatives gave them the opportunity to 
develop their abilities in these areas. 
 
An Estonian official (interview 2010) asserted that the Baltic military assistance 
projects were indeed a success. He noted that they could be judged in two 
ways: 1) by classical standards of a successful military project, or 2) according 
to the political aims to be achieved by the particular project.  Viewed as a 
totality, he judged, the experience of the Baltic programmes indicated a good 
way to proceed with these challenging initiatives.  
 
It is important to highlight the fact that in addition to the unique challenges noted 
previously, the Baltic projects also had to address the normal difficulties 
inherent in any such complex enterprise.  For that reason, the success of the 
Baltic initiatives was particularly noteworthy and warranted the extensive 
research conducted in this thesis.  Carlsen (interview 2010) admitted that he 
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was surprised that things actually kept on schedule.  Progress was made, 
problems were resolved and the process worked.  Most notably, when 
questioned on whether he would do anything differently if he could do it again, 
Carlsen (interview 2010) flatly stated "no."  When asked the same question, 
Linnkevicius (interview 2010) and Clemmesen (interview 2010) strongly echoed 
Carlsen’s position.  A Latvian official (interview 2010) seconded Carlsen’s point 
that in view of the risks and challenges when the work began, he was proud that 
BALTBAT even worked at all.  In his opinion, even with the benefit of hindsight, 
what was achieved in the Baltic states was as much as could have been 
accomplished in view of the situation they faced and the available resources.    
 
7.2  Conclusions 
 
The specific research question was whether the elements of a model (now 
called Mechanisms) for effective military assistance projects can be drawn from 
the Baltic military cooperative programmes, particularly BALTBAT.  Drawing on 
data from 27 interviews, supplemented by 37 documents regarding the Baltic 
projects, 12 Mechanisms were apparent.  They were:      
 
(1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns 
(2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance 
(3) - A Constant Source of Support 
(4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment 
(5) - Connection to Larger Goals 
 (5A) - NATO membership 
 (5B) - Development of National Defence Capabilities 
(6) - Development of New Leadership 
(7) - Direction and Control by Donor States 
(8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States 
(9) - Flexibility in Planning 
(10) - Good Organizational Structures 
(11) - A Strong Lead Nation 
(12) - Leadership From Key Individuals 
 
These Mechanisms fell logically within the following five clusters: 
 
Political-Military Planning 
(1) Assessment of Regional Security Concerns 
 (2) Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance 
 (5) Connection to Larger Goals 
Steadfast Donor Support 
 (3) A Constant Source of Support 
 (4) A Long-Term Political Commitment 
 (7) Direction and Control by Donor States 
 (11) A Strong Lead Nation 
 (12) Leadership From Key Individuals 
Establishing Permanent Strengths 
 (6) Development of New Leadership 
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 (8) Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States 
Clear Structures and Lines of Authority 
 (10) Good Organizational Structures 
 (11) A Strong Lead Nation 
 (7) Direction and Control by Donor States 
Sufficient Flexibility 
 (9) Flexibility in Planning 
 (2) Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance 
 (8) Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States 
 
The five clusters were intended to assist future research in development of a 
model for effective military assistance initiatives.  There was no intention of 
providing any relative weighting among the individual clusters or an attempt to 
indicate a specific sequence with regard to how the clusters should be 
addressed.  They were simply noted as important areas which might be of 
assistance to academics working on the development of a model, and may 
need to be considered by political and military policy-makers in preparing the 
foundation for a military assistance initiative.    
 
The fundamental proposition of this research was that BALTBAT and the other 
Baltic projects provided lessons for effective implementation of military 
assistance programmes.  There was no claim that the BALTBAT procedures 
and processes should simply be transferred to other states with the expectation 
that they would prove to be as successful as they were in the Baltic region.  
However, an extensive analysis of the Baltic projects appeared to indicate that 
the broad political decisions between the donor and recipient states (the 
Intervention) were important in achieving desired Outcomes.  Moreover, 
detailed analysis of the Baltic projects also provided useful guidance on the 
important Mechanisms that should be considered in planning, initiating and 
implementing military assistance projects.  They also constituted elements in 
development of a model for effective military assistance initiatives.     
 
7.3 Contributions to the Field of Study  
 
A question which may be raised regarding the Mechanisms and clusters is 
whether these are not self-apparent.  What is the academic contribution which 
has been provided by this research?  With regard to operators and practitioners 
in the area, are these not the logical issues which would be considered for any 
military assistance programme?  There are numerous points to be made in 
response to these questions. 
 
First, it is worth reiterating that the number of instances in which military 
assistance projects appear to fall short of expectations indicates that there is 
nothing obvious or self-apparent about how such complex enterprises should be 
planned, structured and developed.  If they were that simple and the processes 
that self-apparent, there would be many more examples of successful initiatives 
and fewer failures. 
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Second, this research constituted an attempt to utilize the CIMO model in the 
area of military assistance.  It therefore made two specific contributions.  First, 
with regard to work on CIMO, it was a new utilization of the model, specifically 
within the field of military assistance, which added to the body of knowledge to 
judge the utility or limitations of CIMO.  Second, with regard to the study of 
military assistance, the use of CIMO to assess such projects was a novel 
approach which could assist academics in determining whether it is indeed a 
suitable model to use in this field.  As such, the use of the CIMO model for this 
particular research into military assistance was of value for academics working 
in both areas. 
 
Third, the Mechanisms which were outlined are the result of a detailed 
examination of a set of military assistance projects which had not been 
previously scrutinized in this particular manner.  While there had been 
commentary about the success of the Baltic programmes, there was never an 
in-depth analysis of the fundamental reasons which explained why the initiatives 
were successful.  This research provided empirical data regarding the reasons 
for success, drawn from individuals who either worked on the programmes or 
were experts in the area. 
 
Fourth, the research addressed the specific Intervention of the impact of 
political decisions between the Western supporting governments and the Baltic 
governments on the Outcomes which were achieved in these programmes.  
This issue had not been addressed by academics or practitioners in the area 
with regard to the Baltic initiatives, and would appear to be an important topic 
for consideration.  The lessons from the Baltic projects indicated the 
significance of Mechanisms which could allow the Intervention of broad political 
decisions between donor and recipient states to generate the desired 
Outcomes.     
 
Fifth, the findings were drawn from a large number of individuals who were 
personally involved in BALTBAT or the subsequent Baltic programmes.  From a 
purely academic perspective, this represented a source of information which 
had not previously been examined.  Moreover, from an academic as well as an 
operational perspective, the views, recollections and opinions of the people who 
were present at the creation of the Baltic programmes, or worked to make them 
a reality, were of value and worth recording and analyzing. 
 
Sixth, the Mechanisms and clusters which have been identified were elements 
that can be used to develop a model for effective military assistance projects.  
This was the research objective set out in Section 1.2.2.  These elements 
constituted a contribution to the body of knowledge in the area of military 
assistance and can be drawn upon by researchers for generation of a model.  
Academics in this field can assess the validity and utility of each of these 
Mechanisms, possibly by conducting studies on current or past military 
assistance projects to judge their applicability or impact.  In addition, these 
elements could also serve as starting points for consideration of other potential 
elements which could be derived from analysis of other programmes.   
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Continuing with the sixth point, practitioners in the area of military assistance 
could consider implementation of actions within existing or future projects with 
an eye toward these elements to see whether there is indeed generation of 
desired Outcomes.  Such practical use of these elements would provide a solid 
foundation for future research into the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Mechanisms and clusters, or the need to modify (or discard) some of these 
elements.  
 
Seventh, the generation of these elements could also contribute to work in other 
areas of military assistance outlined in Section 2.7.1.  With regard to donor 
states, one of the topics noted was the contribution of military assistance to 
achieving the foreign policy goals of donor states.  Mechanisms such as 
assessment of regional security concerns (Mechanism 1) and connection to 
larger goals (Mechanism 5) could be of value to those addressing the issue of 
how military assistance initiatives can contribute to achieving those goals.  
Academics could use the appropriate Mechanism to analyse past projects 
which did not achieve the desired policy goal and ask the following question: 
Was a failure to consider such a Mechanism a contributing factor to the 
difficulties in the project which led to a failure to achieve the desired policy goal? 
 
Continuing with the seventh point, with regard to research into the decision-
making process within donor states, the identification of Mechanisms such as a 
long-term political commitment (Mechanism 4) would appear to have relevance.  
Once again, academics could use the perspective of an appropriate Mechanism 
to ask concrete questions with regard to a current or past military assistance 
project: Did the political leadership in the donor state consider this particular 
Mechanism in making important decisions at the onset of the initiative?  If not, 
was a failure to consider this Mechanism a contributing factor in the overall 
failure of the programme to achieve the desired Outcomes?   
 
To be clear on this point, the goal of this research was to make a contribution to 
the body of knowledge by identifying the elements that could be used for the 
generation of a model for effective military assistance initiatives.  Assessing 
each of these elements in isolation may not be sufficient to generate a model.  
However, the proposition is put forth that such assessments would make a 
contribution toward analyzing how the various elements in the model would 
work as a whole.  In short, such analysis is not sufficient, but it is necessary. 
 
Eighth, the proposed elements of a model could also make a contribution 
toward research into the political or economic impact of military assistance on 
the recipient states.  For example, consideration of development of new 
leadership (Mechanism 6) would appear to play an important role with regard to 
the political impact of assistance on the recipient states. Academics could 
review past initiatives with consideration of the suitable Mechanism to see 
whether such elements were not considered, were not addressed adequately, 
or were not considered in conjunction with other elements.  They could then ask 
questions such as:  Was there insufficient consideration of generating new 
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military leadership that would accept and abide by the political concept of 
civilian control of the military? 
 
Continuing with the eighth point, but turning to economic impacts, the 
Mechanism of a constant source of support (Mechanism 3) would have an 
impact on defence spending in recipient states and thereby affect the national 
budget and spending.  However, while the advantage for the recipient state of 
not having to utilize scarce resources on the defence budget is apparent, the 
disadvantage of being at the mercy of budget problems in the donor state, with 
a potentially sharp, unexpected cut-off of assistance funding, is equally clear.  
The elements generated by this research could assist academics in putting this 
issue of financial dependency in a larger context.  For example, the 
consideration of a long-term political commitment (Mechanism 4) in conjunction 
with Mechanism 3 could assist in reducing the potential economic impact.  Once 
again, such analysis would contribute to the arrangement of elements into an 
effective model,  
 
Ninth, with regard to the topic of the impact of military assistance on the 
behaviour of the recipient states, the Mechanisms of direction and control by 
donor states (Mechanism 7) as well as transfer of responsibility to recipient 
states (Mechanism 8) would appear to be relevant from a purely academic 
perspective.  Researchers could analyse past military assistance projects to 
assess whether the donor and recipient states had developed an optimal 
arrangement for the transfer of control and responsibility, and ask questions 
such as the following: Did the transfer of control of a programme have an 
impact on the development of recipient state behaviour?  If so, was that impact 
positive or negative? 
 
Tenth, the research findings made a contribution to the larger body of 
knowledge beyond military assistance.  The proposition is put forth that the 
Mechanisms of leadership from key individuals (Mechanism 12) as well as a 
strong lead nation (Mechanism 11) would be of relevance to leadership theory 
in general.  Moreover, as this is in connection with a military assistance 
initiative, this necessarily involves change in the recipient state.  This would 
indicate that some of the elements noted in this research would be relevant with 
regard to change management theory in general.   
 
Eleventh, while the point was made early in this thesis that the focus is not on 
project or programme management with regard to military assistance, it would 
appear that any number of Mechanisms would be relevant for academics 
working in that subject area.  Whether it is flexibility in planning (Mechanism 9) 
or good organizational structures (Mechanism 10), the findings from this 
research would appear to augment the body of knowledge for generic project 
and programme management. 
 
Twelfth, one of the other areas noted in Section 2.7.1 is the specific, narrow 
task of improving the provision of military assistance.  While the goal of this 
thesis was identification of the elements for a model for effective military 
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assistance programmes, and a focus on the specific Intervention of broad 
political decisions between donor and recipient states, the research addressed 
a number of concrete measures which could improve the provision of such aid.  
The research identified commentary with regard to improved training, better 
administrative processes, the need for accountability, and numerous other 
details on the conduct of military assistance.  All of these points are of 
relevance to academics and practitioners in the area in addressing the specific 
question of how better to address specific aspects of such initiatives.   
 
To summarize, the 12 Mechanisms and five clusters were in no way self-
apparent or obvious.  They were the result of a research effort which generated 
new data that are relevant and significant for both academics and practitioners 
working in the area of military assistance and contributed to the body of 
knowledge in this field as well as related academic areas.   
 
7.4  Recommendations for Future Research 
 
There are numerous recommendations for future research which are best 
addressed by moving from the specific to the general.  First, there was one 
specific item raised by six interviewees, which meant that it was not a 
Mechanism, and possible element for a model, but could well warrant additional 
research.  That involved the issue of recipient state readiness to challenge 
donor states.  Such an issue appeared to have relevance to the topic of broad 
political decisions between donor and recipient states and the efficacy of 
military assistance projects and is therefore a possible area for further study.    
 
Second, there were weaknesses in the research methods utilised which 
suggested the need for further research to correct these shortfalls.  The method 
used in this thesis judged all items that were raised to be the same, preventing 
an indication of the difference in impact which was placed by individuals on a 
particular item.  Future research should gauge the intensity of the responses of 
those providing data to judge the weight given to any particular issue and 
potential Mechanism.   
 
Third, this research did not seek to provide the relationship between the 
different Mechanisms or clusters, which would be important for future research 
into development of a model from the identified elements.  The first of such 
relationships which could be addressed is whether a chronological relationship 
may be present, raising the question of whether clusters or Mechanisms should 
be considered in a particular sequence.  Such research also would be of 
particular value to practitioners in the field, as it would provide more concrete 
guidelines with regard to how to address the numerous tasks which are 
involved.  Further on this point, it might be desirable to have individual 
Mechanisms within each cluster assessed with regard to possible sequencing.  
As an example, within the cluster of Steadfast Donor Support, it might be 
prudent to first address a constant source of support (Mechanism 3) before 
turning to other Mechanisms.   
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Fourth, a determination of the relative weight of each Mechanism or cluster and 
its impact on generating Outcomes would appear to be critical for the 
development of a model.  For example, the proposition can be put forth that the 
cluster of Steadfast Donor Support and the five Mechanisms contained within it 
are of greater significance than the cluster of Sufficient Flexibility and its three 
Mechanisms.  While the latter is still important, the case can be made that the 
former cluster is far more critical with regard to generating Outcomes.  Once 
again, such a determination would be of particular value to practitioners in the 
field, who will benefit from guidance on where best to focus their time and 
attention.   
 
Fifth, it would be beneficial to ascertain the extent to which decisions on specific 
Mechanisms will have an impact on other clusters or Mechanisms in a model.  
Academic research into such a relationship moves closer to the goal of taking 
disparate elements and generating a model for effective military assistance 
projects.  Practitioners in this area would benefit from having some type of 
framework for the manner in which the various elements interact, and the 
guiding principles which could enhance the prospects of achieving the desired 
Outcomes.   
 
Sixth, should the preceding steps be successfully undertaken, it would then be 
possible to consider whether a model could be generated which has predictive 
ability.  As noted in Section 3.5.9, there is no requirement that the model 
actually has to be predictive.  If a model can outline guiding principles for a 
complicated process or provide some order to the complexity of military 
assistance, that would be of utility for both academics and practitioners in the 
area.  However, should the research on the previous points generate good 
results, it would be worthwhile to see whether a model with predictive ability 
could be constructed.      
 
All of these points lead to the seventh and overarching recommendation that 
more research should be conducted on specific military assistance projects to 
see which were successful and the reasons for those Outcomes, and which 
were “failures” and what caused that result.  On that count, it was rewarding to 
have received a request from those familiar with this thesis to use the material 
to produce a chapter for a book.  The result was a chapter with the title “Baltic 
Military Cooperative Projects: a Record of Success” in a book published by the 
International Centre for Defence Studies in Estonia (Ito, 2013).  The abstract 
from that article is provided in Appendix F of the Appendices.  More such 
research and writing on specific initiatives would be of value to academics and 
practitioners working in the area to build the base of knowledge regarding the 
elements for success in military assistance programmes. 
 
7.5  Final Thoughts 
 
As the author conceded in Section 1.6, the reason for conducting this research 
arose from personal observation of the effort that went into BALTBAT and the 
other Baltic programmes, and a judgment that these initiatives were indeed 
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successful.  The complementary observation was that there has been far too 
little analysis of why some military assistance projects succeed and why so 
many fail, with the result that initiatives are not built on an expanding base of 
knowledge about what works or what constitutes a prerequisite for success.  
The hope was that this research could provide a contribution to that base of 
knowledge, that it has identified elements which can be used as the basis for 
development of a model for effective military assistance initiatives, and that it 
has been of value to academics and practitioners working in this complex and 
challenging area.     
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
BALTIC MILITARY COOPERATIVE PROJECTS: CASE STUDY ON 
EFFECTIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
(items which may be of particular interest are highlighted in bold) 
 
Privacy 
 
May I quote you? ____________ 
 
If so, what name and title would you wish me to use? 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Origin 
 
1.  It has been reported in the literature that Commander of the Estonian 
Defence Forces first raised the idea of a joint Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion at a 
meeting of Baltic military commanders in 1993.  It was also reported that this 
idea came up from the ranks.   
 
• 1a. Is that consistent with your recollection? 
 
• 1b. If so, was it received enthusiastically by the political leadership in the 
Baltic states? 
 
2.  The MOU on Cooperation on formation of BALTBAT was signed by the 
Baltic states, the Nordic states and the UK in June 1994.  The U.S., Germany, 
France and the Netherlands subsequently signed on as supporting states.   
 
• 2a. How was the BALTBAT concept first broached with the Nordic states 
and the UK? 
 
• 2b. Was there initial, strong enthusiasm among the Nordic states and UK 
for the project? 
 
• 2c. Which country (countries) voiced concerns? 
 
• 2d. Were they based on military, political, diplomatic or other concerns? 
 
• 2e. Was there a general recognition among the Nordic states and 
the UK that this was a long-term commitment to supporting the 
Baltic states? 
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• 2e. When was the decision taken to seek the support of the U.S., 
Germany, France and the Netherlands?  
 
• 2f. How much of the BALTBAT development programme and timeline 
already was clear in June 1994?   
 
• 2g. Was serious consideration ever given to providing traditional military 
assistance programs to the Baltic states for development of national 
defence capabilities? 
 
• 2h. How large a role did NATO membership play in the thinking of 
planners of BALTBAT and the other Baltic projects? 
 
3.   One of the overriding concerns during this period was the reaction from 
Russia to any project which could involve provision of military assistance to the 
Baltic states. 
 
• 3a. What was the level of concern regarding Russian reactions? 
 
• 3b. Was peacekeeping selected as the area of assistance on the 
assumption it would be more acceptable to Moscow? 
 
• 3c. Was the BALTBAT concept broached informally in any way with 
Russian authorities before the announcement of the project? 
 
• 3d. From your perspective, what were the key Russian reactions when 
BALTBAT was announced in 1994? 
 
• 3e. What were the key Russian reactions in subsequent years, as 
BALTBAT and the other Baltic programs developed? 
 
Developing National Defence 
 
4.  There has been considerable discussion since BALTBAT was announced on 
the contribution it would make toward development of Baltic national defence 
capabilities.  Some commentators have argued that BALTBAT was a "show 
piece" which diverted attention and resources from developing national defence. 
 
• 4a. How prominent a factor in 1994 was the consideration that 
BALTBAT would need to make a contribution to development of 
Baltic national defence capabilities? 
 
• 4b. How important was it for the Baltic states in particular at that time to 
have BALTBAT contribute to national capabilities? 
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• 4c. Ultimately, how extensive were the "spill-over" benefits from 
BALTBAT and the other Baltic cooperative projects to national defence 
forces? 
 
• 4d. In retrospect, should there have been more focus on the extent 
to which BALTBAT and the other projects contributed to 
development of individual national defence forces? 
 
Baltic State Participation 
 
5.  One of the key points emphasized in the MOU was that the Baltic states 
would assume responsibility for the project.  In 1997, it appeared there was an 
intensified effort to achieve "Baltification."  
 
• 5a. In retrospect, should the Baltic states have played a larger role 
from the onset of BALTBAT? 
 
• 5b. Did the role and input of the Baltic states increase as the BALTBAT 
project progressed? 
 
• 5c. Were there particular areas in which the Baltic states should have 
been pressed to assume a greater role?   
 
• 5d. Was there more intensified Baltic state participation from the onset of 
BALTRON, BALTNET and BALTDEFCOL? 
 
Coordination 
 
6.  The process for coordinating all aspects of BALTBAT has gotten high marks 
from commentators.  The Steering Group and the Military Working Group did a 
good job handling their specific areas of responsibility and coordinating their 
work.  The BALTBAT Training Teams seem to have been particularly valuable.  
With the addition of other Baltic programs, the initiation of the Baltic Security 
Assistance Group appears to have performed an important function. 
 
• 6a. How would you characterize the oversight provided by the Steering 
Group?   
 
• 6b. Were there policy disagreements within the Steering Group?  If so, 
on what issues? 
 
• 6c. How much latitude was left to the Military Working Group to set 
schedules and manage equipment delivery and training?  
 
• 6d. How would you characterize the coordination between the Steering 
Group and the Military Working Group? 
 
• 6e. How much latitude was left to the Training Teams?   
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• 6f. How would you describe the working relationship between the 
Training Teams and the Baltic military personnel?   
 
• 6g. In retrospect, would you have any recommended changes to the 
operations of the Training Teams?  
 
• 6h. How were decisions made on which offers of military equipment, 
training and other assistance would be accepted?  How were decisions 
made on what additional assistance to request?   
 
• 6i. In retrospect, should a mechanism like BALTSEA have been 
established with the initiation of BALTBAT? 
 
• 6j. Was there concern about whether the three Baltic companies were 
ready for their separate deployments for peacekeeping duties? 
 
• 6k. The literature indicates there was disagreement on the key 
question of whether BALTBAT, as a whole, was ready to be 
deployed.  What are your recollections of the nature of that 
discussion and the positions taken by the various participants? 
 
• 6l. Were there conscious efforts to find other areas in which Baltic 
military assistance cooperation could be established?  Did BALTRON, 
BALTNET and BALTDEFCOL arise to utilize opportunities?  Did they 
arise out of necessity?  
 
General Comments 
 
7.  The Southern African Development Community is looking to generate a 
multinational peacekeeping force.  The purpose of this study is to assess 
whether BALTBAT and the Baltic programs in general can provide a model 
which can be of use in providing effective military assistance programs, 
particularly multinational forces, and those particularly for peacekeeping 
missions.  The model would focus on essential political decisions which are 
crucial to establishing a successful program. 
 
• 7a. Do you believe that BALTBAT can serve to provide such a 
model? 
 
• 7b. What are your views on some of the factors noted below as 
possible components of that model? 
 
o Assessment and utilization of available opportunities. 
o Establishing mechanisms that can maximize political and 
military assistance. 
o Establishing clear political goals. 
o Obtaining a long-term commitment from supporting states. 
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o Establishing a solid programme framework. 
o Clarifying the linkage with other goals (such as development 
of national military forces). 
o Establishing the process by which recipient countries handle 
more responsibilities. 
 
• 7c. What additional factors would you recommend? 
 
• 7d. Do you have recommendations on how to handle development of this 
model differently? 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Interview With 
 
HANS HAEKKERUP 
Former Defence Minister of Denmark 
 
3 December 2008 
 
FINAL -- AS APPROVED BY HAEKKERUP ON 2 FEBRUARY 2009 
 
Haekkerup emphasized that the primary initial concern was to get Russian 
forces out of the Baltic states as quickly as possible.  Indeed, he pressed for 
efforts, which ultimately failed, for Denmark to address the cost involved with 
officers returning to Russia.  He candidly noted that the Baltic states had 
serious problems regarding their military forces.  Their professional soldiers 
were Soviet-trained and needed substantial re-training. 
 
On BALTBAT, Haekkerup said he made his initial pitch for the program to the 
other Nordic states, which were supportive.  He emphasized that Denmark had 
options and room to act which the U.S. or Germany simply did not have.  He 
stressed that peacekeeping was a good way to educate and train the Baltic 
forces, and was also less threatening to the Russians.  Moreover, it was an 
area which allowed the Baltic forces to "learn by doing."   
 
Administratively, the Working Group and the Military Steering Group framework 
worked well for BALTBAT, noted Haekkerup.  He stressed that it was critical to 
have a lead nation for such a challenging program, and Denmark was ready to 
assume that role.  He added that he did not like the idea of pairing Nordic and 
Baltic states, although Finnish support for Estonia in a number of areas was an 
example of the kind of practical pairing that was taking place.   
 
Haekkerup stressed that there was substantial Nordic solidarity on BALTBAT 
and strong support from the UK.  The program then gradually was expanded to 
include the Netherlands, Germany and the U.S.  He noted that there already 
had been extensive Nordic cooperation on efforts to bolster peacekeeping 
capabilities, as exemplified by the work on the Stand-by High Readiness 
Brigade (SHIRBRIG).  However, he noted the concern that was generated when 
he pushed to get the Baltic forces immediately involved in peacekeeping efforts 
in Croatia.  He recounted the "helicopter agreement" in which it was agreed that 
a Lithuanian platoon would be transported by Denmark to assist in Croatia, with 
Estonian and Latvia platoons subsequently participating.  Norway thought that 
this Danish initiative competed with BALTBAT, but Haekkerup convinced Oslo 
that it supplemented that effort.   
 
Danish-German-Polish cooperation, asserted Haekkerup, was also critical to 
the effort involving the Baltic states.  The Baltics were concerned about the 
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attention in this other area, but Haekkerup stressed to the Baltic states that the 
region "needed two wings in order to fly."   
 
There was no direct opposition from Moscow to BALTBAT from the outset, 
stressed Haekkerup, but everyone in the Nordic region was concerned about 
the Russian reaction.  Certainly the Baltic states were nervous.  Haekkerup 
commented that Russia later tried to dissuade and even split the Nordic states, 
particularly by trying to put Sweden in a position where they would not be 
comfortable supporting the NATO members, Denmark and Norway.  He noted 
that at a stage the Russian Defence Minister even refused to talk to him.     
 
Haekkerup plainly stated that Denmark had strongly pressed the case for 
supporting the Baltic states, adding that the record clearly showed that he had 
been particularly outspoken on their behalf.  He added that German Defence 
Minister Ruehe was also critical on pushing the German-Danish-Polish effort.  
Haekkerup also noted that he did not always get what he wanted in the internal 
deliberations of Danish policy.  For example, Haekkerup said he wanted the 
Baltics to work and be considered as three separate states.  However the 
Danish policy was to focus on the united group of "Baltic states." 
 
BALTBAT, continued Haekkerup, proved a good model to use in other areas of 
Baltic military cooperation: BALTRON, BALTNET and the BALTDEFCOL.  As 
for BALTSEA, he noted that it was not really needed early on in the process, but 
became useful as the Baltic programs evolved and grew.   
 
Haekkerup noted that he tried to get the Southern African Development 
Community to copy the BALTBAT model.  However the effort fell apart due to 
the war in the Congo and developments in Zimbabwe.  He also pushed to see if 
the Central Asian countries could also copy BALTBAT.  In short, emphasized 
Haekkerup, "BALTBAT is a good model."   
 
There was Nordic disagreement on the deployment of BALTBAT as a whole for 
peacekeeping operations.  Haekkerup said that he thought BALTBAT as a 
whole could deploy, but the others disagreed and felt BALTBAT was not ready.  
The result, commented Haekkerup, was simply to proceed with what was 
politically feasible with BALTBAT component companies from the three Baltic 
states separately participating in peacekeeping missions.   
 
With regard to the levels of enthusiasm of other Nordic states, Haekkerup noted 
that Norway was especially conservative on BALTBAT.  He added that while 
Sweden had pursued a policy of neutrality for 200 years, the Swedes certainly 
did "deliver the goods" with regard to Baltic assistance.  Haekkerup also noted 
that there were domestic political advantages to Denmark from Nordic 
assistance.  One Danish political party objected to military sales, so the label of 
a "Nordic package" made it easier to get Parliamentary approval for military 
assistance. 
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Returning to the issue of practical training, Haekkerup noted that training on old 
Danish material was good for the Baltic states.  More generally, the value of 
BALTBAT also came as a unit that could serve as an example for the Baltic 
military establishments.  The examples, practices and processes could filter 
down to other levels, especially as BALTBAT exercised with other Baltic units.   
 
As for BALTIFICATION, Haekkerup emphasized that the Baltic states were not 
ready to assume more responsibility for the projects at the onset.  He was 
surprised at how quickly the Baltic states developed their capabilities.  On the 
issue of BALTBAT decision-making, Denmark had the lead, but all the key 
decisions were made in common.  Similarly, on BALTRON, the Germans had 
the lead, but concurrence from the others was needed. 
 
Russia increasingly soured as the BALTBAT project proceeded, noted 
Haekkerup.  Moscow's criticism of NATO enlargement fed the criticism of 
BALTBAT.  The Nordic states increased their efforts to engage with Russia, 
even offering military cooperation, but the Russians declined.  Instead, Moscow 
tried increasingly to divide the Nordic states, but failed, which Haekkerup 
attributed to Nordic solidarity on military and non-military projects.   
 
All the Baltic programs, commented Haekkerup, were made to make the case 
that the Baltic states were ready for NATO membership.  The range of initiatives 
was key to helping the Baltic self-assurance and improving capabilities.   
 
Speaking candidly, Haekkerup noted that the Baltics could have ended up like 
the Balkans.  However, the Nordic states "took the Baltics by the hands and 
guided them."  Citing a particularly sensitive example, Haekkerup said the 
Nordic states took great pains to make the point to the Baltic states that they 
needed to handle the Russian minority populations with sensitivity.   
 
Haekkerup emphasized that there was no blue-print or policy for Denmark to 
follow in this critical period.  But, he stressed, that is how leaders have to 
respond when sailing in uncharged waters.  There was an opportunity that 
Haekkerup and Denmark seized.  The will to take that action was decisive.  And 
critically, added Haekkerup, the Nordic countries, in signing up to BALTBAT, 
understood that they were making a long-term commitment to provide support 
to the Baltic states in a crucial area. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Matrix of Mechanisms Noted by Interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mechanisms 
 
Mechanisms as listed in Section 5.2.1.  Mechanisms 5a on NATO membership 
and 5b on development of national defence capabilities have been combined as 
Mechanism 5. 
 
(1) - Assessment of Regional Security Concerns 
(2) - Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance 
(3) - A Constant Source of Support 
(4) - A Long-Term Political Commitment 
(5) - Connection to Larger Goals 
(6) - Development of New Leadership 
(7) - Direction and Control by Donor States 
(8) - Transfer of Responsibility to Recipient States 
(9) - Flexibility in Planning 
(10) - Good Organizational Structures 
(11) - A Strong Lead Nation 
(12) - Leadership From Key Individuals 
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Interviewees 
 
Interviewees are listed in the same order as in the Dramatis Personae on pages 
xiii and xiv. 
 
1. .Abols, Gunnar  
2.  Andrusyszyn, Walter  
3.  Brett, Julian  
4.  Carlsen, Per  
5.  Clemmesen, Michael  
6.  Donnelly, Chris   
7.  Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe   
8.  Fischer, Kristian   
9.  Godal, Bjorn Tove   
10.  Haekkerup, Hans  
11.  Hannibalsson, Jon Baldvin 
12.  Herd, Graham  
13.  Johnson, Garry  
14.  Kolga, Margus  
15.  Laneman, Alar  
16.  Lawrence, Anthony 
17.  Linkevicius, Linas 
18.  Mackenzie, Jeremy 
19.  Molis, Arunas 
20.  Saar, Valeri  
21.  Schvede, Igor 
22.  Sibul, Eric 
23.  Tori, Erkki 
24.  An Estonian official. 
25.  A Latvian official.  
26.  A US official. 
27.  A retired US military officer. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Coding Sample 
 
Mechanism 12 - Leadership From Key Individuals 
 
Clemmesen: Clemmesen began by noting his view that the most important 
factor for the success of the Western assistance to the Baltic states involved the 
personalities and commitment of key individuals.  Former Danish Foreign 
Minister Ellemann-Jensen was a driving force on Danish support for Baltic 
independence.  Former Danish Defence Minister Haekkerup and former Chief 
of Defence Lyng were instrumental in formulating Danish policy and generating 
action.  Clemmesen stated that Haekkerup was "emotionally attached" to 
Eastern Europe, and particularly to the Baltic states, due to his time as leader of 
the NATO Parliamentarians.  Lyng was strongly influenced by the fact that the 
Baltic states did not enjoy the liberation which Western Europe experienced in 
1945, and instead suffered under Russian domination in the USSR.  
Clemmesen commented that it was Lyng who actually began the effort to 
provide aid to the Baltic states, working with former Defence Minister Enggaard, 
Haekkerup's predecessor, and then with Haekkerup.  
 
However, stressed Clemmesen, UK policy towards the Baltic States reinforces 
the point of the importance of individuals in driving national policy.  Clemmesen 
said that UK Defence Attache in Riga John (Janis) Kazocins, the son of Latvian 
refugees, led the UK effort to be much more supportive of the Baltic states, a 
position he also pushed with other states.  Similarly, former US Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Ron Asmus pushed the development of US policy 
toward the Baltic states.  Asmus and a small, important group of officials at the 
Department of Defence who strongly supported the Baltic projects, made the 
difference in formulating US policy.   
 
Clemmesen stressed that Danish leadership was essential to turning the policy 
concept into a reality.  The key individual was Danish Under Secretary for 
Defence Per Carlsen.   
 
Clemmesen noted that Carlsen was the official who addressed practical 
concerns.  Subsequently, the later head of the Military Working Group, Colonel 
Jacobsen, was the individual who addressed details and made BALTBAT work. 
 
Donnelly:  Donnelly reiterated that the initial Western view was not a strong 
commitment to the Baltic states. That then changed due to the people who took 
charge and pushed hard to get Western aid to the Baltic states. 
 
Haekkerup:  Haekkerup emphasized that there was no blue-print or policy for 
Denmark to follow in this critical period. But, he stressed, that is how leaders 
have to respond when sailing in uncharged waters. There was an opportunity 
that Haekkerup and Denmark seized. The will to take that action was decisive. 
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Johnson:  Denmark was certainly the most active from the start, and Danish 
MOD Under Secretary Per Carlsen was the driving force. 
Laneman:  The selection of key personnel was very good. "People come first, 
not the papers." Capable leaders like Danish MOD Under Secretary Carlsen 
made the project work. The Danish head of the Working Group was tough, but 
drove the process. 
Linkeviciuis:  Danish Defence Minister Haekkerup's efforts were essential to 
success.  In 1994, continued Linkevicius, he and Haekkerup were flying to 
Vilnius in a helicopter when they discussed the prospects of sending a 
Lithuanian platoon to Croatia to serve under Danish military supervision.  
Agreement was reached, and upon landing, the two notified a very surprised 
Danish MOD Under Secretary Carlsen.  Linkevicius stated that at point there 
was no Lithuanian legal basis for the action and certainly no experience in 
handling such a military task.  As a result, the Lithuanians had to develop the 
legal basis, which included a major effort to get approval from the Lithuanian 
Parliament. 
Returning to personalities, Linkevicius re-emphasized that if Haekkerup had not 
been there, none of the Baltic assistance programmes would have worked.  
There were dangers involved in the key decisions.  The Lithuanian troops sent 
to the Balkans could have suffered casualties, and if that happened, that could 
have had a negative impact on all the Baltic regional activities. 
With regard to the key issues for success, Linkevicius emphasized that 
personalities were important in driving the Baltic initiatives forward.  It was 
strong leadership which kept things moving in the right direction and worked out 
solutions to problems. 
Saar:  Ultimately, noted Saar, an energetic Norwegian Brigadier General was 
designated the project leader for BALTNET, and he made things happen.  From 
the concept to the details, he drove the process and generated good 
coordination and results on BALTNET. 
Schvede: Schvede stressed that personalities were key in the BALTRN 
process. National positions depended on who represented a supporting state at 
a meeting. The UK and Norway were always solidly supportive. So on 
communications (Danish lead) and diving (Norwegian lead), results were 
achieved and the work progressed well. In the case of some countries, it 
depended on the representative. 
A Latvian official:  The Danes were very good at leading the project, and MOD 
Under Secretary Carlsen was particularly important in making BALTBAT work.  
The Steering Group, Working Group and Training Teams were good 
mechanisms to make BALTBAT a reality.  But they all depended on 
personalities, referring again to the importance of the role played by Carlsen.  A 
good Training Team commander was essential for good results and avoiding or 
resolving problems.
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
Cluster of Mechanisms 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Military Planning 
 Assessment of Regional Security Concerns 
 Focus on Optimal Areas of Military Assistance 
 Connection to Larger Goals 
Steadfast Donor Support 
 A Constant Source of 
Support 
 A Long-Term Political 
Commitment 
 Direction and Control 
by Donor States 
 A Strong Lead Nation 
 Leadership from Key 
Individuals 
Clear Structures and Lines 
of Authority 
 Good Organizational 
Structures 
 A Strong Lead Nation 
 Direction and Control 
by Donor States 
Establishing Permanent Strengths 
 Development of New 
Leadership 
 Transfer of Responsibility to 
Recipient States 
Sufficient Flexibility 
 Flexibility in Planning 
 Focus on Optimal 
Areas of Military 
Assistance 
 Transfer of 
Responsibility to 
Recipient States 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Abstract submitted for ‘Baltic Military Cooperative Projects: a Record of 
Success’ 
 
After regaining independence, the Baltic states undertook a number of 
cooperative regional military projects in the 1990s with the support of numerous 
Western countries.  In particular, the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) 
was a good example of a capable multinational military unit, as well as a basis 
for efficient Western support for the Baltic states to modernize their military 
forces.  BALTBAT became the model for other Baltic programs: the Baltic Naval 
Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the 
Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL).     
 
This chapter analyses the Baltic projects, particularly BALTBAT, and makes the 
case that they serve as a good model for effective military assistance programs, 
especially in the areas of multinational forces and development of 
peacekeeping capabilities.  While there is attention to the specific military steps 
taken to develop these projects, the focus is on critical political decisions, such 
as the selection of a focus on peacekeeping, the assumption of responsibilities 
by the Baltic states at the appropriate time, and the significance of the long-term 
political commitment of the Western supporting states to the Baltic states.   
 
 
 
